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As wireless devices are more widely used, it is clear that security and energy consumption are major
concerns. From a energy perspective, it is increasingly evident that marginal gains in battery energy density
necessitate energy efficient protocols. In the security realm, growth in the value and amount of information
being transmitted over wireless channels demands confidentiality and integrity.
In the energy efficiency domain, this dissertation focuses on the wireless interface since this has been
identified as a major source of energy consumption on devices such as sensors. Within this domain, many
previous approaches propose using fixed listening and sleeping intervals regardless of the network conditions.
We propose adaptive listening and sleeping techniques where these intervals are adjusted based on obser-
vations of traffic patterns and channel state. Another shortcoming of many power save protocols is that
they wastefully listen for entire packets as a wake-up signal. In this dissertation, we propose carrier sensing
techniques that reduce the cost of checking for such signals.
In the security domain, this dissertation looks at key distribution in wireless sensor networks. Because
such devices may face severe resource constraints, symmetric keys are used since public-key cryptography may
be infeasible. Previous approaches to this problem include key predistribution, and broadcasting plaintext
keys, under the assumption that few eavesdroppers are present during key discovery. However, drawbacks
to these approaches include poor secure connectivity or degraded security when several eavesdroppers are in
the network. Our work exploits the underlying wireless channel diversity to address the problem. In doing
so, our key distribution protocol effectively addresses the drawbacks of previous techniques.
The major contributions of this dissertation are: (1) leveraging multiple channels to improve the con-
nectivity and security of key distribution, (2) proposing adaptive power save mechanisms to reduce energy
consumption, and (3) improving power save protocols by using carrier sensing to enhance their energy effi-
ciency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The use of wireless networks in our society is increasing at a rapid pace. The number of 802.11 [7] hotspots
is expected to have a 31.5% compound annual growth rate during a four year period [8]. RFID production
is projected to increase by a factor of 25 in the next four years [9]. During a five year period, the number
of Bluetooth devices expects a 60% compound annual growth rate [10]. TinyOS [11], a popular open-source
sensor operating system, typically has between 50 and 200 downloads per day [12].
Most existing wireless networks are single hop which means that devices communicating wirelessly are
within range of each other. By contrast, multihop wireless networks may transmit packets over multiple
wireless hops before reaching their final destination. While single-hop wireless networks are widespread,
multihop networking offers several additional advantages:
• Cost of Deployment: Installing network wiring can be expensive. Their is a labor cost that often
includes burying or running wires through walls, floors, or the ground. In addition, there may be
costs associated with considerations such as ownership of the property across which the wires need
laid, preservation of historical structures, and conservation of environmentally protected areas. By
contrast, wireless infrastructure can be cheaper and less invasive to deploy. Off-the-shelf wireless
routers can be used to extend the infrastructure hundreds of meters. Mesh networking [13] is an area
of research that aims to do just that.
• Rapid Deployment: When the wire infrastructure is destroyed or unavailable, wireless networks can be
used to quickly extend the reach of the wired infrastructure to areas of need. An example is military
applications where a temporary network must be set up quickly. Another illustration is improving
network coverage in a disaster area. This was attempted by some wireless enthusiasts in the wake of
hurricane Katrina [14]. Vehicular [15,16] and underwater networks [17] are two more applications where
wired communication may be impossible and, hence, are conducive to multihop wireless networking.
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Sensors [18] are another example that may benefit from quickly deployed networks that can monitor
the environment and/or detect events.
• Capacity Improvement: In a single-hop network, the capacity available to each node will decrease
linearly with the size of the network. That is, given a channel bitrate ofW and N nodes in the network,
the maximum available capacity per node will be W
N
. In a seminal work on multihop wireless networks,
Gupta and Kumar [19] showed that the per node capacity in a multihop environment decreases with
the square root of the number of nodes (i.e., O
(
W√
N
)
). Thus, we can observe a O(
√
N) improvement
in the available capacity per node by using multihop wireless networks (as compared with single hop
networks). Intuitively, this occurs because multiple communications can occur simultaneously among
non-interfering pairs of nodes.
However, despite their promise, there remain research challenges associated with multihop wireless net-
works. Some issues include improving reliability, increasing throughput, and providing incentives to efficiently
share resources. In this dissertation we focus on two areas of importance: energy efficiency and security.
As wireless devices are more widely used, clearly security and energy consumption are major concerns.
From an energy perspective, it is increasingly evident that marginal gains in battery energy density necessi-
tate energy efficient protocols. In the security realm, growth in the value and amount of information being
transmitted over wireless channels demands confidentiality and integrity. Both are problems that need to be
addressed if ubiquitous wireless networks are to become a reality.
Energy Efficiency: The necessity of energy efficient protocols for wireless devices is motivated by the fact
that battery capacity has improved at a much smaller rate than that of other wireless device components.
This trend is quantified in Table 1.1, that shows the relative improvement over a decade of various laptop
components. While all of the other major components of the laptop showed one to three orders of magnitude
improvement, the battery energy density increased by only a disappointing factor of less than three. The
problem of available energy is further exacerbated by trends toward smaller devices (e.g., cell phones, sensors,
lightweight laptops) which will have less available physical space for batteries. Thus, it is safe to assume
that energy-constrained devices are a reality for the foreseeable future and that wireless protocol designers
must cope with this rather than hoping for Moore’s Law improvements in available energy.
In this work, we aim to reduce the energy consumption of the wireless networking interface by modifying
network protocols. Table 1.2 shows an experimental energy breakdown, by component, for data traffic on
a laptop and voice traffic on a cell phone. From this, we see that reducing the wireless interface energy
consumption is only one aspect of a comprehensive solution towards energy efficient wireless devices that
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Table 1.1: Improvement of various laptop components between 1990 and 2001 [20–22].
Laptop Component Relative Improvement from 1990 to 2001
Disk Capacity 1200×
CPU Speed 393×
Available RAM 128×
Wireless Transfer Speed 18×
Battery Energy Density (J/kg) 2.7×
also requires research in the areas of architecture, operating systems, and application design [23]. Though
our design techniques are applicable to multihop wireless networks in general, we note that our work is
particularly beneficial for devices with no display (e.g., sensors) or small displays (e.g., cell phones, iPods,
PDAs). Table 1.2 shows that the wireless interface energy consumption of such devices can account for over
60% of the device’s overall energy usage.
Table 1.2: Fraction of energy used by device components for different hardware and traffic [24].
Data Traffic on a Laptop Voice Traffic on a Cell Phone
Display 45% 2%
Transmit 5% 24%
Receive/Idle 10% 37%
CPU 40% 37%
Wireless interfaces often have four power levels corresponding to the following states: transmitting,
receiving, listening, and sleeping. Typically, the power required to listen is about the same as the power
to receive. The power to transmit is generally slightly higher than the receive/listen power. However, the
sleep power is usually one to four orders of magnitude less than the receive/listen power. For Mica2 Mote
sensors [25], these power levels are shown in Table 1.3. Thus, to save energy, the interface should sleep as
much as possible when it is not engaged in communication.
Table 1.3: Characteristics of a Mica2 Mote radio [25].
Radio State Power Consumption (mW)
Transmit 81
Receive/Idle 30
Sleep 0.003
Motivated by the large reduction in energy consumption that is possible from entering the sleep state,
we focus on power save protocols. Our work looks at three techniques to improve energy efficiency in power
save protocols:
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• Carrier Sensing for Energy-Efficient Signaling: Many power save protocols wastefully check for wake-
up signals by listening to the channel on the order of the time it takes to receive a packet. In Chapter 3,
we explore the use of carrier sensing to reduce the energy consumption of such protocols.
• Adaptive Energy-Saving Protocols: A common design used in both 802.11 [7] and sensor protocols [3,26]
is to use fixed listening and sleeping intervals regardless of the network environment. Building on our
previous work [27–29], in Chapter 4 we propose methods to dynamically adjust these intervals in
response to indicators such as the sending rate and desired latency.
• Energy-Efficient Broadcast Dissemination: Prior to our work, doing a broadcast flood in a power save
network gave a designer only two choices: a low-latency, high-energy flood or a high-latency, low-energy
flood. We provide a framework to allow more fine-grained control where the broadcast latency can be
lowered to a desirable level without immediately resorting to the highest energy state. Thus, devices
can save more energy while still providing an acceptable latency for a broadcast dissemination.
Security: Multihop wireless networks give rise to a new set of security and privacy issues. The most
obvious difference is the ease with which the channel can be eavesdropped. With wired networks, it takes
significantly more skill to find and access a network cable, splice it, and interpret its signals. With wireless
networks, even so-called “script kiddies” with little hacking expertise can download programs to tap the
wireless channel and view packets [30, 31].
This real-world implications of this problem were greatly exacerbated when a fundamental flaw was
discovered in 802.11’s security protocol, WEP, by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir [32] that allows the network
key to be discovered by sniffing encrypted packets. A popular implementation of this attack, AirSnort [33],
requires about 5-10 million packets to be overheard to crack the key, but other tools, such as aircrack [34] use
statistical methods to significantly reduce this number to the order of hundreds of thousands of packets on
average. Additionally, these tools can use packet injection techniques to actively force a vulnerable network
to generate more packets for collection. Even with the WPA protocol that replaces WEP, many users remain
vulnerable to standard dictionary-based password attacks that circumvent encryption.
A second issue with multihop wireless networks is that devices may be pushed farther away from a
trusted infrastructure. Thus, protocols must allow nodes to establish security among neighbors and multihop
endpoints without having a direct connection to a trusted entity.
Finally, the resource constraints of many devices may require new techniques to provide security and
privacy. On wired networks, public-key cryptography has been extremely effective in creating a secure
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system of communication. However, the hardware used for sensors may have the resources to do only
symmetric key operations which are orders of magnitude more efficient.
Our work looks at the problem of key distribution in the context of wireless sensor networks where
devices are resource-constrained, can do only symmetric key cryptography, and cannot communicate with
a trusted source after deployment. Shared keys are fundamental in providing confidentiality and integrity
of data packets in such systems. In Chapter 6, we propose leveraging the channel diversity available in
wireless networks for key distribution. Our work exploits the underlying wireless channel diversity to address
the problem. In doing so, our key distribution protocol effectively addresses drawbacks in connectivity and
attacker resilience of previous techniques. Additionally, we look at using path diversity to further improve
security.
1.1 Main Contributions
The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• We propose carrier sensing techniques to improve the energy efficiency of power save protocols and
demonstrate its use with both in-band and out-of-band protocols (these terms will be defined in Chap-
ter 2).
• We propose adaptive sleeping and listening for in-band protocols to reduce energy consumption. This
compliments our earlier work of adaptive sleeping for out-of-band protocols [27–29].
• We propose a probabilistic approach for broadcast dissemination that allows a tradeoff in energy, la-
tency, and reliability. This gives users fine-grained control of these metrics to reduce energy consump-
tion while maintaining a desired latency and reliability. We implemented our protocol in TinyOS [11]
to demonstrate its effectiveness on sensor hardware.
• We propose using the underlying channel diversity to improve security in resource-constrained networks.
We design a protocol for symmetric key distribution that improves connectivity and resilience to
adversaries when compared with previous work.
1.2 Dissertation Outline
In Chapter 2, we review past work related to our dissertation. In Section 2.1, we discuss power save
protocols and describe in-band, and out-of-band protocols. In Section 2.2, we give an overview of protocols
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for the efficient propagation of broadcasts. Section 2.3 reviews work in symmetric key distribution for sensor
networks.
In Chapter 3, we propose carrier sensing techniques to improve energy efficiency. In particular, we observe
that the energy nodes spend listening to detect a signal to wake up can be significantly reduced by using the
carrier sensing capabilities. We demonstrate how this technique can be used to augment both synchronous
and out-of-band protocols.
Chapter 4 explores methods of adaptive energy saving. By dynamically adjusting listening and sleeping
intervals, we reduce the energy consumption of in-band protocols (our previous work addressed adaptive
techniques for out-of-band protocols [27–29]). We look at both link layer and network layer protocols.
In Chapter 5, we quantify the effects on energy-saving on the latency and reliability of applications which
propagate information via multihop broadcast. We develop a simple, lightweight protocol that can augment
existing power save protocols to achieve a desired tradeoff among energy, latency, and reliability. This allows
broadcast propagation to be energy efficient while still achieving a desired latency and reliability. We also
describe our implementation of the protocol in TinyOS [11].
In Chapter 6, we develop a protocol for symmetric key distribution to address security in multihop
wireless networks. Our approach leverages the underlying channel diversity to create pairwise symmetric
keys that, with high probability, are known to only the two communicating nodes. Our results demonstrate
that the protocol performs well in connectivity and resilience to adversary devices.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and offers some directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss related work for power save and key distribution in multihop wireless networks.
In Section 2.1, we give an overview of the power save problem and define in-band and out-of-band protocols
in Section 2.1.1. In Section 2.1.2 and Section 2.1.3, we focus on related work for our carrier sensing and
adaptive energy saving techniques, respectively. Section 2.2 reviews previous work in efficient broadcast
propagation. We discuss key distribution in sensor networks in Section 2.3.
2.1 Power Save Protocols
The fundamental question power save protocols seek to answer is: When should a radio switch to sleep mode
and for how long? In Section 2.1.1, we broadly categorize protocols as either in-band or out-of-band. In-band
protocols do all wake-up signaling on the data channel. By contrast, out-of-band protocols use a separate,
orthogonal channel to do the wake-up signaling.
We note that the focus of this dissertation is on power save protocols to reduce idle listening energy.
A vast area of research exists in energy efficient wireless transmission (e.g., power control, physical layer
encoding) that is independent from our work. We do not discuss these techniques in this work, but refer
interested readers to [35–38] and references therein for discussion of these techniques.
2.1.1 Taxonomy
In-Band Protocols: These protocols use one channel for both wake-up signaling and data communica-
tions. The most obvious advantage to this approach is that devices only need one half-duplex channel, which
is available on any wireless device. A disadvantage is that the signaling overhead may now interfere with data
communication. Protocols in this class can be sub-categorized as synchronous or asynchronous as described
below.
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• Synchronous Protocols: Nodes schedule a time in the future to wake up. The scheduled time can be
absolute (e.g., using synchronized clocks to wake up at certain epochs) or relative to some event (e.g.,
a node wakes up T seconds after the last packet reception). One example [7] is IEEE 802.11’s Power
Save Mode (PSM) where all nodes wake up and remain on for a fixed time at the start of each beacon
interval. Another example [27–29] is two communicating nodes that wake up T seconds after the last
packet reception and T is adjusted dynamically based on traffic patterns.
Protocols that require global synchronization need some external synchronization mechanism. If
available and operating in the proper environment (e.g., outdoors), GPS could be used for this pur-
pose. For a survey of other synchronization protocols, see [39]. Recent synchronization protocols for
sensors [40] demonstrate precision on the order of a microsecond. For the purposes of our work, we
assume that some such external mechanism is available.
• Asynchronous Protocols: Nodes wake up independently according to their own schedule and try to
discover other nodes that are also awake. When the wake-ups of two nodes overlap, they can com-
municate. For example [41,42], nodes may choose deterministic schedules to guarantee overlap within
a bounded latency. Another example [43, 44] is nodes that wake up non-deterministically such that
overlap is within a bounded time with high probability.
Generally, these techniques are orthogonal. For example, a node could use an asynchronous protocol
to discover neighbors and, after discovery, use a synchronous protocol to schedule subsequent wake-ups.
Similarly, an out-of-band protocol (described later in this section) could be used to wake up a neighbor to
send the first data packet and synchronous wake-ups could be scheduled for later packets (see [27–29] for an
example of this combination of techniques).
We begin by describing 802.11 PSM [7]. Most of our work on in-band protocols focuses on improving
the 802.11 PSM design. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, it has the most complete specification of
any open standard power save protocol. Second, almost any protocol that schedules a wake-up time when
a node and all of its neighbors will be awake bears a strong resemblance to 802.11 PSM’s design. As an
example, S-MAC [45], a synchronous wake-up protocol for sensors, basically uses the same design as 802.11
PSM with minor differences. So, the 802.11 PSM design is versatile and is the basis for many synchronous
protocols.
In 802.11 PSM [7], nodes are assumed to be synchronized and awake at the beginning of each beacon
interval. After waking up, each node stays on for a period of time called the Ad hoc Traffic Indication
Message (ATIM) window. During the ATIM window, since all nodes are guaranteed to be listening, packets
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that have been queued since the previous beacon interval are advertised. These advertisements take the
form of ATIM packets. More formally, when a node has a packet to advertise, it sends an ATIM packet
to the intended receiver during the ATIM window (following IEEE 802.11’s CSMA/CA rules). In response
to receiving an ATIM packet, the destination will respond with an ATIM-ACK packet (unless the ATIM
specified a broadcast or multicast destination address). When this ATIM handshake has occurred, both
nodes will remain on after the ATIM window and try to send their advertised data packets before the next
beacon interval (subject to CSMA/CA rules). If a node remains on after the ATIM window, it must keep
its radio on until the next beacon interval [7]. If a node does not send or receive an ATIM, it will enter
sleep mode at the end of the ATIM window until the next beacon interval. This process is illustrated in
Figure 2.1. The dotted arrows indicate events that cause other events to occur. Node A sends a data packet
to B, while C, not receiving any ATIM packets, returns to sleep for the rest of the beacon interval.
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Figure 2.1: IEEE 802.11 IBSS power save mode [7].
S-MAC [45] is similar to 802.11 PSM, but with some modifications specifically for sensor networks. It
reduces energy consumption at the expense of fairness and latency. S-MAC uses a simple scheduling scheme
to allow neighbors to sleep for long periods and synchronize wake-ups. A group of nodes synchronize by one
node broadcasting a duration of time it will be awake. After this period, the node will sleep for the same
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amount of time. Each node will follow this sleep/awake schedule also and broadcast it to their neighbors. If
a node receives two different schedules, it will remain awake according to both schedules. In S-MAC, nodes
enter sleep mode when a neighbor is transmitting and fragment long packets to avoid costly retransmissions.
After each fragment, an ACK is sent by the receiver so that nodes waking up in its vicinity will sense the
transmission.
TRAMA [46] uses TDMA to schedule queued packets. The TDMA scheduling is done based on an
election algorithm within a node’s two-hop neighborhood to ensure that every node has a slot to transmit
data to its receiver while avoiding collisions. Also, when a node does not have anything to send in its assigned
slot, other transmitters may use the slot.
Other protocols use TDMA to schedule “flows” of data packets [47, 48] where periodic flows try to find
slots to transmit data at regular intervals without interfering with existing flows. Thus, in these protocols, the
wake-up procedure requires the sender/receiver pair to wake up during a slot when they will have exclusive
access to the medium. In both [47] and [48], non-interfering slots are discovered listening to the beginning
of a slot for transmissions. If no transmission is detected within a specified time, a node can claim the slot
for its flow. Then, in subsequent cycles, the node can always transmit a packet in that slot without other
nodes interfering.
In the asynchronous protocol presented in [42], nodes choose their awake times such that they are guar-
anteed to overlap with each neighbor’s awake time within a bounded time period. In [42], three protocols
are proposed that allow neighbors to advertise to each other by guaranteeing some overlap in their awake
windows. The first protocol calls for nodes to be awake for at least half of each beacon interval and alternate
their advertisement windows at the beginning and end of intervals. This guarantees overlap but requires
significant energy consumption. The second approach requires the nodes to stay awake for a long active
interval only once every T beacon intervals. During the other T − 1 intervals, the node will wake up for
only the duration of an advertisement window. The final approach is quorum-based. In this approach, each
node picks 2n − 1 out of n2 intervals (where n is a specified value) in such a way that at least two chosen
intervals are guaranteed to overlap with a neighbor’s. Each chosen interval, the node will stay awake for the
entire interval. During the other intervals, the node will stay awake for only an advertisement window. The
authors note that broadcast is still difficult in such a scheme. Also, these methods require all nodes to have
the same advertisement window and beacon interval lengths.
In [41], a deterministic protocol for neighbor discovery is presented. Sleep schedules are chosen such that
every pair of neighbors is guaranteed to overlap for at least one slot. Thus, if a node is awake X out of Y
slots, energy consumption is reduced and all neighbors can contact each other within Y slots to synchronize
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their communication.
In [44], a non-deterministic approach is used for neighbor discovery. Nodes wake up probabilistically
in each slot and can communicate only with other nodes that are also on in that slot. Thus, this is a
nondeterministic protocol where a node is awake for randomly chosen X time slots out of Y (where X ≪ Y ).
Each node enters a listen or transmit mode with a specified probability such that, with high probability,
neighbors will discover each other over some time interval.
The protocol in [43] is based on continuum percolation theory. Packets are broadcast throughout a
network of nodes following independent sleep schedules. A packet sender broadcasts a packet until most of
its neighbors are likely to have received the packet with high probability.
Out-of-Band Protocols: In this domain, a node’s data radio sleeps until an out-of-band channel alerts it
to wake up. An example [49,50] is a low-power radio idly listening on a separate, wake-up channel. Another
example [2, 3] is a wake-up radio that periodically idly listens to the channel. In both examples, when a
wake-up signal is detected, the data radio turns on. The out-of-band channel is non-interfering with respect
to the data channel. The disadvantage of this approach is the hardware complexity and potentially increased
bandwidth usage. However, the advantage is that no coordination is required to avoid interfering with data
packets and that the wake-up radio may be designed to use less power than the data radio.
Examples of out-of-band protocols include PicoRadio [49,51–53] which uses a low-power hardware device
to serve as a wake-up channel with a low idle listening cost. A MAC protocol has been designed that allows
nodes to wake up a neighbor when data needs to be sent. When a node wishes to send data, it encodes the
neighbor’s receiving channel in a beacon on the wake-up channel. The nodes then communicate over the
high powered data channel of the receiver. This design uses a CDMA scheme that requires each neighbor
within a 2-hop range to be assigned a unique channel and discover and maintain the channel IDs for each
1-hop neighbor, which is difficult in a distributed setting. Also, the channel ID is encoded in the wake-up
signal, which increases the hardware complexity. Table 2.1 shows the target specifications for the PicoRadio
hardware.1
Similar to PicoRadio, in [54] as well, a hardware design for a wake-up radio is presented. A wake-up
channel is also used in [50]. Here, a low-power radio is integrated with a PDA. The protocol is implemented
from off-the-shelf hardware. The devices register their presence with a server via a proxy. When another
node wishes to communicate, the proxy will send a short wake-up packet over the low power, low bit rate
1These values were obtained in an email correspondence with Brian Otis, while he was at the University of California–
Berkeley.
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Table 2.1: Target specifications for PicoRadio hardware.
Wakeup Radio Data Radio
Transmit Power (µW) 1000 1000
Receive/Idle (µW) 50 1000
Sleep (µW) — 0
Bitrate ∼ 100 bps 50 kbps
Range (m) 10 10
Transition Energy, sleep→idle — 1µs × 1mW
Transition Energy, idle→sleep — 1µs × 0mW
channel. This will cause the high powered radio to turn on so that data communication can begin. However,
this protocol is designed for systems with centralized access points or proxies.
In [55], paging interfaces are used so a base station can wake up certain nodes when it has data to send.
Here a base station uses RFID tags to wake up devices that could be in any one of L sleep states. Each
sleep state uses less power in steady state, but requires more delay and power when transitioning to the fully
awake state. A device will remain in a power save state at least long enough to get a positive energy gain
before transitioning to the next lower power state. The base station tracks this cycle for each device and
when it has data to send, it waits as long as possible before waking the device and transmitting subject to
QoS requirements. When the base station wishes to wake a device up, it pages all devices in that current
sleep state. The non-target devices in the paged sleep state will then start the sleep cycle again once they
determine that the data is not for them. This allows the size of the paging message to be on the order of
the number of sleep states instead of the number of nodes.
Another work [56] uses out-of-band channels to pipeline wake-ups. This allows a node receiving a data
packet to start waking up the next node on the path using the out-of-band channel. Thus, the data reception
and wake-up process occur in parallel.
STEM and STEM-BT [2, 3] are also out-of-band wake-up protocols. In Chapter 3, we propose carrier
sense techniques can be applied to these protocol. Thus, we defer a detailed description of these protocols
to Section 3.2.1.
The PAMAS protocol [57] adapts basic mechanisms of IEEE 802.11 [7] to a two-radio architecture.
PAMAS allows a node to sleep to avoid overhearing a packet intended for a different destination or to avoid
interfering with another node’s reception by transmitting. The control channel is used to exchange RTS/CTS
packets, emit busy tones to eliminate interference, and probe ongoing communications for their duration.
Whenever a node awakes and detects another transmission, it can probe the control channel to determine
how much longer this transmission will continue. Unlike our work, it ignores the idle listening problem.
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2.1.2 Carrier Sense Techniques
The idea of preamble sampling has been used with B-MAC [26]. The basic idea of preamble sampling is that
the packet preamble is long enough to be detected by all nodes that are periodically sampling the channel
in between sleep periods (i.e., the preamble must be slightly longer than the sleep time between sampling
periods). When sleeping nodes sample the channel and detect the preamble, they remain on to receive the
entire packet.
WiseMAC [58] improves on B-MAC by having nodes store the next sampling time of a node with which
it is sending packets. Thus, after accounting for the maximum clock drift since the last packet was sent,
a node can usually transmit a much shorter preamble than is required by B-MAC and, therefore, greatly
improves energy consumption. While preamble sampling is similar to one of our proposed carrier sensing
techniques in Section 3.1, some key differences are discussed in Section 3.1.2.
2.1.3 Adaptive Energy-Saving Techniques
Most adaptive protocols try to adjust sleeping and/or listening intervals based on traffic in the network.
Another class of adaptive power save protocols adjust in response to the topology. We primarily focus on
the traffic-based approaches because they relate closely our work. However, at the end of this subsection,
we mention the topology-based research.
In Table 2.2, we give classify our previous work [27–29] in relation to our work in this dissertation.
In [27–29], we used synchronous wake-ups to adaptively sleep in an out-of-band protocol. Nodes engaged
in communication schedule times in the future to wake up based on past traffic patterns. In our proto-
cols [27–29], nodes dynamically adapt to changing traffic rates try to minimize energy consumption for their
communication. The adaptive listening techniques from Section 4.1 could be applied to our previous work
as well.
Table 2.2: Classification of our work.
Adaptive Listening Adaptive Sleeping
In-Band Section 4.1 Section 4.2
Out-of-Band Techniques from Section 4.1 applicable Our previous work [27–29]
In [59], it is shown that the static ATIM window of 802.11 PSM does not work well for all traffic loads.
Intuitively, higher traffic loads need larger ATIM windows. This observation motivates our adaptive design
in Section 4.1 that dynamically adjusts the ATIM window.
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Other works have also proposed dynamic ATIM window adjustment. DPSM [60] is designed for single-
hop networks (i.e., WLANs) and uses indications such as the listening time at the end of the ATIM, the
number of packets pending for a node, and the number of packets that could not be advertised in the previous
beacon interval. Unlike our work, this protocol adjusts the current ATIM window based on traffic in past
beacon intervals. By contrast, our protocol adjusts the current ATIM window based on the traffic in the
current beacon interval. IPSM [61] is similar to our work in that the ATIM window ends when the channel
is idle for a specified amount of time. However, IPSM works in only single-hop networks since it relies on a
node and all its neighbors having a consistent view of channel activity. Unlike DPSM and IPSM, all of our
protocols are designed for multihop networks.
In TIPS [62], the ATIM window is divided into two slots. If a beacon packet is received during the first
slot, it indicates that nodes should stay on to receive ATIMs later in the ATIM window. If the first beacon
packet is not received until the second slot, then the node can return to sleep since no more advertisements
will follow. In our work, carrier sensing is used as an indication that nodes should remain on longer. The
time it takes to carrier sense is usually much shorter than the time it takes to access the channel and send
an entire packet. Additionally, TIPS uses only static ATIM window sizes whereas our techniques allows
dynamic adjustment of the window.
T-MAC [63] extends S-MAC by adjusting the length of time sensors are awake between sleep intervals
based on communication of nearby neighbors. Thus, less energy is wasted due to idle listening when traffic is
light. In the T-MAC work, the authors refer to the early sleeping problem that occurs when a node returns
to sleep when one of its neighbors has data to send to it but is deferring to another sender. Essentially,
this early sleeping problem is the main problem that we address in Section 4.1. The two techniques that
T-MAC proposes to address the problem are not applicable to advertisement windows. One reason is that
T-MAC is designed for relatively large data packets and relies on short RTS and CTS control packets to
address the early sleeping problem. By contrast, since the ATIM and ATIM-ACK packets exchanged in the
advertisement window are about the same size as RTS and CTS packets, it would be a significant increase
in overhead to precede the ATIM/ATIM-ACK handshake with RTS and CTS packets. Also, T-MAC results
in an increase in energy consumption to improve throughput. In our work, we prefer reducing energy
consumption over increasing throughput. Our work addresses the early sleeping problem without inducing
any extra control overhead (since the ATIM/ATIM-ACK packets are already small) and is designed to reduce
energy consumption, not improve throughput.
In [64, 65], modifications are made to S-MAC to reduce the multihop delay of packet forwarding. Also
in [64], a global scheduling algorithm is developed for S-MAC to converge to one sleep schedule in the
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network. The carrier sensing techniques in Section 3.1 could be used to complement the S-MAC protocols.
In [66], a protocol is proposed that works with on-demand routing and uses 802.11’s PSM when a node
is not engaged in sending, receiving, or forwarding data. When a node is communicating, soft-timers are
used to transition the node to an idle listening mode that reduces latency and preserves throughput better
than using only 802.11’s power save. However, the timers do not adjust to the traffic rate, so if traffic is not
frequent enough to refresh the timers, the benefits of the protocol are lost. Nodes must promiscuously listen
to the packets of neighbors to determine if they are disconnected or in power save mode. In this sense, the
protocol does a coarse-grained form of adaptive sleeping based on whether a node is forwarding traffic. Our
approach in Section 4.2 takes a much more fine-grained adaptive sleeping approach based on the desired
latency of an application. TITAN [67] extends the work from [66]. In TITAN, route requests are delayed by
sleeping nodes to allow the route discovery procedure to favor nodes that are already in the idle listening
state. This helps reduce the overall energy consumption in the network.
LISP [68] is an extension to 802.11 PSM where nodes try to predictively remain on after the ATIM
window to forward multihop traffic at a lower latency. When a node is scheduled to sleep at the end of
an ATIM window, it may remain on based on correlations between overheard ATIM-ACKs and previous
ATIM/ATIM-ACK handshakes. Our adaptive sleeping technique, on the other hand, attempts to achieve a
latency bound while still conserving as much energy as possible.
In [69], ESSAT is designed to handle Constant BitRate (CBR) traffic in sensor networks. In particular,
ESSAT predictively wakes up downstream neighbors based on past reception times for CBR flows. The wake
up times are adjusted when phase shifts occur in the flow due to packet loss and contention. Our protocols
are designed for traffic that is not necessarily CBR.
Topology Adaptive Protocols: Another common strategy is for nodes to remain awake based on their
local topology and/or traffic [70, 71]. Work in this area investigates how a subset of the nodes in a system
can enter a low power state without significantly degrading the performance achievable if all nodes were to
remain in high power mode.
The AFECA algorithm [72] allows nodes to sleep based on the size of their neighborhood. If node density
is large, then more nodes can sleep without greatly increasing the latency of data flows. GAF [71] assumes
the nodes have some location information and form virtual grids. The size of the grids is chosen such that
the nodes in two adjacent grids are equivalent with respect to forwarding packets. Then, within each grid,
a discovery protocol tries to ensure that most of the time one node remains active while the rest enter a
low-power state. As mobility increases, the discovery process should be more frequent.
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The goal of SPAN [70] is to save energy while not degrading the latency and throughput achievable
in 802.11 without power save mode. This protocol operates between the MAC and routing layers. The
system allows all nodes to enter power save mode except for elected coordinators. At the MAC layer, nodes
periodically exchange hello messages that contain its set of neighbors, coordinators, and whether it is a
coordinator. Nodes will then elect themselves coordinators if their neighbors would get better connectivity
by it doing so. A random delay is introduced before nodes declare themselves coordinators. This delay varies
inversely with the amount of connectivity that would be achieved and inversely with the amount of energy
remaining at the node. For fairness, the coordinators will periodically withdraw.
2.2 Efficient Broadcast Propagation
Broadcast is prevalent in wireless networks as a means to propagate information. The application on which
we focus in testing our protocol in Chapter 5 is code distribution, whereby a source periodically sends out
patches for sensors to apply to their software. In [73], the authors demonstrate a software architecture to
allow the application of such updates. In other works [74–76], the focus is on reducing the flooding overhead
for disseminating code updates. In our work, we look at the effects on energy-saving on the reception
rate of code updates. Other applications of multihop broadcasts include route discovery in ad hoc routing
protocols [77, 78] and querying for sensor data [79].
One popular method for reducing the overhead of broadcast is to form a backbone in the network where
only certain nodes forward data [80–82], which can reduce overhead. Another method, which is most similar
to our work in Chapter 5, is probabilistic broadcast [83–85], where nodes only forward a broadcast with
some probability, p. By doing this, the broadcast is capable of reaching most of the nodes in the network
while reducing the overhead. This is based on the observation that a broadcast flood typically has a high
level of redundancy [86]. In our protocol, we try to use this redundancy to reduce the energy consumed by
the broadcast.
2.3 Symmetric Key Distribution
In Chapter 6, we propose a novel method of symmetric key establishment for a sensor network that uses
channel diversity, as well as spatial diversity, to create link keys for one-hop neighbors. Given this protocol,
we characterize the tradeoffs that arise in energy and security. Establishing such keys is important because
public keys are too computationally intensive for many sensors. Sharing a symmetric key with neighbors
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allows for secure aggregation as well as transmitting data used to authenticate hash chains, for example. In
this section, we give an overview of five approaches to the problem.
Trusted Intermediary: This approach is similar to that of Kerberos [87], which is used widely on wired
networks. Every node shares a secret symmetric key with a trusted intermediary that is loaded before
deployment. The key establishment protocol requires two sensors that wish to establish a pairwise key to
communicate with the trusted intermediary to create the key. SPINS is an example of this approach [88]
A disadvantage of this approach is that the server may become a bottleneck in large networks and that the
trusted intermediary must be online whenever key establishment is desired.
Key Predistribution: Eschenauer and Gligor [89] were among the first to consider key predistribution for
sensor networks. In their work, referred to here as the basic scheme, sensors are loaded with randomly chosen
keys out of a master key pool before deployment. After deployment, a sensor can securely communicate with
its neighbors if it shares at least one key in common with the neighbor. Chan et al. [90] extend the basic
scheme to require neighbors to share q keys in common before a link is possible. This improves security at
the cost of decreased connectivity. Their work also proposes the idea of using multiple node disjoint paths
to strengthen security. This is a different form of diversity than what we propose, but demonstrates how
the concept can improve security in diverse path selection. Other schemes propose that keys be distributed
deterministically based on a sensor’s ID [91,92].
Du et al. [93] adapt a key predistribution scheme originally proposed by Blom [94] for sensor networks by
using finite fields to generate multiple key spaces that can be randomly deployed to sensors. Liu et al. [95]
extend a key distribution method proposed by Blundo et al. [96] that uses polynomial based distribution
methods.
In Section 6.5.1, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of our approach compared with key pre-
distribution.
Transitory Keys: The LEAP architecture [97] provides a method of establishing pairwise keys provided
sensors cannot be compromised during a short initialization phase after deployment and the sensor hardware
that can be trusted to completely erase a master key after initialization. Thus, the master key is transitory
at each device and only available during the initialization. Some disadvantages of this approach are that (1)
if a node is compromised during the initialization period, the entire network may be compromised and (2)
the low-end sensor hardware must ensure that the master key is erased from memory such that recovery is
not possible.
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Public Key Exchange: Public key exchanges to generate the symmetric keys for bulk encryption are
used in many Internet protocols (e.g., IPsec). The Diffie-Hellman key exchange [98] and Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [99] are two widely used protocols designed for this purpose. The primary reason
for not using such protocols in sensor networks is the large computational overhead incurred by asymmetric
key cryptography when compared with symmetric key protocols. However, elliptic curve cryptography has
been implemented in TinyOS [100, 101]. In Table 2.3, we give the performance metrics for the two Mica2
Mote public key implementations of which we are aware, EccM 2.0 [100] and Sizzle [101].
Table 2.3: Performance of public key exchange implementations on Mica2 Motes.
EccM 2.0 [100] Sizzle [101]
Key Size (bits) 163 160
Bits of Securitya 80 80
RAM Usage (KB) 1.03 3.08
ROM Usage (KB) 33.5 60
ECDH Time (s) 34.173 3.8
a “An algorithm that has a ‘Y ’ bit key, but whose strength is compa-
rable to an ‘X’ bit key of such a symmetric algorithm is said have a
‘security strength of X bits’ or to provide ‘X bits of security’. Given
a few plaintext blocks and corresponding cipher, an algorithm that
provides X bits of security would, on average, take 2X−1T of time
to attack, where T is the amount of time that is required to per-
form one encryption of a plaintext value and comparison of the
result against the corresponding ciphertext value.” [102]
While computationally expensive, this approach may be acceptable in long-lived sensor networks where
the cost of the key exchange is amortized over the lifetime of the sensors. We are unaware of any rig-
orous quantitative analysis comparing the public key exchange implementations with pure symmetric key
approaches in security, performance, and memory usage. We believe that the research community could
greatly benefit from such a detailed comparison. In the absence of such results, our work explores a pure
symmetric key exchange approach.
Broadcasting Plaintext Keys: The work that is most similar to ours is that of Anderson et al. [6]. The
protocol is based on the assumption that the number of adversary devices in the network at the time of
key establishment is small (in their results, less than 3% of the nodes are adversaries). Thus, during the
initialization phase, a sensor, u, will broadcast a randomly generated plaintext key, ku, that is overheard
by all its one-hop neighbors (including adversaries). Each one of u’s neighbors replies with the message
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{v, kuv}ku , where v is the ID of the neighbor and kuv is a pairwise key randomly generated by v.2 After this
exchange, u and v use key kuv for communication. Power control is used to reduce the number of devices
that overhear the key exchange.
In Section 6.5.2, we discuss in detail the differences between our work and Anderson’s. We briefly
mention these differences here. First, our protocol is much more resilient to eavesdropping by attacking
devices since we leverage channel diversity and use location diversity more.3 Second, a link cannot be
authenticated in Anderson’s scheme since u or v has no way to verify the sender of the messages. In
contrast, we provide mechanisms that allow a trusted source to authenticate sensor IDs and broadcasted
keys. Refer to Section 6.5.2 for more details about these differences.
2We use the notation {M}k to indicate a message, M , encrypted using key k.
3We note that the goal in [6], unlike our work, is not to make it difficult for a nearby attacker to compromise a link or to
operate in hostile environments where there may be many adversaries.
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Chapter 3
Carrier Sensing for Energy-Efficient
Signaling
Many power save protocols described in Section 2.1 follow a common design where potential receivers peri-
odically awake to listen for some type of wake-up signal in between long periods of sleep. However, many
such protocols are inefficient from an energy perspective in that this listening period is on the order of a
packet transmission time. The increase in energy consumption is particularly significant in networks with
light traffic, as might be expected in many sensor applications.1
Based on this observation, we propose using the carrier sensing capabilities that are available at the
physical layer to reduce the listening period for wake-up signals to be on the order of the time it takes to
detect the channel busy. This detection time is typically much smaller than a packet transmission time. In
this chapter, we demonstrate how this technique can be applied to both a in-band protocol (Section 3.1.1)
as well as out-of-band protocols (Section 3.2.5 and Section 3.2.6).
3.1 Carrier Sensing for In-Band Protocols
In this section, we further discuss our proposed techniques to leverage carrier sensing for energy efficiency
and demonstrate their application to an in-band power save protocol. Specifically, we look at techniques
to improve the IBSS Power Save Mode (PSM) in IEEE 802.11 [7]. IBSS (Independent Basic Service Set)
is the protocol set for ad hoc networks. While the techniques we propose are tested with 802.11 PSM,
in Section 3.1.1 we discuss how they can augment other power save protocols. Our results show that the
proposed improvements to 802.11 PSM can greatly reduce energy consumption with little increase in the
average packet latency. Our carrier sensing protocol will be combined with an adaptive listening and adaptive
1We note that if traffic is heavy in a network, then using any type of power save is generally not useful.
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sleeping scheme in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, respectively. We defer the presentation of simulation results
to these sections.
3.1.1 Protocol Description
We use a short carrier sensing period preceding the ATIM window where nodes can indicate whether they
intend to advertise any data. Thus, when none of a node’s neighbors are going to advertise any data, the node
can return to sleep without remaining on for the ATIM window. In Section 4.1.1, we further improve the
energy consumption of the protocol by allowing nodes that participate in the ATIM window to dynamically
adjust the size of their ATIM window. By using this technique, nodes that do not receive any ATIMs can
usually return to sleep sooner than if a static ATIM window size is used.
We make the assumption that the nodes in the network are time synchronized by some out-of-band
means. For example, the nodes may be GPS-equipped. Later, we discuss modifications to the protocols to
handle some synchronization errors. Thus, the timing synchronization function (TSF) of 802.11 is disabled
and beacons are never sent. For consistency with the terminology in related work, we will still refer to the
time between ATIM windows as a “beacon interval” even though no beacons are sent.
From the description of 802.11 PSM in Section 2, we observe that it is possible that most beacon intervals
have no packets to be advertised. In this case, the ATIM window needlessly wastes energy. However, when
traffic is queued at the beginning of a beacon interval, nodes need a mechanism to advertise their packets.
Thus, the ATIM window concept cannot be completely removed. What is needed is a energy-efficient binary
signal so that a node can let neighbors know when it has traffic to advertise and, hence, an ATIM window
is needed for that beacon interval.
For this purpose, we propose Carrier Sense ATIM (CS-ATIM) that adds a short carrier sensing period
at the beginning of each beacon interval as shown in Figure 3.1. The basic idea is that the time it takes to
carrier sense the channel busy or idle, Tcs, is significantly smaller than the ATIM window, Taw. Rather than
every node waking up for Taw at the beginning of every beacon interval, the nodes will wake up for only Tcs
at the beginning of every interval when no packets are to be advertised in their neighborhood. When packets
are to be advertised, the nodes will wake up for an entire ATIM window after the carrier sensing period.
Using Figure 3.1, we will explain how CS-ATIM works. The shaded regions in Figure 3.1 indicate that
a node is transmitting a packet. At time t0, no packets are to be advertised so all nodes wake up for Tcs
time and return to sleep when the channel is detected idle. At time t1, the nodes wake up for the start of
the next beacon interval. This time, node A has a packet to advertise, so it transmits a “dummy” packet
to make the channel busy. When nodes B and C finish carrier sensing the channel at time t1 + Tcs, the
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Figure 3.1: CS-ATIM protocol (Tcs and Taw are not drawn to scale).
channel is detected busy because of A’s packet transmission. Thus, all nodes who carrier sensed the channel
busy or transmitted a “dummy” packet will remain on for an ATIM window of length Taw after the carrier
sensing period. During the ATIM window, A sends an ATIM to B and B replies to A with an ATIM-ACK.
Because of this exchange, A and B will remain on for the rest of the beacon interval. Because C did not
send or receive an ATIM during the ATIM window, it returns to sleep at the end of the ATIM window at
time t2. After the ATIM window, A and B exchange the data packet and corresponding ACK. At time t3,
a new beacon interval begins and all of the nodes return to sleep after carrier sensing the channel as idle.
The value of Tcs is chosen to be long enough to carrier sense the channel as idle or busy with a desired level
of reliability. According to the 802.11 specification [7], the clear channel assessment (CCA) for compliant
hardware must be less than 15 µs. In our experiments, we use a much larger value for Tcs to mitigate the
effects of short-term fading. The dummy packet transmitted by a node with packets to advertise does not
contain any information that needs to be decoded; its only purpose is to cause other nodes to detect the
channel as busy. The advantage of not having information in the dummy packet is that multiple nodes can
transmit simultaneously, causing collisions at the receivers, without hindering the protocol. If a collision
occurs at the receiver, it can still detect the channel as busy and remain on for the ATIM window. In the
ATIM window, nodes use the standard 802.11 CSMA/CA protocol to send their ATIMs and ATIM-ACKs
while avoiding collisions. A node that transmits a dummy packet cannot carrier sense dummy packets being
sent by other nodes at the beginning of the beacon interval. However, this does not affect the protocol since
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a node stays on for the ATIM interval whenever it transmits a dummy packet or carrier senses the channel
busy.
From this description of CS-ATIM, clearly nodes can use significantly less energy than 802.11 PSM
listening at the beginning of each beacon interval when no packets are to be advertised. When packets are
to be advertised, CS-ATIM uses only slightly more energy than 802.11 PSM because of the short carrier
sensing period. For packet latency, 802.11 PSM does slightly better than CS-ATIM. One reason is that
data packets that arrive after the carrier sensing period but before the end of the ATIM window may be
sent in the current beacon interval in 802.11 PSM. In CS-ATIM, such packets may have to wait until the
next beacon interval. Also, CS-ATIM has a slightly larger delay since the ATIM window does not end until
Tcs + Taw, whereas the 802.11 PSM ATIM window ends Taw after the beginning of the beacon interval.
With CS-ATIM, we note that carrier sensing for energy on the channel, as opposed to actually decoding
a packet, runs the risk that nodes may erroneously carrier sense energy that is due to interference in the
frequency band rather than the dummy packet transmission. In this case, a node remains on for the ATIM
window even though none of its neighbors sent a dummy packet. We refer to this as a false positive. In
Section 4.1.3, the effects of false positives on CS-ATIM are tested.
As mentioned, CS-ATIM can be adapted to operate in networks without perfect synchronization. We
assume that the node’s clocks are always within ∆ seconds of each other. Thus, ∆ represents the maximum
error between the clocks of any two nodes in the network. To handle synchronization errors, the following
changes are made to CS-ATIM:
• At the beginning of a beacon interval, a dummy packet is transmitted for 2∆+Tcs time instead of Tcs
time.
• Nodes that do not have packets to advertise begin their carrier sensing period ∆ time after the beginning
of the beacon interval (according to their local clock). Originally, these nodes would begin carrier
sensing immediately at the beginning of a beacon interval.
• For dummy packet transmitters, ATIM windows last for 2∆ + Taw time instead of Taw time. A node
is not allowed to transmit any ATIMs for the first ∆ time of the ATIM window and the last ∆ time
of the ATIM window. However, a node may send ACKs, ATIM-ACKs, and receive packets during the
entire 2∆ + Taw duration of the ATIM window.
• For nodes that sense a dummy packet, ATIM windows last for 3∆ + Taw time instead of Taw time.
Such a node may reply to any ATIMs that they receive during this 3∆+Taw period with ATIM-ACKs.
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To preserve the flow of the dissertation, we move the discussion of the correctness of these modifications to
Appendix A.
The basic idea from CS-ATIM can be adapted to other power save protocols besides 802.11 PSM. When-
ever a node is scheduled to listen in a power save protocol, it can do carrier sensing at the start of its
scheduled wake-up time to determine if it can return to sleep because no nodes have data to send. For
example, in a TDMA protocol, nodes can carrier sense at the beginning of their scheduled slot and return
to sleep if no data needs to be sent.
3.1.2 Comparison with Preamble Sampling
We note that the technique described in Section 3.1.1 is similar to the preamble sampling used in protocols
such as B-MAC [26] and WiseMAC [58]. However, our proposed carrier sensing technique has some key
differences when compared with these preamble sampling protocols. The advantage of preamble sampling is
that it works in completely unsynchronized environments.2 However, because the nodes may transmit their
preamble at any time (which serves as the wake-up signal), the probability increases that the preamble will
collide with an ongoing data transmission (e.g., due to hidden terminals). By contrast, our protocol restricts
wake-up signals to a specific time when data packets are not being transmitted. Also, because the wake-up
signal in our protocol serves as only a binary indication of whether or not the channel is busy, interference
among wake-up signals is tolerable, as discussed in Section 3.1.1. With preamble sampling, interference may
affect packet reception since the preamble may synchronize the bits of the incoming data packet.
Another disadvantage of preamble sampling is that broadcast, which is commonly used in wireless com-
munication, requires a large preamble transmission. In particular, the preamble must be slightly longer than
a beacon interval (which is at least on the order of tens of milliseconds and longer if less energy consumption
is desired). This is the only way to ensure that all of a node’s neighbors are able to detect the preamble.
By contrast, in our protocol, the overhead for a wake-up signal is slightly longer than the time to reliably
carrier sense the channel (e.g., typically on the order of tens of microseconds) for both unicast and broadcast
packets.3 Thus, the well-known overhead problem associated with broadcast storms [86] is exacerbated by
the preamble sampling protocols whereas our protocol does not add any extra overhead to broadcast packets
when compared with unicast packets.
2WiseMAC [58] does require nodes to keep track of their last communication time with each neighbor as well as the maximum
possible clock drift of the hardware.
3To do broadcast in our protocol, a dummy packet is transmitted causing all of a node’s neighbors to remain on for an ATIM
window. At this point, the transmitter can simply transmit a broadcast ATIM packet as discussed in Section 2.1.1 and follow
the standard 802.11 PSM protocol [7].
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3.1.3 Simulation Results
See Section 4.1.3 for CS-ATIM simulation results.
3.2 Carrier Sensing for Out-of-Band protocols
In this section, we demonstrate how carrier sensing can be applied to an out-of-band power save protocol.
An advantage of this technique is that, unlike synchronous protocols, no clock synchronization is needed.
Unlike asynchronous protocols, nodes do not have to probe the channel whenever they wake up (i.e., less
channel contention and control overhead). Also, out-of-band protocols have a deterministic bound on wake-
up latency, which is not true of asynchronous protocols with non-deterministic schedules. However, tradeoffs
exist when using out-of-band protocols. One disadvantage is the increased hardware complexity and cost to
provide an extra wake-up channel. Also, the wake-up channel requires extra bandwidth to avoid interference
with the data channel. Finally, the wake-up channel must be designed such that its monitoring does not
consume much energy. Obviously, the wake-up channel is of little use, from an energy perspective, if it
consumes a large amount of energy idly listening to the channel while the data radio is saving energy by
sleeping.
STEM [2, 3] and STEM-BT [3] (STEM Busy Tone) are out-of-band protocols that use periodic idle
listening on the wake-up channel. In this section, using carrier sensing, we identify ways to make each of
these protocols more efficient.
3.2.1 Protocol Descriptions
In STEM [2, 3], a two-radio architecture achieves energy savings by letting the data radio sleep until com-
munication is necessary while the wake-up radio periodically listens according to a duty cycle. When a node
has data to send, it begins transmitting continuously on the wake-up channel long enough to guarantee that
all neighbors will receive the wake-up signal. STEM-BT [3] is a variant of STEM where the wake-up radio
uses a busy tone, instead of encoded data, for the wake-up signal. Both protocols are orthogonal to the data
radio MAC layer transmission scheduling scheme.
In this section, we describe the operation of STEM and STEM-BT. Based on this discussion, we make
some observations about how the protocols could achieve better energy efficiency using carrier sensing. Based
on this, we present two new protocols, STEM-H and STEM-BT2, which reduce the energy consumption for
STEM and STEM-BT, respectively. For each of the protocols, we have two sub-protocols. One is the
transmitting sub-protocol, which is performed when a node has data to send and tries to wake up the
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Figure 3.2: STEM protocol [2, 3].
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Figure 3.3: STEM-BT protocol [3].
intended receiver. The other sub-protocol is for monitoring; typically, the nodes spend most of their time in
the monitoring state where they periodically listen to the wake-up channel to determine if a signal is being
sent and they need to wake up their data radio. In STEM and STEM-H, the wake-up radio must be able
to send and receive data packets. By contrast, in STEM-BT and STEM-BT2, the wake-up radio needs to
be able to only send and detect a busy tone (i.e., making a binary decision whether the channel is busy or
not). Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 give a pictorial example of the protocols described below. In each of
these figures, the arrows show a “causes” relationship between events. The key for the figures is: F is a filter
packet, D is a data packet, A is an ACK packet, and BT is a busy tone. When F, D, A, or BT is in a
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shaded area, a node is sending; otherwise, a node is receiving.
3.2.2 STEM Description [2, 3] (Figure 3.2)
Sending Protocol: When a node has data to send, it begins a continuous cycle of transmitting a FILTER
packet on the wake-up channel followed by a idle listening period for the corresponding FILTER-ACK packet.
The idle listening time in between FILTERs, denoted as TA, has to be long enough to receive a FILTER-
ACK. Thus, TA is the time to transmit a FILTER-ACK plus extra time due to factors such as propagation
delay and hardware switching time.
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When a sender gets the corresponding FILTER-ACK, it turns on its data radio and begins sending data
packets according to the data radio MAC protocol. At this point, the sender stops sending FILTERs and the
wake-up radio enters the monitoring state. For a discussion of how wake-up channel collisions are handled,
see [2, 3]. When a node with its data radio on does not send or receive packets for an idle threshold time,
Tth, it returns the data radio to sleep.
Monitoring Protocol: Nodes periodically wake up long enough to receive a FILTER and respond with a
FILTER-ACK if they are the intended receiver. After idly listening for some time, Twi, the node’s wake-up
radio returns to sleep for a period of time, Tws. The Tws value is chosen by the user. A long Tws saves
more energy in the monitoring state, but increases the wake-up process latency. Twi is a function of TF and
TA [2].
When a node receives a FILTER and it is the intended receiver, it sends a FILTER-ACK and turns its
data radio on to idly listen for packets on the data channel. On the wake-up channel, the node continues
in the monitoring state. When a node with its data radio on does not send or receive packets for an idle
threshold time, Tth, it returns the data radio to sleep.
3.2.3 STEM-BT Description [3] (Figure 3.3)
Sending Protocol: When a node has data to send in STEM-BT, it starts transmitting a busy tone on the
wake-up channel. The busy tone is sent for Twt time, long enough to guarantee overlap with every neighbor’s
wake-up channel carrier sensing period.
After the sender has transmitted a busy tone for Twt time, it turns on its data radio. Once the data radio
is on, a FILTER packet is sent on the data channel indicating which receiver will receive more data. The
sender then begins transmitting the data to the receiver on the data channel. As in STEM, when a node
with its data radio on does not send or receive packets for Tth time, it returns its data radio to sleep.
Monitoring Protocol: For monitoring nodes, the protocol is similar to STEM’s. A difference between the
monitoring protocol of STEM and STEM-BT is the length of Twi, the carrier sensing time. In STEM-BT,
Twi is shorter because a monitoring node has to only detect a busy tone. On the other hand, in STEM, the
monitoring node has to decode a packet and send a FILTER-ACK if it is the intended receiver.
When a node detects a busy tone, it turns on its data radio and idly listens for a FILTER packet on
the data channel. When the FILTER packet is received, the node remains on if it is the intended receiver.
Otherwise, its data radio returns to sleep. If a node keeps its data radio on to receive data packets, it
returns the data radio to sleep when no packet has been sent or received for Tth time. One key point about
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STEM-BT’s monitoring protocol is that all one-hop neighbors of the sender must turn their data radio on
and idly listen until the FILTER packet is received.
3.2.4 Discussion of STEM and STEM-BT
Based on these protocol descriptions, we make a couple of observations. First, the wake-up process of STEM
is relatively inexpensive (in energy consumption) for all nodes other than the sender when compared with
the steady-state monitoring process. In particular, neighbor nodes use almost the same amount of energy
whether they are monitoring the channel or receiving the FILTER packet.4 The receiving node uses slightly
more energy because it responds with a FILTER-ACK packet. While the sender uses more energy due to
its FILTER transmissions, it transmits FILTERs for only Twt/2 time on average. By contrast, the wake-up
procedure for STEM-BT is relatively expensive compared with STEM. In STEM-BT, every neighbor node
that detects the busy tone turns its data radio on to listen for the FILTER packet on the data channel.
Thus, on average, each neighbor node idly listens to the data channel for half of the time that the busy
tone is emitted. Based on this, we can conclude that STEM-BT’s performance degrades when (1) a large
number of neighbor nodes are in the vicinity of the sender5 or (2) wake-ups become more frequent (e.g., due
to a higher traffic load). STEM’s wake-up procedure, however, is relatively inexpensive and does not greatly
increase energy consumption as the size of the sender’s neighborhood increases.
The second observation is that STEM’s steady-state monitoring process is relatively expensive when
compared with STEM-BT. Since Twi is proportional to TF and TA, it can be large for sensor networks which
tend to have a relatively low bitrate (e.g., 19.2 kbps for Mica2 Motes [25]). All nodes in the network must
spend Twi
Tws+Twi
fraction of the time idly listening even if no network traffic is present. In STEM-BT, Twi is
significantly smaller since it is only long enough to detect if a busy tone is being emitted. In STEM-BT, Twi
is independent of the size of FILTER and FILTER-ACK packets. Thus, the monitoring process in STEM-BT
uses much less energy than STEM. For example, as we will see in Section 3.2.8, Twi is about 80 times larger
for STEM than for STEM-BT for our simulation parameters. Thus, when the traffic load is low in a network,
STEM-BT is more energy efficient than STEM because of its low monitoring costs.
3.2.5 Proposed Protocol Description: STEM-H (Figure 3.4)
Based on the discussion in Section 3.2.4, we see that STEM’s energy consumption can be improved by
reducing the monitoring costs while retaining its relatively low wake-up cost. Thus, we propose STEM-H
4We assume the idle listening power and receiving power are about the same.
5Many applications assume that sensor networks can be rather dense for reasons such as increased reliability, connectivity,
and adequate sensing coverage.
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(STEM Hybrid) which combines aspects of STEM and STEM-BT to create a protocol more energy efficient
than STEM. The basic idea of STEM-H is to idly listen only long enough to carrier sense whether the
wake-up channel is busy during the monitoring phase. This detection time is relatively small (e.g., similar to
STEM-BT). When the wake-up channel is carrier sensed busy, then the monitoring node leaves its wake-up
radio on to receive and decode a FILTER packet.
Sending Protocol: The sending protocol is identical to STEM’s, described in Section 3.2.2. The only
difference is in the length of Twt, which guarantees sufficient overlap with STEM-H’s monitoring protocol.
Monitoring Protocol: For STEM-H’s monitoring state, nodes wake up only long enough to carrier sense
whether the wake-up channel is busy or idle. This differs from STEM’s monitoring protocol, where nodes
wake up long enough to receive FILTER packets and send FILTER-ACKs. STEM-H’s monitoring protocol
has two phases. In the first phase, nodes sleep for Tws time. In the second phase, nodes wake up and
periodically carrier sense the wake-up channel, then return to the first phase. This is shown in Figure 3.4,
where in between phase one periods of length Tws, nodes probe the wake-up channel multiple times. During
the second phase, if the wake-up channel is detected as busy, a node stays on to receive the next FILTER and,
if necessary, send a FILTER-ACK. Like STEM, nodes reply with a FILTER-ACK if the FILTER is for them.
Otherwise, the node returns to its regular monitoring state. Once the FILTER/FILTER-ACK handshake
occurs, nodes follow the same procedure for turning on their data radios as described in Section 3.2.2. They
also follow the same protocol for returning their data radios to sleep. It is important to note that in STEM-H,
Twi, the carrier sensing time when probing the wake-up channel, is comparable to that of STEM-BT since
only a binary decision on the channel status is necessary. STEM, on the other hand, requires a much longer
Twi because it must completely decode packets during its idle listening period on the wake-up channel.
Discussion: STEM-H improves the energy consumption of STEM by reducing the monitoring process cost
while keeping the benefits from the relatively inexpensive wake-up process discussed in Section 3.2.4. As we
see in Section 3.2.8, STEM-H does no worse than STEM, in energy consumption, and in most environments
does significantly better. This is true even with substantial degradation from false positive detection on the
wake-up channel. Intuitively, even if every carrier sensing period results in a false positive for STEM-H,
monitoring nodes will stay on, in this worst case, about as long as STEM’s idle listening period.
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3.2.6 Proposed Protocol Description: STEM-BT2 (Figure 3.5)
From Section 3.2.4, we see that STEM-BT’s energy consumption can be improved by reducing the wake-up
cost while retaining its relatively low monitoring cost. Thus, we propose STEM-BT2 to augment STEM-BT’s
wake-up protocol with data channel probing for improved energy efficiency. The basic idea of STEM-BT2
is to perform the same wake-up protocol as STEM-BT while avoiding excessive idle listening on the data
channel while waiting for the FILTER packet to be sent. Rather than turning on the data radio and doing
continuous idle listening like STEM-BT, STEM-BT2 will periodically carrier sense the data channel to detect
whether it is busy or not. When the data channel is detected busy, then STEM-BT2 remains on to receive
the FILTER packet like STEM-BT.
Sending Protocol: The sending protocol is nearly identical to that of STEM-BT described in Sec-
tion 3.2.3. The only difference is that two FILTER packets are sent on the data channel rather than
one. The first FILTER packet is a “dummy” packet that allows probing nodes to detect the channel as busy
and the second packet is the one that actually gets decoded.
Monitoring Protocol: The monitoring cycle is the same as STEM-BT. The difference in STEM-BT and
STEM-BT2 is the reaction after a monitoring node detects a wake-up channel busy tone. STEM-BT’s
protocol is described in Section 3.2.3. STEM-BT2 reacts by turning on its data radio and carrier sensing for
Twi time.
6 If the data channel is detected as busy, the data radio remains on in anticipation of receiving a
FILTER packet. If the data channel is detected as idle, the data radio returns to sleep for Tws2 time before
attempting to sense again. This cycle continues until either the channel is detected busy or a timeout occurs.
Once the FILTER packet has been received, nodes behave the same as in STEM-BT. The intended
receiver, as specified by the FILTER packet, remains on while all other nodes return their data radios to
sleep. The sender and receiver return their data radios to sleep when the data channel has been idle for Tth
time.
Discussion: STEM-BT2 improves the energy consumption of STEM-BT by reducing the cost of the expen-
sive wake-up process while maintaining the benefits from the relatively inexpensive steady-state monitoring
process discussed in Section 3.2.4. As we see in Section 3.2.8, STEM-BT2 rarely does worse than STEM-BT,
in terms of energy consumption, and in most environments does significantly better. This is true even with
significant degradation due to false positives (i.e., carrier sensing the channel busy when it is idle) being
6More generally, the carrier sensing time for the data radio and wake-up radio can be Twi2 and Twi, respectively, where
Twi2 6= Twi.
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detected on the data channel. Intuitively, in the worst case, where every carrier sensing period on the data
radio detects the channel as busy, STEM-BT2 will behave identical to STEM-BT except that it sends two
FILTER packets instead of one. Thus, in this case, STEM-BT2 uses extra energy to transmit the extra
FILTER packet, but otherwise behaves the same as STEM-BT.
3.2.7 Parameter Values
In this section, we discuss the values needed for the Twi, Twt, Tws2 parameters described in Section 3.2.1.
The values for STEM and STEM-BT were discussed previously in [2, 3], but we mention them here for
completeness.
STEM: The idle listening period, Twi, must be long enough that a node will successfully receive a FILTER
packet even if the node wakes up in the middle of a FILTER transmission (and hence cannot correctly decode
the first FILTER packet). In the worst case, the node wakes up just after a FILTER transmission has begun.
Thus, the node has to wait for this first, undecodable FILTER packet to finish, which takes about TF time.
It then must wait for the sender to idly listen for a FILTER-ACK, which takes αTA time, where α accounts
for propagation delays and hardware switching time. Finally, it must stay on long enough to receive the next
FILTER packet, which takes TF time. Thus, Twi = TF + αTA + TF = 2TF + αTA.
Now, we discuss Twt, the duration for which the sending protocol must be performed to ensure enough
overlap that every neighbor doing the monitoring protocol will receive a FILTER and have time to respond
with the FILTER-ACK, if necessary. In the worst case, a monitoring node’s idle listening period ends just
before the sender’s first FILTER transmission ends, which takes TF time. The sender must continue the
process for Tws time since the monitoring node will be asleep for that duration. When the monitoring node
begins idly listening again, it may wake up just after a FILTER transmission began (TF time). After the
sending node idly listens for αTA time, it sends another FILTER packet (TF time) which will successfully
be decoded by the receiver. Finally, the sending node must wait long enough to receive the corresponding
FILTER-ACK, if necessary, which takes αTA time. Thus, summing up the terms mentioned in this paragraph,
we get: Twt = TF + Tws + TF + αTA + TF + αTA = 3TF + Tws + 2αTA.
STEM-BT: In STEM-BT, Twi is a fixed value based on how long the radio must listen to detect a busy
tone with a specified level of confidence (see [56] for a discussion on this). The busy tone transmission
time, Twt, must be sufficiently long to ensure enough overlap such that every neighbor doing the monitoring
protocol receives the busy tone. In the worst case, a monitoring node’s idle listening period begins just before
the sender starts transmitting the busy tone. In this situation, the busy tone is not detected at the specified
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level of confidence. Thus, the sending node must transmit the busy tone long enough that the monitoring
node’s next idle listening period will completely overlap with the busy tone. Thus, Twt = Twi+Tws+Twi =
2Twi + Tws.
STEM-H: We begin by determining Tws2 and wi, the sleeping time between idle listening periods and
the number of idle listening period required to guarantee a FILTER is detected, respectively. To determine
the frequency and number of times a nodes must wake-up during the monitoring periods, we observe the
following constraint. If a node begins its idle listening period after the sender has started its FILTER packet
transmissions, Tws2 and wi must be chosen to guarantee at least one of the Twi duration wake-ups will
completely overlap with one of the sender’s FILTER transmissions. Similar to STEM-BT, we assume that
Twi is the minimum amount of time required to classify the wake-up channel as busy (with sufficiently low
error probability). Thus, if a FILTER packet only partially overlaps with a Twi period, the channel may not
be detected as busy.
In the worst case, a wake-up idle listening period begins just before a FILTER transmission begins. For
example, the listening period begins at time t0 and the FILTER transmission begins at t1 = t0 + ǫ, where ǫ
is a small positive number close to zero. In this case, t0 + Twi < t1 + Twi, which means that the FILTER
transmission will not be detected for Twi, the minimum required time for correct detection. Thus, Tws2
needs to be chosen such that the next idle listening period will begin and end before the current FILTER
transmission ends. The FILTER transmission will end at t1+TF . Thus, the next idle listening period needs
to begin by t1 + TF − Twi = t0 + ǫ+ TF − Twi to allow the minimum detection time. The first idle listening
period ended at t0 + Twi. Thus, subtracting the first idle listening period’s end time from the second idle
listening period’s start time, we get: (t0 + ǫ + TF − Twi) − (t0 + Twi) = TF − 2Twi + ǫ. Thus, we need:
Tws2 ≤ TF − 2Twi + ǫ. Because ǫ→ 0 and the Tws2 inequality must be valid for the smallest ǫ possible, we
get:7 Tws2 ≤ TF − 2Twi to ensure that the second idle listening period completely overlaps with part of the
FILTER packet transmission. To avoid unnecessary wake-ups, we set:8
Tws2 = TF − 2Twi (3.1)
Next, we consider wi, the number of times these idle listening periods must occur on the wake-up radio to
ensure that one overlaps with an adequate part of a FILTER packet transmission. This is necessary since the
7It is assumed that TF > 2Twi. If this is not true, then it is impossible to guarantee sufficient overlap between the FILTER
and carrier sensing periods without synchronizing the boundaries of TF and Twi.
8If false negatives are a problem with detecting the wake-up channel busy, Tws2 and wi could be adjusted to provide
redundancy in the amount of times idle listening periods are guaranteed to overlap with FILTER packet transmission. The
obvious tradeoff is that more energy is consumed during the monitoring phase as Tws2 becomes smaller and wi becomes larger.
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idle listening periods may occur during the αTA time that the sender is idly listening for a FILTER-ACK.
We assume that Tws2 is set according to Equation 3.1.
In the worst case, the first wake-up idle listening period ends just after a FILTER transmission ends. For
example, the FILTER packet transmission ends at t1 and the first idle listening period ends at t2 = t1 + ǫ.
Thus, that idle listening period began at t0 = t2 − Twi. In this case, t0 + Twi > t1, which means that the
FILTER transmission will not be detected for Twi, the minimum time required for correct detection. After
this most recent FILTER transmission, the sender will wait for αTA time before beginning the next FILTER
transmission (i.e., it begins at t1 + αTA). We need to guarantee that enough idle listening periods with the
Tws2 spacing will occur such that the last one begins at or after t1 + αTA (and hence is detects the next
FILTER transmission). The next (second) idle listening period begins at t2 + Tws2. If another one occurs
(the third), it will begin at t2 + Tws2 + Twi + Tws2. If we have wi such idle listening periods, the last one
will begin at t2 + (wi − 1)Tws2 + (wi − 2)Twi (trivially, wi ≥ 2). Using Equation 3.1, the last idle listening
period begins at: t2 + (wi − 1)(TF − 2Twi) + (wi − 2)Twi = t2 + (wi − 1)TF − wiTwi. Thus, we need:
t1 + αTA ≤ t2 + (wi − 1)TF − wiTwi
t1 + αTA ≤ t1 + ǫ+ (wi − 1)TF − wiTwi
αTA ≤ ǫ+ (wi − 1)TF − wiTwi
(3.2)
Because ǫ→ 0 and the inequality in Equation 3.2 must be valid for the smallest ǫ possible, we get:
αTA ≤ (wi − 1)TF − wiTwi (3.3)
Therefore, we need wi to be the smallest integer which satisfies the inequality in Equation 3.3. This gives
us:
wi =
⌈
αTA + TF
TF − Twi
⌉
(3.4)
To determine Twt, we consider the worst case where the first FILTER transmission starts just after the
last idle listening period begins for a monitoring node (i.e., just before the last idle period of length Twi
returns to sleep for Tws time). In this case, the sender has to do the wake-up procedure for the length
of that idle listening period (i.e., Twi) plus the subsequent sleeping time (i.e., Tws). Additionally, it must
transmit for the time it takes the monitoring node to do wi idle listening periods (i.e., wiTwi+(wi−1)Tws2).
Recall that Tws2 and wi were set in Equation 3.1 and Equation 3.4, respectively, to ensure that the channel
is carrier sensed busy during one of these wi idle listening periods. Thus, in the worst case, the beginning
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of the FILTER transmission is detected during the monitoring node’s last idle listening period. Thus, the
monitoring node will keep its wake-up radio on to receive the next FILTER. The next FILTER transmission
occurs after the sender idly listens for a FILTER-ACK. In this case, the time needed is enough to detect
(but not correctly receive) the first FILTER packet, then wait for the transmitter to listen for the FILTER-
ACK, and then for the monitoring node to receive the next FILTER packet send by the transmitter (i.e.,
2TF +αTA). Finally, the sender must continue the wake-up process long enough to receive the FILTER-ACK
which follows the last FILTER transmission (i.e., αTA). Combining all this time, we get:
Twt = Twi + Tws + wiTwi + (wi − 1)Tws2 + 2αTA + 2TF
= (wi + 1)Twi + Tws + (wi − 1)Tws2 + 2αTA + 2TF
(3.5)
STEM-BT2: The value of Twt in STEM-BT2 is computed exactly the same as for STEM-BT, as described
previously. We set Tws2 = TF − 2Twi for the same reasons discussed for STEM-H.
3.2.8 Simulation Results
To test the protocols from Section 3.2.1, we implemented them by modifying the 802.11 MAC and physical
layer code in ns-2 [103]. We use the values from Table 3.3. These values are based on Mica2 Motes [104]
and TinyOS [11]. For STEM-BT, STEM-H, and STEM-BT2, we set Twi = 1ms [56]. This is the time it
takes to reliably detect that the wake-up and data channel are busy when a busy tone or packet is being
transmitted.9 Each data point is averaged over 20 runs. The standard deviation for the figures is given in
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.
Table 3.1: Standard deviation as percentage of mean for Section 3.2.8 figures (Average | Maximum).
Fig. 3.6 Fig. 3.7 Fig. 3.9 Fig. 3.12 Fig. 3.13 Fig. 3.14a
STEM 3.54 3.99 2.18 2.90 2.096 2.628 1.00 1.00 1.60 2.58 1.93 3.18
STEM-BT 1.90 2.61 1.08 1.50 1.96 2.76 0.44 1.43 20.10 24.57 0.53 0.80
STEM-H 2.27 2.86 1.61 2.57 1.84 2.45 1.59 15.87 18.63 22.04 1.92 3.13
STEM-BT2 1.84 2.41 1.13 1.52 1.64 2.28 0.37 0.84 21.34 24.14 0.83 1.36
a In Figure 3.14, STEM-BT, STEM-H, and STEM-BT2 all have 50% false positive probabilities.
Initially, we look at a single-hop scenario with 10 sensors in range of each other. A random sender and
receiver are chosen to communicate with Poisson traffic at a fixed rate of one packet per second (unless
otherwise noted). Each simulation runs for 500 seconds. Because each data packet has a corresponding ACK
9While we do not explicitly consider switching energy and delay, Twi can be adjusted to this cost into account. We note
that radios on earlier versions of Mica Motes had transition times of less than 10µs [105].
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Table 3.2: Standard deviation as percentage of mean for Section 3.2.8 figures with false positive curves
(Average | Maximum).
Figure 3.10 Figure 3.11
STEM 3.66 4.04 — —
STEM-H, 0% 2.17 2.95 — —
STEM-H, 1% 2.31 3.17 — —
STEM-H, 5% 2.77 3.71 — —
STEM-H, 50% 3.87 4.98 — —
STEM-H, 100% 3.71 4.72 — —
STEM-BT, 0% — — 0.31 1.10
STEM-BT2, 0% — — 0.09 0.16
STEM-BT, 5% — — 0.79 1.09
STEM-BT2, 5% — — 0.91 1.29
STEM-BT, 50% — — 0.40 0.69
STEM-BT2, 50% — — 0.42 0.58
STEM-BT, 95% — — 0.44 0.87
STEM-BT2, 95% — — 0.47 1.12
Table 3.3: Protocol parameter values.
Parameter Value
Physical Layer Header 28 bytes
MAC Layer Header 6 bytes
Payload per Packet 30 bytes
Total Packet Sizea 64 bytes
Bitrate 19.2 kbps
PTX 81mW
PI 30mW
PS 3µW
Tth 30ms
a We assume that FILTER, FILTER-
ACK, data, and ACK packets are the
same size.
packet, 128 bytes (see Table 3.3) are transferred per data packet. This translates to a 5.33% utilization of
the channel bitrate. The sleep interval, Tws, for the protocols is varied to determine its effects on energy and
latency. The goal of these experiments is to investigate properties of the protocols in a simple environment.
We also evaluate performance in a more realistic, multi-hop scenario. We define the node density of a
network, ∆, as ∆ = N ·pir
2
A
, where N is the number of nodes in the network, r is the range of a node’s radios,
and A is the geographic area of the network. Given this definition, we place 50 sensor nodes uniformly at
random in a square region such that ∆ ≈ 9.8. For each topology tested, a path exists between every node
in the network. We vary the number of connections per scenario while keeping Tws and the Poisson traffic
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Figure 3.6: Energy consumption of the protocols.
rate fixed. For each connection the sender and receiver of the flow is chosen uniformly at random. For the
sensor network application at Great Duck Island [106], the traffic rate is one data packet every 70 seconds.
To keep our simulation execution times reasonable, the traffic rate per flow is set to be one data packet every
20 seconds and each simulation runs for 1000 seconds.
Energy and Latency Comparison: We adjust Tws from 60ms to 250ms to see the performance of the
protocols, shown in Figure 3.6. The energy metric we use is Joules per bit, which is the aggregate energy used
by all nodes during the simulation divided by the total number of data bits received by the destination(s).
The simulation results are presented in Figure 3.6. We see that STEM uses the most energy of the
protocols, but shows a large improvement as Tws increases. Recall that STEM’s major weakness is its large
energy cost to monitor the wake-up channel in steady-state. As Tws increases, the relative amount of sleep
time for the monitoring process increases. Thus, the monitoring process uses less energy while the wake-up
process uses only slightly more energy (due to the increase in Twt for the sender). STEM-H consistently
does much better than STEM. STEM-H’s energy consumption also decreases as Tws increases, though it is
much less dramatic than STEM’s decrease.
Figure 3.6 also shows that STEM-BT2 consistently outperforms STEM-BT. Both STEM-BT and STEM-
BT2 show the same trend, a linear increase in energy consumption as Tws increases. This is because the
wake-up cost for these protocols increases while the monitoring cost decreases only slightly. In particular,
the busy tone is transmitted for a longer time and, hence, neighbors have to keep their data radios idly
listening (or probing) for a longer period of time on average.
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In Figure 3.7, we see a linear increase in latency for all protocols as Tws increases. This is because
the wake-up process takes longer as Tws grows. STEM and STEM-H show a more gradual increase in
latency because the time of their wake-up processes are proportional to roughly 12Tws, whereas STEM-BT
and STEM-BT2’s wake-up processes are proportional to Tws. We also note that STEM-H and STEM-BT2
have a latency that is larger than that of STEM and STEM-BT, respectively, by a constant amount. This
constant amount is approximately equal to TF since STEM-H has to wait for an extra FILTER to be sent
on the wake-up channel (when compared with STEM) and STEM-BT2 has to wait for an extra FILTER to
be sent on the data channel (when compared with STEM-BT).
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Figure 3.7: Latency of the protocols.
To gain a better understanding of the energy-latency tradeoff for the protocols, we plot the average
latency versus the energy consumption for each fixed Tws value. The result is shown in Figure 3.8. We can
see that STEM-BT2 outperforms all of the other protocols in this metric. However, we notice that STEM-BT
and STEM-BT2 show an increase in energy consumption as latency increases while STEM and STEM-H
show a decrease in energy consumption. Thus, comparing the energy of STEM-H to that of STEM-BT when
the average latency is about 220ms is misleading because STEM-H has lower energy consumption at that
point, but STEM-BT has lower energy consumption when the average latency is smaller.
In Figure 3.9, we test the protocols at a higher sending rate. The rate is set to three packets per second
(i.e., 16% channel utilization). From this graph, we see that the relative difference in energy consumption
between STEM and STEM-H decreases. This is because a higher rate reduces the amount of monitoring
time between wake-up procedures. Thus, STEM does better at higher data rates due to less monitoring time
per packet arrival. STEM-H, however, shows less relative improvement since its monitoring cost is already
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Figure 3.8: Energy versus average latency.
low by design.
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Figure 3.9: Energy consumption at a higher rate.
Also in Figure 3.9, we see that the relative difference between STEM-BT and STEM-BT2 increases at
a higher rate. This is because, at a higher rate, the wake-up procedure becomes more frequent. Thus,
STEM-BT2, which has a lower wake-up cost than STEM-BT, will further outperform STEM-BT.
The Effects of Spurious Wake-Ups: One of the disadvantages of doing the FILTER transmission
detection on the wake-up channel in STEM-H is that interference in the frequency band may cause a node to
detect the channel as busy when no FILTER is being transmitted. For example, such interference may come
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from other sensor nodes that are not within communication range, but still transmit with enough power
to interfere. Another example of interference is other electronic devices that share the same unlicensed
bandwidth as the sensors. Thus, we study how the performance of STEM-H degrades in the face of such
interference.
Figure 3.10 shows the energy consumption of STEM and STEM-H. For STEM-H, we vary the probability
that when a monitoring node idly listens on the wake-up channel, it erroneously detects a FILTER transmis-
sion (i.e., a false positive). For STEM-H, the percentage values shown in the key of Figure 3.10 indicate the
probability a false positive occurs each carrier sensing period. For example, “STEM-H, 5%” indicates that
each idle listening period on the wake-up channel a monitoring node falsely detects a FILTER transmission
with probability 0.05. Thus, 0% false postive value indicates that every detection of the wake-up channel as
busy is caused by a FILTER transmission. A 100% false positive value is the worst case where every carrier
sensing period a monitoring node detects the wake-up channel as busy regardless of its actual state.
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Figure 3.10: Effects of false positives on STEM-H.
From Figure 3.10, we see that a low false positive percentage (e.g., less than 5%) does not affect the
performance of STEM-H much and it still significantly outperforms STEM. As the false positive percentage
increase, the performance of STEM-H converges to that of STEM (the line for STEM and STEM-H with
100% false positives almost overlaps). This confirms the intuition discussed in Section 3.2.5. Thus, with
completely unreliable FILTER transmission detection, STEM-H does no worse than STEM.
We do similar tests with STEM-BT and STEM-BT2. In STEM-BT, false positives affect the detection
of busy tones on the wake-up channel. In STEM-BT2, false positives affect both the detection of busy tones
on the wake-up channel and the detection of FILTER packets on the data channel. Figure 3.11 shows the
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results. At a low false positive percentage (i.e., 0% and 5%), STEM-BT2 saves more energy than STEM-
BT because the benefits from data channel carrier sensing are significant. However, as the false positive
percentage becomes large (i.e., 50% and 95%), the performances of STEM-BT and STEM-BT2 converge
since both protocols are using a large amount of energy on the wake-up channel. In this situation, STEM-
BT2’s data channel carrier sensing will exhibit similar behavior to STEM-BT’s data channel idle listening
since the false positives from carrier sensing cause STEM-BT2 to frequently resort to idle listening.
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Figure 3.11: Effects of false positives on STEM-BT and STEM-BT2.
Our final experiment to test spurious wake-ups investigates the relation between the false positive per-
centage and energy consumption. In Figure 3.12, we fix Tws = 100ms and see that only at low percentages
does STEM-H perform worse that STEM-BT. This is because carrier sensing occurs more frequently for
STEM-BT than for STEM-H and, thus, shows more degradation as a higher percentage of carrier sensing
periods detect false positives. STEM-BT2 also outperforms STEM-BT at low percentages, and their perfor-
mance converges at high percentages. STEM is not affected by spurious wake-ups; its performance is shown
for reference relative to the other protocols.
Multi-Hop Performance: We tested the protocols in multi-hop, multi-flow environments. We note that
this is the first time, of which we are aware, that such tests have been done on STEM or STEM-BT. In [2,3],
the simulation results are limited in that they consider only a single flow.
In Figure 3.13, we set Tws = 100ms and incrementally increase the number of concurrent flows in the
network. At the low rate of one packet every 20 seconds, STEM does much worse than the other protocols
for reasons discussed in Section 3.2.4. The performance of STEM-BT and STEM-BT2 is almost identical
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Figure 3.12: Effects of false positives on protocols.
since wake-ups are rare. STEM-H does slightly worse than STEM-BT and STEM-BT2 because, as shown
in Figure 3.4, STEM-H has a higher monitoring cost since it must wake up multiple times in between sleep
intervals.
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Figure 3.13: Multi-hop energy consumption.
From Figure 3.13, one could conclude that the busy tone protocols are always superior to STEM and
STEM-H. However, STEM-BT and STEM-BT2 rely heavily on carrier sensing and are, therefore, more
susceptible to the effects of spurious wake-ups. In contrast, STEM is unaffected by false positives since no
carrier sensing is needed to determine when the radios should remain on. STEM-H shows some effects from
spurious wake-ups, but as shown in Figure 3.12, large false positive percentages are not as detrimental as
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they are for STEM-BT and STEM-BT2. Thus, in Figure 3.14, we see that STEM and STEM-H outperform
STEM-BT and STEM-BT2 when the sensors operate in an environment where spurious wake-ups are a
significant problem.
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Figure 3.14: Multi-hop energy consumption with false positives.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed and demonstrated two methods where carrier sensing at the physical
layer can reduce the energy consumption of power save protocols. The technique significantly reduces the
energy spent listening for wake-up signals. We have shown how this can be applied to both an in-band
protocol, IEEE 802.11 PSM [7], (Section 3.1.1) and an out-of-band protocol, STEM [2, 3], (Section 3.2.1).
This technique is particularly beneficial when traffic is light and, most of the time, no packets need to be
advertised.
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Chapter 4
Adaptive Energy-Saving Protocols
Many power save protocols use a similar design where nodes sleep for some fixed interval and, at the end
of that interval, wake up for a fixed listening interval to check for wake-up signals. This design is used in
802.11 PSM [7] as well as sensor network protocols, such as B-MAC [26] and STEM [2]. As discussed in
Section 2.1.3, the disadvantage of such an approach is that is results in a “one size fits all” protocol that is
agnostic of the traffic rate in the network or desired latency of an application, for example.
In this chapter we propose adaptive techniques to improve the energy efficiency of in-band power save
protocols. Our previous work [27–29] has looked at adaptive intervals for out-of-band protocols. In Sec-
tion 4.1, we propose dynamic listening intervals based on the traffic near a node. In Section 4.2, we explore
dynamic sleeping intervals based on the desired latency requirements of an application.
4.1 Dynamic Advertisement Windows
From the description of 802.11 PSM in Section 2, we can see that the ATIM window wastes a significant
amount of energy when the traffic load is low. For example, in previous work [60, 68] some typical values
for the ATIM window and beacon interval are 20ms and 100ms, respectively. Thus, even when no traffic is
being sent, nodes listen to the channel for 20% of the time. It is obvious that more energy could be conserved
by reducing the size of the ATIM window when traffic is sparse. However, if the ATIM window becomes
too small, then nodes cannot advertise their data since the window ends before they are able to access the
channel and send an ATIM. Thus, our techniques reduce the overhead of the ATIM window when traffic is
sparse and provide larger ATIM windows when more data needs to be advertise.
The major contribution of this work is that we dynamically re-size the ATIM window based on the
number of advertisements to be sent in the current window. While the dynamic adjustment of the ATIM
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window has been explored previously [60,107], this is the first work of which we are aware that achieves this
in a multi-hop environment using a single channel.
4.1.1 Protocol Description
The CS-ATIM protocol discussed in Chapter 3 is more energy efficient than 802.11 PSM when there are a
large number of beacon intervals in which no nodes have packets to advertise. However, if a small number
of packets need to be advertised in a beacon interval, then requiring nodes to listen for the entire ATIM
window wastes energy. Ideally, the ATIM window should be long enough for all the ATIMs that need to
be transmitted and then the ATIM window should end right after the last ATIM-ACK is received.1 This
is what past work tries to achieve either through heuristics [60] or dynamically extending the window when
packets are received [61, 107]. Unlike the previous work that dynamically extends the ATIM window based
on packet reception, our goal is to have a protocol that works in multi-hop environments and does not use
a second channel (e.g., a busy-tone channel). We refer to this extension of CS-ATIM as Dynamic CS-ATIM
(DCS-ATIM).
First, we distinguish between two types of packet reception in IEEE 802.11. When a packet is received
at a power level above the RX THRESHOLD, we say that the receiver is within the transmission range
of the sender. When a packet is received at a power level below the RX THRESHOLD, but above the
CS THRESHOLD (carrier sense threshold), the receiver is said to be within the carrier sensing range of the
sender. Packets received by nodes in the carrier sensing range cannot be decoded, but do cause the node’s
clear channel assessment to classify the channel as busy. We assume that, most of the time, a node’s carrier
sensing range is at least twice as big as its transmission range [108]. Thus, when S sends a packet and R is
within the transmission range of S, the nodes within the transmission range of R are likely to be within the
carrier sensing range of S.
We note that in several cases a node may receive a packet above the RX THRESHOLD, but its neigh-
bors do not receive the packet above the CS THRESHOLD. This may occur due to short-term fading or
obstructions in the line-of-sight of a node pair. While DCS-ATIM can recover from such occurrences, we
assume such events are rare.2 In the worst case, when a node detects little or no correlation between its
packet receptions and a neighbor’s carrier sensing of these packets, then the node can fall back to CS-ATIM
to advertise packets to that neighbor.
In DCS-ATIM, two carrier sensing periods follow the beginning of the beacon interval:
1This statement assumes traffic is not so heavy that the ATIM window grows large enough that data packets can never be
sent.
2We do not test these situations in our simulations.
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• CS1: As in CS-ATIM, DCS-ATIM begins with a carrier sensing period of length Tcs during which
time nodes use the protocol from Section 4.1.1 to indicate whether they have packets to advertise. We
refer to this carrier sensing interval as CS1.
• CS2: DCS-ATIM adds a second carrier sensing period, CS2, (of duration Tcs) that immediately follows
CS1. If a node wants its neighbors to use a static ATIM window, as in CS-ATIM, then it transmits
a dummy packet during CS2. Otherwise, its neighbors use the dynamic window scheme described
below. For example, a node may use a static ATIM window if it has not been able to advertise a
packet for the past k intervals. This is a fail-safe mechanism when a packet is unable to be advertised
after attempting for several dynamic windows.
We now describe the protocol after the above two carrier sensing periods when nodes have decided
to use dynamic ATIM windows. First, we give ATIM packets a different maximum contention window
size (CWaw) than data packets (CWmax). In the IEEE 802.11 specification [7] for direct-sequence spread
spectrum (DSSS), the default CWmax is 1023 slots and the default slot time, Tslot, is 20 µs. Using such a
large contention window for ATIMs is unnecessary when the entire ATIM window is typically on the order of
tens of milliseconds. Also, only one ATIM is sent per sender-receiver pair whereas multiple data packets may
then be sent over that link after the ATIM window. Thus, the number of ATIM packets sent in the ATIM
window should be less than or equal to the number of data packets sent following the ATIM window. This
means there should be less nodes contending for access during the ATIM window since each sender-receiver
link contends for the channel only once during the ATIM phase, but potentially multiple times during the
data phase. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to make CWaw < CWmax in most scenarios. Thus, nodes that
have ATIMs to send during the ATIM phase use the same protocol as 802.11 CSMA/CA, but use CWaw as
the maximum contention window size rather than the default CWmax.
At the start of the dynamic ATIM window, every node listens to the channel and sets a timer to expire
after:
Tidle = DIFS + Tslot · CWaw + propmax
+ Tatim + SIFS + propmax + Tack
+DIFS + Tslot · CWaw + propmax
(4.1)
whereDIFS and SIFS are the DCF and Short Interframe Space as specified by IEEE 802.11 [7], respectively.
The values Tatim and Tack are the time durations required to send an ATIM and ATIM-ACK, respectively.
3
3Tatim and Tack are constant since ATIM and ATIM-ACK packets have a fixed, specified size.
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The maximum propagation delay between two nodes is denoted as propmax. Tidle is long enough to give a
node the chance to access the channel after it was in the carrier sensing, but not transmission range, of an
ATIM/ATIM-ACK handshake.
If a node sends or carrier senses a packet before the timer expires, the timer is reset to end Tidle time
after the packet is sent or carrier sensed. To avoid starvation, an upper limit is set on the size that the
dynamic ATIM window can reach. We set this upper bound equal to the default, static ATIM window size,
Taw, used for unmodified 802.11 PSM.
A node may transmit ATIM packets as long as it has sent a packet or received a packet above the
RX THRESHOLD within the past Tidle time. When one of these two conditions is met, it implies that the
node’s neighbors have either received or carrier sensed a packet within the past Tidle interval and, hence,
refreshed their timers to continue listening for ATIM packets. If a node has carrier sensed a packet within
the past Tidle time, but not sent or received a packet during that time, then it must continue to listen for
ATIMs until its timer expires, but it cannot send anymore ATIMs until the next beacon interval. If a node
is unable to send an ATIM for k consecutive intervals, it uses CS1 to let its neighbors know to resort to a
static ATIM window size.
Whenever a node does not send or carrier sense a data packet for Tidle time, or the upper bound on the
dynamic ATIM window is reached, the node ends the ATIM phase and waits for the data phase to begin.
As in 802.11 PSM, if a node sent or received an ATIM during the ATIM window, it remains on for data
communications. Otherwise, the node returns to sleep until the beginning of the next beacon interval. The
data phase begins Taw after the start of the ATIM window. It is postponed until this time to avoid sending
potentially long data packets while other neighbors are trying to transmit ATIMs.
An example of DCS-ATIM compared with 802.11 PSM is given in Figure 4.1. First, DCS-ATIM has
an additional carrier sensing period at the beginning of the beacon interval. Because A has a packet to
advertise, it sends a dummy packet at the start of the beacon interval. In this example, A desires a dynamic
ATIM window, so no dummy packet is sent during the second carrier sensing period. After both carrier
sensing periods have ended, A sends an ATIM to B. In this example, C does not carrier sense anymore
transmissions after B’s ATIM-ACK. Thus, with DCS-ATIM, C returns to sleep Tidle time after receiving
the ATIM-ACK rather than waiting for the entire Taw duration of the ATIM window. With 802.11 PSM,
C must remain on for the entire Taw time of the static ATIM window.
From this description, we see that, in the worst case, the ATIM window for DCS-ATIM uses only slightly
more energy in the ATIM window than 802.11 PSM (for the carrier sensing periods) and may use much less
energy when a small number of ATIMs are sent. In terms of latency, DCS-ATIM may perform worse than
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802.11 PSM if a data packet arrives at the node towards the end of 802.11 PSM’s static ATIM window. In
this case, 802.11 PSM can advertise the packet and send the data in the current beacon interval. By contrast,
if DCS-ATIM’s dynamic ATIM window has already ended, the node may wait until the next beacon interval
to advertise the packet. Additionally, DCS-ATIM may not be able to advertise as many packets as 802.11
PSM if a node with a packet to advertise does not send or receive any packets above the RX THRESHOLD
as discussed above (e.g., a node cannot transmit since it lost contention to the access). In this case, the node
will wait until the next ATIM window to advertise the packet.
4.1.2 Design Discussion
Tidle Length: As shown in Equation 4.1, we set Tidle (the time a node waits before returning to sleep) to
be a static value that is long enough for a sender to lose channel access once and still have its receiver remain
listening to the channel. We chose this value to design for systems where traffic, and, hence, contention, is
rather low. We feel that many power save protocols may operate in such environments where traffic is sparse,
such as sensor networks. In Section 4.1.3, we show that this value works relatively well in the environments
we tested.
If traffic is extremely sparse and usually only one node is transmitting in an area, then using an even
smaller value of Tidle may perform better due to the lack of contention. However, if the environment is such
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that contention increases, then it may be better to choose a larger value of Tidle. Such a situation may occur
in event detecting applications, where a geographically clustered group of sensors may begin contending for
the channel at the same time in response to an event.
The value of Tidle should be chosen appropriately for the expected traffic patterns of the application. If
the amount of traffic has a high deviation (e.g., event detection), it may be beneficial to explore dynamic
values of Tidle. In this scenario, a sender may track a contention metric, such as how often it is unable to
transmit its packet within Tidle time or how many other nodes in its neighborhood are contending. If the
contention metric increases, then a sender can piggyback a new Tidle value on advertisement packets. When
nodes receive new Tidle values from their neighbors, they will choose the largest value as the time that they
use to accommodate their neighbor that expects them to remain on the longest.
In the dynamic scenario, a mechanism must be introduced to allow nodes to reduce their Tidle value when
the contention decreases. A node could keep track of what Tidle value was requested by each neighbor and
when. Then a node would no longer consider that value in deciding which value to use if (1) a soft timer
expires without hearing from that particular neighbor or (2) the neighbor explicitly sends a new, lower Tidle
value, which is then used in future decisions of how long to extend listening. Thus, the Tidle value associated
with each neighbor may be changed implicitly or explicitly. Whenever a neighbor’s Tidle value expires or
changes, the node will again look at its neighbor table to determine which one has the largest Tidle value
and, hence, should be used by the node.
The dynamic adjustment could be further optimized by a sender specifying Tidle times per receiver rather
than using one valued for every neighbor. The main reason that we do not use such a dynamic scheme is
that it significantly increases the amount of coordination and complexity of the protocol. However, future
work could include incorporating such a modification to determine how much traffic variance is necessary
before such a scheme offers significant benefits over our scheme.
Dynamic Thresholds: In our current protocol description, we use RX THRESHOLD and CS THRESHOLD
as the signal strengths necessary for a node to consider its neighbors as still listening and to continue listen-
ing to the channel, respectively. We use these values because they are already specified for other purposes.
However, it is not necessary to use these two values. More generally, we could refer the thresholds as Thrtx
and Thrlisten and adjust them as necessary. That is, Thrtx and Thrlisten are not necessarily equal to
RX THRESHOLD and CS THRESHOLD, respectively.
These thresholds could then be adjusted dynamically in response to the environment. By increasing
Thrtx, a node becomes more conservative in when it considers its neighbors to still be listening and, hence,
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transmits. By decreasing Thrlisten, a node becomes more liberal in when it continues listening to the channel
and, hence, may receive more of a transmitter’s packets, but expends more energy.
If a sender fails to successfully communicate with its receiver using DCS-ATIM and has to fall back to the
original 802.11 PSM protocol, as discussed in Section 4.1.1, then it can increase its Thrtx by some specified
amount. Each sender could also maintain a Thrtx per receiver based on past history. If the sender still
has difficulty in communicating with the receiver, it could piggyback some information (e.g., the number of
beacon intervals the packet has been delayed) in each packet in order to give the receiver an indication that
it should decrease its Thrlisten. Unlike the Thrtx value, a node can only use one Thrlisten value (as opposed
to a separate value per sender) since the receiver does not know which senders may try to transmit in a
given beacon interval.
One major design issue is when to decrease and increase Thrtx and Thrlisten, respectively, in a dynamic
scheme. The benefit of decreasing Thrtx is that the sender may be too conservative in trying to communicate
and unnecessarily delay packets for subsequent beacon intervals when the receiver is in fact still listening in
the current advertisement window. The benefit to increasing Thrlisten is that the node will use less energy
remaining on to listen for potential advertisements.
The difficulty with these rules are as follows. The reasons that a sender/receiver pair would try to decrease
Thrtx or increase Thrlisten are (1) the link and/or connection terminates or (2) their current communication
is acceptable in terms of reliability and they want to try to improve the latency or energy consumption
by changing Thrtx and Thrlisten, respectively. In the first case, a node must keep track of the thresholds
per connection/link and use, for example, soft timers or packet loss to determine when the connection or
link terminates. At this point, the sender can stop using that receiver’s Thrtx value and the receiver can
re-evaluate the Thrlisten value it is using after removing the Thrlisten value for that sender.
The second case is more difficult since it is necessary to know how much a modification in Thrtx or
Thrlisten would effect the reliability. One method may be for the nodes to periodically modify their thresholds
for a neighbor and observe the reliability. Determining the magnitude of the change may be another issue.
Also, it may be the case that, for whatever reason, the observations represent outliers when compared with
the common operating environment and, thus, measure better reliability than will be experienced on averaged
with the thresholds being tested.
We chose to use the RX THRESHOLD and CS THRESHOLD values since they are already specified.
Also, choosing a specific Thrtx and Thrlisten would vary largely by environment and, thus, is difficult to
effectively test in simulation. We chose to use static values of the thresholds to simplify the protocol. As
we can see from the discussion in this section, adding dynamic extensions would greatly complicate the
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protocol. As we show in Section 4.1.3, just using the static value for Thrtx and Thrlisten performs well in
many environments and the added complexity of dynamic values may not be worth the potential additional
improvement in many circumstances.
4.1.3 Simulation Results
To evaluate our protocols, we simulated them by modifying the MAC and physical layers of ns-2 [103]. We
use the notation Ptx, Prx, Plisten, and Psleep to denote the power a node consumes to transmit, receive,
listen, and sleep, respectively. We test the following protocols:
• ALWAYS ON [7]: This is the IEEE 802.11 protocol with no power save. It is the default, unmodified
MAC protocol in ns-2. Because nodes never sleep, ALWAYS ON uses the most energy, but has the
lowest latency.
• 802.11 PSM [7]: This is the standard IEEE 802.11 protocol with power save enabled. 802.11 PSM
is described in Chapter 2.
• CS-ATIM: This is 802.11 PSM with the carrier sensing modification described in Section 3.1.1.
• DCS-ATIM: This is 802.11 PSM with the dynamic ATIM modification for multi-hop networks de-
scribed in Section 4.1.1.
• 802.11 MIN: This protocol needs more explanation because we are unaware of any other work which
uses it. 802.11 MIN represents the minimum latency and energy consumption possible for the IEEE
802.11 protocol. We do not claim, nor believe, that it is optimal across the entire range of possible
MAC protocols. However, it provides a useful baseline to measure other protocols against, since energy
consumption and latency are two competing metrics and the desired tradeoff between these metrics
is application-dependent. The latency for 802.11 MIN is simply equal to the latency for ALWAYS
ON. Generally, ALWAYS ON is better than any power save protocol in latency since a node can
immediately begin contending for medium access rather than waiting for the next scheduled wake-up
time for the sender and receiver. To calculate 802.11 MIN’s energy, a node consumes Ptx power while
sending a packet, Prx power while overhearing a packet, Plisten power while deferring and backing
off as required by IEEE 802.11, and Psleep power at all other times. Essentially, for a given scenario,
802.11 MIN represents the lowest possible energy achievable for nodes using IEEE 802.11 if they slept
as aggressively as possible (i.e., a node sleeps whenever they are not sending a packet or attempting
to access the channel). Obviously, such a protocol is not possible since it requires the receiver to have
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perfect, advance knowledge of when a sender will attempt to begin contending for the channel to send
a packet and wake up at that time (even if the two nodes had never communicated previously).
We use 2 Mbps radios that have a 250m range. Each data point is averaged over 30 tests. The choice
of a different channel bitrate would have the following effects on the protocols. For CS-ATIM, the carrier
sensing period is rate-independent [109]. Thus, if Taw is normalized to the packet transmission time, the
carrier sensing time will be a higher overhead at a high bitrate and a lower overhead at a low bitrate. For
DCS-ATIM, Tidle from Equation 4.1 will be larger for a lower bitrate and smaller for a higher bitrate since
it is a function of how long it takes to transmit ATIM and ATIM-ACK packets.
For each multi-hop scenario, we place 50 nodes uniformly at random in a 1000m × 1000m area and
consider only scenarios in which every node has a route to every other node in the network. To avoid second-
order effects from routing protocols (e.g., the long delay for RREQs to traverse a power save network), we
use Floyd-Warshall’s All-Pairs Shortest Path algorithm [110] to precompute routes for all the nodes.
We vary different parameters for each test, but the following values are used when the parameter is not
being varied. The beacon interval length is 100ms and Taw is 20ms. Five flows send 512 byte data packets at
a rate of 1 kbps per flow (i.e., each flow uses about 0.05% of the channel bitrate per hop). We test the effects
of increasing the per-flow rate. We use a relatively low rate because at high rates, power save protocols
become ineffective since nodes essentially transition to the ALWAYS ON state.
The sender and receiver of each flow are chosen uniformly at random and the traffic is constant bitrate
(CBR) unless otherwise noted. With CS-ATIM, the carrier sensing time, Tcs, is set to 1ms, which is about
66 times larger than the 15µs required by 802.11 compliant hardware. We set Tcs to be large to mitigate the
effects of short-term fading. In DCS-ATIM, the maximum backoff interval size, CWaw , is set to be 63 slots.
For the parameters we use, Tidle is set to 3.19ms according to Equation 4.1. For the power characteristics
of the radio [66, 70], we use: Ptx = 1.4W, Prx = 1.0W, Plisten = 0.83W, and Psleep = 0.13W.
As mentioned earlier, CS-ATIM and DCS-ATIM are vulnerable to false positives when they erroneously
carrier sense the presence of a signal. Thus, in some of our tests we evaluate the effect of false positives
on the protocols by specifying a percentage that represents the probability that a node remains on for the
ATIM window even when none of its neighbors transmitted a dummy packet. For example, a 10% chance of
false probabilities means that with probability 0.1, a node running the protocols remains on for the ATIM
window even though there were no dummy packets transmitted.
In this chapter, we present tests that measure energy consumption and latency by varying the following
parameters:
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• Beacon Interval Time: We vary the length of the beacon interval to increase the amount of sleep
time between beacon epochs.
• Per-Flow Rate: We increase the rate at which each of the flows in the network is sending packets.
• False Positives: For our protocols, we show how false positives (i.e., erroneously detecting the channel
as busy) affect the energy consumption.
In our tests, energy consumption is measured in units of Joules/bit. This is calculated by dividing the
total energy consumed by all nodes in a scenario by the total number of data bits that are received by their
final destination. The latency is calculated as the average end-to-end latency over all packets received by
their final destination in a given scenario.
Evaluating CS-ATIM and DCS-ATIM: First we tested the power consumption and latency of CS-
ATIM and DCS-ATIM. For these tests, we varied the length of the beacon interval from 40ms to 150ms. As
shown in Figure 4.2, all of the power save protocols show a decrease in energy consumption as the beacon
interval is increased since this allows nodes more sleep time between ATIM windows. We see that CS-ATIM
and DCS-ATIM both perform significantly better than 802.11 PSM. CS-ATIM and DCS-ATIM use about
the same amount of energy and consume anywhere from 30% to 60% less energy than 802.11 PSM for the
parameters tested. All protocols do significantly better than ALWAYS ON; even 802.11 PSM consumes
anywhere from 40% to 70% less energy than ALWAYS ON. When compared to 802.11 MIN, CS-ATIM and
DCS-ATIM use only about 18% to 30% more energy. The standard deviation for any single data point in
Figure 4.2 never exceeds 4.5% of the mean.
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The disadvantage of using power save protocols is evident in Figure 4.3 that shows the latency of the
protocols. Just as an increasing beacon interval decreases the energy consumption, it increases the latency
since there is a greater probability packets arrive outside the ATIM window and the time that these packets
have to wait to be advertised increases. ALWAYS ON, and hence 802.11 MIN by definition, always do
significantly better than the power save protocols. The maximum standard deviation for any single point on
a curve in Figure 4.3 is between 34% and 35.8% of its mean depending on the protocol.
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For the power save protocols, 802.11 PSM always has the lowest latency of the power save protocols.
CS-ATIM, however, tends have a slightly higher latency. The difference between CS-ATIM’s latency and the
latency of 802.11 PSM is relatively constant in the range of 8ms to 15ms. This small increase in CS-ATIM
latency is due to the greater probability that packets may arrive during 802.11’s longer ATIM window.
DCS-ATIM has a slightly larger latency than CS-ATIM because of the extra carrier sensing period as well
as the fact that sender’s may occasionally have to postpone their advertisement until a later ATIM window.
In Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 we show how an increased sending rate affects the protocols. In these tests,
the sending rate of each of the five flows is increased from 1 kbps to 10 kbps (i.e., each flow uses about
0.5% of the channel bitrate per hop). We see that DCS-ATIM does even better relative to CS-ATIM in this
setting since a larger fraction of the ATIM windows have at least one advertisement to be sent. In this case,
CS-ATIM has the same energy consumption as 802.11 PSM. However, DCS-ATIM can do better by allowing
nodes to return to sleep earlier when only one advertisement is sent. The maximum standard deviation
for any point on the ALWAYS ON curve in Figure 4.4 is about 0.5% of its mean; for the other curves in
the figure, this standard deviation metric ranges from 8% to 12.5%. In Figure 4.5, the maximum standard
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deviation for any single point on a curve ranges from 34.5% to 42.7% of its mean depending on the protocol.
 0
 0.0001
 0.0002
 0.0003
 0.0004
 0.0005
 0.0006
 0.0007
 0.0008
 0.0009
 40  60  80  100  120  140  160
Jo
ul
es
/B
it
Beacon Interval (ms), ATIM Window = 20 ms
802.11 MIN
ALWAYS ON
802.11 PSM
DCS-ATIM
CS-ATIM
Figure 4.4: Energy vs. beacon interval with 10 kbps flows.
However, as Figure 4.5 shows, this improved relative energy consumption comes at the cost of increased
latency. As the beacon intervals get longer with the higher sending rate, more contention occurs during
the ATIM window and, hence, a greater chance that a node with an ATIM to send will have to delay the
transmission until a later ATIM window, which significantly increases the delay of that packet.
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Figure 4.5: Latency vs. beacon interval with 10 kbps flows.
This increased contention and advertisement delay also explains the gradual increase in energy consump-
tion for DCS-ATIM seen in Figure 4.4. We set DCS-ATIM to resort to CS-ATIM when a packet cannot be
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advertised for three consecutive ATIM windows. Thus, as DCS-ATIM uses more static ATIM windows, its
energy consumption approaches that of CS-ATIM.
In Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, we see this trend as a function of per-flow rate. We note that the figures
show the values of these metrics relative to 802.11 PSM (i.e., 802.11 PSM is always equal to one). CS-ATIM
converges to 802.11 PSM in terms of energy and latency when the load increases to the point that packets
are being advertised every ATIM window. DCS-ATIM, however, tends to plateau relative to 802.11 PSM
when the rate reaches the point where packets are being advertised every beacon interval. In Figure 4.6 and
Figure 4.7, the maximum standard deviation of any single point on any single curve as a percentage of its
mean is 11% and 26%, respectively.
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False Positives As mentioned earlier, our protocols are susceptible to false positives when nodes carrier
sense the channel as busy even though no dummy packet was sent. In this case, nodes waste energy by
staying up for an ATIM window when no packets need to be advertised. In Figure 4.8, we see that CS-ATIM
and DCS-ATIM show a linear increase in energy consumption as the false positive probability increases. In
the worst case, when the false positive probability is equal to 1, the energy consumption of our protocols
converges to slightly more than that of 802.11 PSM since they still have the overhead of carrier sensing. The
maximum standard deviation for any single point on any single curve in Figure 4.8 is 3.6% of its mean.
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4.2 Multi-Level Power Save Routing
In this section, we propose an adaptive sleeping approach for an in-band protocol. This is somewhat different
from our previous work [27–29] on adaptive sleeping for out-of-band protocols in that we use the routing
layer as opposed to only the link layer. The sleep intervals adapt in response to the desired latency of the
traffic on a path.
In particular, we design a routing protocol for networks that use multiple levels of power save protocols.
Each level of power save provides a different energy-latency tradeoff (i.e., a level with a lower latency requires
more energy). We note that this paradigm is a generalization of the environment in [66, 67] (discussed in
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Section 2.1.3) where only two levels of power save are assumed (i.e., (1) not using any power save and (2)
using 802.11 PSM). This allows applications (e.g., sensor reports) to achieve an acceptable latency while
reducing energy consumption in the network.
By incorporating the routing layer in the power save process, we believe that the energy-latency tradeoff
can be better adapted to fit the needs of an application. For example, consider the scenario where data
packets are being sent from A to C via the route A → B → C. Using network layer information, we can
design power save protocols to consider the whole route. In pure link-layer-based approaches, the power save
protocol would run independently at links A→ B and B→ C.
The idea of using multilevel design to achieve acceptable tradeoffs is prevalent in computer science
(see [111] and references therein). For example, in computer architecture, accessing cache is much faster
than main memory. However, main memory is cheaper in terms of cost per byte and is capable of storing
much more data.
In Section 4.2.1, we give an overview of the link layer protocol that provides multilevel power save. In
Section 4.2.2, we describe our routing protocol to effectively use multilevel power save. We present simulation
results in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Link Layer Protocol Description
First, we need to specify how the link layer power save protocols can be designed to provide k levels of
power save, each with different energy-latency characteristics. Many power save protocols can be adapted to
achieve this as discussed later in this section. We use 802.11 PSM [7] as the underlying power save protocol,
which is described in detail in Chapter 2. This protocol is used because it is in-band and for the reasons
discussed in Section 2.1.1, such as well-documented specification and widespread usage.
The 802.11 PSM protocol can be adapted to provide k levels of power save by changing how frequently
a node wakes up to listen during an ATIM window based on its current power save level. We denote these
k power save levels as PS0, . . . , PSk−1. Without loss of generality, we assume that PS0 corresponds to the
“always on” state and PSk−1 uses the least amount of energy, but has the highest latency. In PS0, the
nodes never sleep and, thus, can receive a packet with the lowest latency, but also consume the most energy.
The next level, PS1 corresponds to the standard implementation of 802.11 PSM. That is, when a node is
not sending or receiving any packets, it wakes up for every ATIM window and sleeps for the remainder of
the beacon interval. In PS2, nodes wake up only every other ATIM window. This allows them to save about
twice as much energy as the nodes in level PS1 while also doubling the latency to send or receive a packet.
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Because we want to ensure that every node has their ATIM overlap with every other node periodically,
we increase the sleep time for each level by a factor of two. This is a simple method to guarantee overlap,
but more complicated schedules [41, 42] may work as well. Thus, to calculate the beacon interval for level
PSi, we have:
BIi = 2
i−1 ×BIbase , when i > 0 (4.2)
where BIi is the beacon interval for the i-th power save level and BIbase is the base beacon interval specified
for the system (i.e., BI1 = BIbase).
Figure 4.9 illustrates the multilevel link layer protocol with k = 4. In this figure, AW corresponds to the
ATIM window size and we show only the case in which no traffic is being sent. The beacon intervals of the
four power save levels are: BI0 = 0, BI1 = t1 − t0, BI2 = t2 − t0, and BI3 = t4 − t0. The base interval is t1
(i.e., BIbase = t1).
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Figure 4.9: Multilevel power save with 802.11 PSM [7].
The largest possible beacon interval, BIk−1, serves as the reference point for all of the nodes to ensure
that they remain in phase. That is, the first ATIM window for which a node awakes in a cycle must always
occur at the beginning of a reference point beacon interval (that is spaced BIk−1 time units after the previous
reference point). The reference points in Figure 4.9 are at t0 and t4.
Since we assume that the nodes are synchronized, each node is initialized with the time of the previous
reference point. Alternatively, if a node is added to the network later, it can learn the time of the previous
reference point from older nodes in the network, along with the ATIM window size, BIbase, and the number
of power levels the network is using via 802.11 management frames. This guarantees that for any two nodes,
one with PSi and the other with power level PSj where i < j, then the node with PSi will be awake during
every ATIM interval that the node with PSj is awake since BIj is divisible by BIi.
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Each node keeps track of its neighbors’ power save state as follows. On every data and ACK packet a
node sends, it attaches its current power save level. We do not test the consistency of a node’s power save
table. However, our protocol could use a scheme similar to the one in [66] whereby the first time a packet
transmission fails, a node sets the intended receiver’s power save state to PSk−1. Recall that PSk−1 has the
longest beacon interval and all nodes, no matter what power state, are guaranteed to wake up every BIk−1
time units. Thus, if the neighbor still exists near the node, communication should be possible during this
beacon interval. If a transmission fails again for the receiver using PSk−1, then the link is considered dead
and reported to upper layers.
This is just one example of how a power save protocol can be modified to achieve multiple levels with
different energy-latency tradeoffs. Other examples include adjusting the time between listening periods in
protocols such as STEM [2, 3] and WiseMAC [58]. Nodes using a longer sleeping time between listening
periods would save more energy, but require a longer latency to be awakened by neighbors.
4.2.2 Routing Protocol Description
In Section 4.2.1, we described how to provide multilevel power save. In this section, we describe a routing
protocol to efficiently use multilevel power save. If energy consumption is the only concern, the optimal
adaptive sleeping strategy is simply for every node to select PSk−1 as their power save state. However, this
results in large delays due to the power save protocol that may be unacceptable for many applications.
Thus, our protocol works by taking an application-defined latency bound and trying to find a route to
achieve the bound while attempting to minimize the increase in energy consumption. We focus on only
the latency induced by the power save protocol because this delay tends to be large (e.g., hundreds of
milliseconds or even seconds per hop) relative to contention and queuing delay in non-congested networks.
In highly congested networks, power save protocols would most likely not be used. A vast body of QoS
research deals with congestion and queuing delay which we view as orthogonal and complementary to our
work.
If we are given a set ofm flows to route (F1, F2, . . . , Fm) and a desired latency for each flow (L1, L2, . . . , Lm),
finding routes that minimize the overall energy consumption increase for the flows is NP-complete. A proof
of this is presented in Appendix B. In this work, therefore, we consider heuristics to address the problem.
We modify DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) [77] to obtain our routing protocol. We now give a brief
overview of the salient aspects of DSR. When a source, S, wants to send packets to a destination, D, it must
first discover a route. To do this, S broadcasts a route request packet (RREQ) that is flooded throughout
the network specifying that it is trying to find a route to D. Each node, other than D, that receives S’s
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RREQ will add itself to a node list in the packet and rebroadcast the RREQ (assuming that the TTL
of the RREQ has not expired).4 Each RREQ is rebroadcast only once by an intermediate node. So, if
multiple copies of the same RREQ are received by a node, as determined by a unique sequence number for
the request, the node will forward only the first one that it receives. If the RREQ reaches D, it generates
a route reply (RREP ) packet and sends it to the source.5 The RREP packet is generated by reversing the
node list in the RREQ and sending the RREP along the path specified by the node list. The entire node
list is included in the payload of the RREP packet and is also used for source routing the packet to S. A
node that receives a source-routed packet will only forward it if the node’s ID is next on this node list. To
do so, it transmits the packet to the next node ID specified on the list. In this manner, the RREP makes
its way back to S. At this point, S extracts the node list from the payload of the RREP and uses it as
the source route to forward data packets. That is, every data packet that S sends will have the node list
appended to the routing header.
We modify DSR as follows. The RREQ sender adds its desired latency, L, for the flow to the RREQ
packet. When forwarding the RREQ, each node will append its current power save state in addition to its
node ID. When D receives its first RREQ from S, it will set a timer for some specified time, Tdelay.
6 D will
not send a RREP until this timer expires. While the timer is running, D will collect all RREQs with the
same sequence number that it receives from S. At the end of this Tdelay time, D will evaluate all the paths
it has received from these RREQs and send an RREP along the “best” path. Next, we specify the routing
metrics that are used to determine which path to use.
The goal of our routing metric is to find the path that can achieve the desired latency, L, (specified in
the RREQ) while increasing the energy consumption in the network the least. To do this, we consider paths
that have been collected during the RREQ reception phase. For each path, we find the node on the path
whose energy consumption will increase the least by moving to the next higher energy state (and, hence,
lowering the latency for that hop). We continue iterating in this manner until the path’s end-to-end power
save-induced latency is less than L or all nodes are in the highest energy state. At this point, we store the
total energy increase for the path that was necessary for the iteration to terminate. Once this has been
done for all the paths, we send the RREP on the path that requires the smallest total energy consumption
increase. If two or more paths are tied for the minimum cost, then our protocol prefers routes with the
4Non-destination nodes replying to RREQs using cached routes is one of many extensions that has been proposed for DSR.
We do not use cached replies in our work.
5Another option in DSR is whether the destination replies to every RREQ it receives or just the first one. In our protocol,
the RREP procedure is modified, but the destination will send only one RREP per RREQ.
6Another option is that a node replies after receiving some number, say x, RREQs even if the Tdelay timer has not yet
expired. For example, if x = 1, then a node would just calculate the power save state changes required for the path on the first
RREQ that it receives and use that path (and disregard all subsequent RREQs for that route discovery). If x = 2, the node
would consider only the first two RREQs that it receives and cancel the Tdelay timer if it has not yet expired.
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lowest hop count.7 Our algorithm is shown in Figures 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12.
Each node receiving the RREP will check the requested power save level set for it by the destination.
If the requested power save level is a higher energy level than its current level, then the node switches to
the new power save level. Otherwise, it will remain in its current power save state since it is sufficient to
maintain the desired latency of the path.
Find-Route(R,L)
1 /*****
2 * Find route on which to send the RREP
3 * given a list, R, of received RREQs
4 * and latency threshold, L
5 *****/
6
7 isF irst← true
8 for each r in R
9 do cost← Energy-Increase(r, L)
10 if isF irst or cost < min
11 then min = cost
12 minRREQ = r
13 isF irst← false
14
15 /* Set the requested power levels for the chosen path */
16 Array-Copy(psLevels[minRREQ], newPsLevels[minRREQ])
17
18 /* Reply using the path from minRREQ */
19 Send-RREP(minRREQ)
Figure 4.10: Algorithm for determining which path to use from collected RREQs.
The Find-Route function in Figure 4.10 finds the route to use based on R, the set of RREQs that have
been collected. For each RREQ, Find-Route calls Energy-Increase (discussed below) to calculate the
cost of using the RREQ’s route in terms of how much the energy consumption of the path must be increased
to reach the latency threshold, L. At the end of the for loop, the least costly path is found and the power
save states are set to the new power levels necessary to achieve the latency threshold (newPsLevels is a
global variable set in Energy-Increase). With these updated power levels, the RREP is constructed and
sent along the chosen path via the call to Send-RREP.
The Energy-Increase function in Figure 4.11 computes the minimum increase in energy consumption
necessary for the path in a RREQ, r, to achieve the desired latency, L. First, the function makes a copy of
the power save levels of the nodes in r’s path (psLevels[r]) since our algorithm needs to change this state.
The energyCost variable keeps a running total of the increase in energy consumption required for r’s path to
reach L. The while loop on line 21 will continue until the latency of the path is less than L (we assume that
7We note that other metrics such expected number of transmissions or packet loss [112] could be used instead.
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Energy-Increase(r,L)
1 /*****
2 * Find the minimum energy consumption increase required
3 * for the path in a RREP , r, to achieve a wake-up
4 * latency less than or equal to L.
5 *****/
6
7 /*****
8 * psLevels[r] contains the current power save level
9 * of each node along the path in r.
10 * psLevels[r] is an array with an element for each node on the path.
11 *****/
12
13 /* pathLen[r] is the length of the path in r */
14
15 Array-Copy(newPsLevels[r], psLevels[r])
16 energyCost← 0
17 /*****
18 * We assume that Path-Latency ≤ L
19 * when newPsLevels[r][i] = 0 for all i on the path
20 *****/
21 while Path-Latency(r) > L
22 do isF irst← true
23 for i← 1 to pathLen[r]
24 do cost← Energy-Diff(newPsLevels[r][i], (newPsLevels[r][i]− 1))
25 if cost 6= 0 and (isF irst or cost < min)
26 then min = cost
27 minIndex = i
28 isF irst← false
29 energyCost← energyCost+ min
30 newPsLevels[r][minIndex]← newPsLevels[r][minIndex]− 1
31 return energyCost
Figure 4.11: Algorithm for computing cost of a path to reach latency threshold L.
this will always terminate in the pseudocode). Each iteration of the while loop will calculate the difference
in energy consumption that would result for each node in r’s path if its current power save state was moved
to the next lower latency power save state (i.e., moving from PSi to PSi−1). This calculation is done via
the call to Energy-Diff, which is discussed below. Once the for loop on line 23 has terminated, we have
identified the node on r’s path who can transition to a lower latency power save state with the smallest
increase in energy consumption. At this point, we transition to the lower latency power save state (using
the newPsLevels variable) and increment energyCost by the energy consumption increase required. When
the path latency (calculated by the Path-Latency function call) is less than L, the while loop terminates
and returns energyCost.
The Path-Latency function in Figure 4.11 (line 21) can be computed in terms of worst-case latency,
average-case latency, or some other metric. We assume that a node j is using the kj-th power level. Thus,
PSkj denotes its power save level and BIkj is the length of its beacon interval. Thus, for a path of n nodes,
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and the worst-case latency metric, our protocol considers the route for use if:
BIk1 +BIk2 + · · ·+BIkn < L (4.3)
Energy-Diff(oldLevel, newLevel)
1 /*****
2 * Find the difference in energy consumption for
3 * switching from the lower energy oldLevel
4 * to the higher energy newLevel
5 *****/
6
7 /*****
8 * atimSize is a parameter specified elsewhere.
9 * It is the size of the ATIM window in units of time.
10 *****/
11
12 if oldLevel = 0 or newLevel > oldLevel
13 then return 0
14
15 oldEnergy ← atimSize
beaconIntervalSize[oldLevel]
16 if newLevel > 0
17 then newEnergy← atimSize
beaconIntervalSize[newLevel]
18 else newEnergy← 1
19 return (newEnergy − oldEnergy)
Figure 4.12: Algorithm for computing the energy consumption difference between two power save levels.
The Energy-Diff function in Figure 4.12 computes an energy cost for transitioning from one power
save state to a lower latency power save state. We compute the energy consumption of a power save state
as the ATIM window size (atimSize, whose value is set elsewhere) divided by the power save state’s beacon
interval size (i.e., BIi). The beaconIntervalSize variable is an array indexed by the beacon interval sizes for
each power save state. Note that this energy consumption calculation considers only the energy consumption
when nodes are not awake after the ATIM window. When nodes are awake following the ATIM window,
the energy consumption used in the subsequent beacon interval is the same regardless of the power save
state. As an example, let atimSize = 20ms, and BIi = 200ms and BIi−1 = 100ms. In this case, Energy-
Diff(PSi, PSi−1) will return 20100 − 20200 = 0.1.
Though we do not test this in our simulations, each node must set a soft timer for each flow for which
it forwards packets so that it can revert to lower energy states whenever that flow ceases or the route fails.
Because the inter-arrival time for the packets on a flow is highly application dependent, we propose letting
the application specify this timeout value and piggybacking it on data packets sent by the flow. Whenever a
flow times out or explicitly indicates that it will no longer use the route, the node transitions into the lowest
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energy power save state that is still acceptable to the flows which continue to use that node on their route,
as indicated by the power save levels specified for the node in RREPs that it has received.
4.2.3 Design Discussion
Wake-Up Schedules: As described in Section 4.2.1, we use a simple link layer protocol to provide multiple
levels of power save. Basically, the beacon interval either increases by a factor of two or decreases by half
depending on whether the node is moving to a lower or higher energy state, respectively. An alternative is
to use more complex wake-up schemes that provide overlap either deterministically or probabilistically.
In general, probabilistic protocols (e.g., [44]) are not appropriate in our design since they essentially add
more uncertainty to an already unreliable channel. Additionally, these protocols make even soft real-time
constraints more difficult to obtain. Thus, we do not consider probabilistic approaches for our protocol.
By contrast, protocols that give deterministic overlap in an asynchronous manner (e.g., [41,42]) do allow
soft real-time latency bounds. The basic idea is that each node wakes up according to some pattern that is
guaranteed to overlap within some bound with every other node even though they may be unsynchronized.
The major advantage of this approach is that it makes synchronization less necessary. However, it can greatly
increase the protocol complexity since the wake-up schedules have to be chosen appropriately and nodes still
must probe to find out when the overlap occurs since they have no prior knowledge. Additionally, broadcast
is a problem since there is no single time where a node is guaranteed to have all of its neighbors listening.
We do not use a deterministic asynchronous protocol because we are not concerned with synchronization
and we need a relatively reliable and low overhead broadcast mechanism for the route discovery in our work.
This also frees us from the added complexity such a scheme would add to focus on the major idea of routing
with multiple power save levels.
Another option is to have one, long “master” beacon interval in which everyone is awake (i.e., PSk−1
in our protocol). Then, each node chooses its own beacon interval independently based on the RREPs it
receives and lets each communicating neighbor know the next time it is scheduled to awake. Nodes then
keep track of the next wake-up time for each node with which they are communicating. This frees the nodes
from the need to use specified discrete intervals and allows them to use any interval up to PSk−1. Broadcast
is still possible, as in our scheme, where broadcasts are sent only during the “master”, or PSk−1, interval.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires the nodes to keep more per flow state. Also, it is more
susceptible to nodes returning to sleep too early since nodes waking up experience contention from data
packets, not just ATIM packets as in our scheme. Data packets tend to be significantly larger than ATIM
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packets. In future work, one could more fully explore this idea to see under what conditions the early sleep
problem makes this protocol worse than our current version.
Soft Timers: As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, we use soft timers per flow passing through a node to
determine when it can revert to a lower energy state. We believe that this is acceptable since, in many
environments, a node will have only a few flows passing through it. Of course, a node can always choose not
to handle additional flows if its per flow state becomes excessive.
An alternative to this design decision is to require a sender to explicitly “delete” a flow by sending a
packet along the path when it is finished. We feel that this method would be unacceptable in multihop
wireless network settings due to the inherent underlying reliability of the channel and devices. Because links
and flows can fail unexpectedly, a node would permanently keep state for dead flows for which the flow was
not deleted. Eventually, this could exhaust the node’s memory resources. Thus, overall, we feel that the per
flow state required to maintains soft timers for this purpose is best for the environment we are considering.
Routing Techniques: We choose to use DSR [77], a source routing protocol, in our work as described in
Section 4.2.1. An alternative would be to use a distance vector approach, like AODV [78]. The disadvantage
of using AODV (or another distance vector protocol) is that nodes learn only aggregate information about
the path during routing as opposed to DSR which provides per node information. In the algorithms discussed
in Section 4.2.1, we need per node information. In this aspect, DSR provides a superset of the information
that AODV does. Because our algorithms do not work with the information from AODV, we use DSR in
our work.
Another choice would be to use link state routing [113], such as OLSR [114]. Nodes could flood the
network whenever their power save level changes or a link breaks. The obvious disadvantage of this approach
is the high overhead to flood the network if power save states are changing relatively frequently. Also, as
shown if Appendix B, even if the entire topology is accurately known, it is still NP-complete to find the
minimal energy consumption increase required for a desired latency. Thus, the advantage of knowing the
entire topology, as opposed DSR which learns just a few paths, is not easily exploited. At the very least, we
could find the k shortest paths [115], given the entire topology, and run the algorithms from Section 4.2.1
on each of these paths. In future work, it would be interesting to test a link state routing protocol versus
our DSR implementation to determine which performs better under different metric change frequencies and
network sizes.
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4.2.4 Simulation Results
To evaluate our protocol, we simulated it using ns-2 [103]. We test the following schemes, where the bold
text is the name we use to refer to the scheme and the italicized text indicates the (Routing, MAC) tuple
used:
• Always On [7, 77] (DSR, 802.11): This is the IEEE 802.11 protocol with no power save. It is the
default, unmodified MAC protocol in ns-2. Because nodes never sleep, ALWAYS ON uses the most
energy, but has the lowest latency.
• 802.11 PSM [7,77] (DSR, 802.11 PSM): This is the standard IEEE 802.11 protocol with power save
enabled. 802.11 PSM is described in Chapter 2. The beacon interval for this protocol is set to the
longest beacon interval for a given k value.
• CS-ATIM (DSR, CS-ATIM): This is 802.11 PSM with our proposed carrier sensing modification
described in Section 3.1.1. The beacon interval for this protocol is set to the longest beacon interval
for a given k value.
• Multilevel PSM (Multilevel DSR, Multilevel 802.11 PSM): This is our proposed multilevel power
save protocol described in Section 4.2 using 802.11 PSM.
• Multilevel CS-ATIM (Multilevel DSR, Multilevel CS-ATIM): This is our proposed multilevel power
save protocol described in Section 4.2 using the CS-ATIM protocol that we proposed in Section 3.1.1.
We use 2 Mbps radios that have a 250m range. Each data point is averaged over 30 tests. The ATIM
window is 20ms and the base beacon interval, BIbase, is 100ms. Our topologies are generated by placing 50
nodes uniformly at random in a 1000m×1000m area. Each scenario has five flows among randomly chosen
source and destination pairs. Each flow sends at rate one packet per second using CBR traffic. We set Tdelay,
the time that a destination waits to collect RREQs to be 500ms. In our experiments, we set L to be the
same value for all flows in the network and do not test the more general case where each flow could select
its own L value.
Since our protocols are designed to only achieve soft real-time bounds on latency, it is important to
consider the standard deviation of our latency results. This gives us an indication of how well the protocols
are able to stay within the bounds over multiple runs. To avoid cluttering our figures with standard deviation
bars, we provide the numerical values in Table 4.1 (we will refer to this table in our discussion of the results).
In this table, we give the standard deviation for each protocol in each latency figure as a percentage of the
mean for the corresponding data point. We use the percentage since the mean values can vary significantly
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which makes the absolute values of the standard deviations difficult to compare. We compute the standard
deviation averaged over all data points for the protocol as well as the maximum standard deviation of any
one data point on a protocol’s curve. Additionally, we have plotted the standard deviation bars for the
latency of the multilevel protocols to show their deviation relative to the desired latency bound.
Table 4.1: Standard deviation as percentage of mean for latency figures (Average | Maximum).
Figure 4.14 Figure 4.16 Figure 4.19
Always On 29.06 29.06 25.99 25.99 29.00 29.00
802.11 PSM 33.77 52.54 29.39 29.39 56.94 56.94
Multilevel PSM 20.03 22.75 26.33 29.04 23.46 53.28
Multilevel CS-ATIM 17.61 19.43 24.86 35.56 22.04 61.39
CS-ATIM 36.06 52.01 26.94 26.94 43.72 43.72
Figure 4.13 shows energy consumption of the protocols when L = 300ms. The horizontal axis is k, the
maximum number of power save levels. Since Tbase = 100ms, k = 2 corresponds to the traditional 802.11
protocol where a node can either be on or using a power save protocol with a beacon interval of 100ms.
From the figure, we see that all the power save protocols use significantly less energy than the Always On
protocol.
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Figure 4.13: Effects of the number of power save levels on energy.
We see that the multilevel PSM protocol uses about 33% to 50% more energy than the traditional PSM
protocol. However, this increase in energy comes with a huge reduction in latency as shown in Figure 4.14.
In this figure, we measure only the latency for packets that are sent after the source has received the RREP .
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The source queues packets while waiting for the RREP , which makes their delay rather large and can skew
the average end-to-end delay of the rest of the packets.
The multilevel protocols achieve a delay of around 140ms to 180ms, which is well within the L = 300ms
bound that was given. By contrast, the non-multilevel protocols have a latency of just over 300ms when
k = 2 and increase to over 3000ms when k = 5. For k = 3 and k = 4, we notice that the average latency
is approximately double that of using the next lower latency power save state (i.e., k = 3 latency is about
double that of k = 2 and k = 4 is twice as much as k = 3). However, when k = 5, the latency more than
doubles over that of k = 4. The reason for this is that ATIM window contention causes significant delays.
Since the ATIM window size is static regardless of k and the traffic rate remains the same, more packets
need to be advertised in the ATIM window when k = 5 as opposed to, say, k = 2. The increased contention
reaches a point where some nodes are unable to send an ATIM when they first try and must wait another
beacon interval. This greatly degrades latency since the beacon intervals are longer for larger values of k.
When k = 5, each hop has a wake-up latency of 800ms plus the increased ATIM contention. With the
multilevel power save protocols, the routing protocol adjusts the power save level of nodes along a path to
ensure that the latency is less than L.
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Figure 4.14: Effects of the number of power save levels on latency.
Additionally, we can see from Table 4.1 that the multilevel protocols in Figure 4.14 have a lower deviation
in their latency among different runs than the corresponding protocol without the multilevel extension. The
multilevel protocols have a deviation of about 20% on average, whereas PSM and CS-ATIM without the
multilevel extension have about a 35% deviation on average. This is due to the fact that a wider range of
average latencies are possible in the non-multilevel protocols for different topologies and traffic patterns.
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From Figure 4.13, we can see that our carrier sense techniques from Section 3.1.1 integrate nicely with
the multilevel power save scheme. In particular, by using CS-ATIM, we are able to achieve virtually the
same latency at using PSM (and well below the L threshold) while consuming less energy than the PSM
version of multilevel power save. All of the protocols seem to plateau at a point where the utility of adding
more power save levels diminishes. The multilevel CS-ATIM protocol seems to reach this plateau with only
two power save levels and shows only a slight decrease in energy consumption after this point.
In Figure 4.15, Figure 4.16, and Figure 4.17, we set k = 2 and show the effects of changing L, the desired
latency, on energy consumption and the observed latency, respectively. Again, we see that the multilevel
power save protocols achieve the latency bound with only a slight increase in energy. In particular, we can
see that, for k = 2, if a latency of less than about 300ms is desired, then the power save protocols that do
not use multilevel power save cannot achieve this. Without multilevel power save, the only option would be
to turn off power save which, as we can see from Figure 4.15, substantially increases energy consumption by
more than a factor of two. Furthermore, in Figure 4.17, we can see that virtually none of the individual runs
exceed the latency bound when using the multilevel extension. We note that a few of the flows do exceed the
latency bound by a small amount. This occurs because our protocol adjusts the power save induced latency
and does not account for transmission times and queuing delays. Thus, our protocol occasionally sets the
power save states such that they are close to or equal to L, but the extra delays make the observed latency
slightly higher than L.
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Figure 4.15: Latency threshold versus energy consumption using two power save levels.
In Figure 4.18, Figure 4.19, and Figure 4.20, we show the effects of changing L for k = 3. We can see
that the multilevel power save protocols use slightly more energy relative to the other power save protocols
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Figure 4.16: Latency threshold versus observed latency using two power save levels.
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Figure 4.17: Latency threshold versus observed latency using two power save levels.
than for the k = 2 case. However, the multilevel power save protocols are also much more useful in achieving
the latency bound. In Figure 4.19, we can see that an application with L up to about 600ms cannot achieve
its bound without the use of multilevel power save protocols or turning off power save all together. The
600ms is a function of the average hop count in the network and beacon interval size. From Figure 4.16
and Figure 4.19, we can infer that the average hop count is approximately three in our scenarios since the
latency with a 100ms beacon interval is about 300ms and with a 200ms beacon interval is about 600ms. As
with the k = 2 case, we can see in Figure 4.20 that virtually none of the individual runs exceed the latency
bound when using the multilevel extension. As discussed earlier, the bound is occasionally exceeded since
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our protocol only accounts for the power save induced latency whereas the observed value is also affected by
the packet transmission time and queuing delay.
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Figure 4.18: Latency threshold versus energy consumption using three power save levels.
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Figure 4.19: Latency threshold versus observed latency using three power save levels.
4.2.5 Extensions
Energy Load Balancing As in previous work [116–118], it is still a concern that certain nodes that are
chosen to have a high energy power save state early may end up receiving a disproportionate amount of the
network’s traffic because they have a favorable metric. To address this, we propose that higher energy nodes
periodically try to “patch” their place on the route with another node with a power level less than or equal
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Figure 4.20: Latency threshold versus observed latency using three power save levels.
to it that can be reached by both its upstream and downstream neighbors on the route. A node could try
this procedure when its residual energy falls below a specified level or when its recent energy consumption
rate exceeds a certain level.
Such a situation may occur when two nodes, say A and B, are equivalent from a routing perspective and
are in the same power save state when the RREQ is initially broadcast. In this circumstance, node A may
be selected, for example, because it wins access to the channel before B and rebroadcasts the RREQ first.
Thus, patching would allow A to eventually switch places with B to balance the energy consumption of the
two nodes.
We note that others [67] propose delaying the RREQ proportional to remaining energy. However, a node
with more energy at the time of the RREQ may eventually consume more energy than its neighbors and
require load balancing. Also, such a scheme assumes a homogeneous environment where all devices have the
same initial energy and/or they all consume energy at the same rate. In practice, this may not be true.
To do this, the node desiring the patch, say P , broadcasts a message that is received by both its upstream
and downstream neighbors (nbrup and nbrdown, respectively) asking them each to broadcast a packet to test
which nodes are neighbors to both nbrup and nbrdown. This packet also includes P ’s residual energy. Any
node that receives both the packet broadcast by nbrup and nbrdown and has more residual energy that P is
a candidate to replace P on the path. Such nodes respond to P and then P can select the node with the
highest remaining residual energy. Standard techniques such as choosing a backoff interval proportional to
a node’s residual energy can be used to ensure that nodes with a higher residual energy reply first.
The process of patching a route is shown in Figure 4.21. Here, we assume that traffic is being sent along
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the route A→ B → C and that B wants to try to remove itself from the path. Thus, B sends out a broadcast
indicating that it wants to try to patch the route between A and C. In turn, A and C broadcast a packet
to help other nodes determine their reachability. In this example, N1, N2, and N3 cannot take B’s place
because they do not have both A and C as neighbors. The only two candidates to take B’s place are N4
and N5, since both are neighbors of both A and C. In order for N5 to take B’s place, it would be necessary
for it to communicate this to B via A and/or C. This is in contrast to N4, which can communicate with B
directly. This implies that the communication overhead and complexity for N4 to be used is less than if N5
is used. In order for N4 or N5 to take B’s place on the route, they need to have more residual energy than
B.
N1 N2 N3
N4
N5
A B C
Figure 4.21: Patching a route in multilevel power save.
If a node is part of multiple, disjoint routes, it can still try this patch procedure incrementally by applying
it to the path which requires the highest energy level until an acceptable level is reached. We note that in
this scenario, a node may also need to account for the rate at which traffic is being forwarded on a given
path since flows which require a lower energy power save level, say flow, may still cause the node to consume
more energy than a flow that requires a higher power save level, say fhigh, if the flow is sending at a higher
rate that fhigh. Another issue is instability in the route if two neighbors try to patch their place on the
route simultaneously. If a node hears a patch request from one of its neighbors, it defers from issuing a patch
request until the current one is resolved or a timeout occurs.
We have not evaluated this protocol extension. Adding it to the protocol and testing it via simulation
and/or implementation is an area of future work.
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4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed methods of adaptive sleep and listening intervals for power save protocols. In
Section 4.1, we propose an adaptive listening technique where a node adjusts the time that spend checking
for wake-up signals in response to transmissions in its neighborhood. This is especially beneficial when only
a few advertisement packets need to be sent in each listening interval. In this case, nodes who are not the
recipient of a wake-up signal can return to sleep much sooner.
In Section 4.2, we present an adaptive sleeping technique that allows nodes to adjust their sleeping interval
in response to the desired latency of data that it is forwarding. We find that our proposed protocol allows
end-to-end latency bounds to be achieved with much less energy consumption than turning power save off.
The protocol can maintain a desired latency bound with only a slight increase in energy consumption over
traditional power save protocols.
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Chapter 5
Adaptive Broadcast Dissemination
Framework
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we have proposed energy-efficient designs primarily for unicast traffic. In
this chapter, we look at power save with respect to broadcast traffic. Multihop broadcast is used in many
wireless network applications. Some common uses of multihop broadcast include discovering routing paths,
sinks querying sensors for data, and distributing code updates throughout the network.
With respect to broadcast, power save protocols generally expose two options to the user. First, if no
power save is used, then the broadcast can achieve a relatively low latency, but at the expense of large energy
costs to listen for broadcasts. The second option is to use the power save protocol. This option conserves
much less energy than the first, but has a high latency that may be unacceptable to some applications.
In our work, we propose a lightweight protocol to augment existing protocols that allows broadcast
propagation to be more energy efficient while still achieving a desired latency. In this chapter, we present
PBBF, Probability-Based Broadcast Forwarding, and explore the resulting energy-latency-reliability trade-
offs that emerge. Additionally, we describe our implementation of PBBF on sensor hardware in TinyOS [11]
in Section 5.3.
5.1 Protocol Description
We propose Probability-Based Broadcast Forwarding (PBBF) that can be used in conjunction with any
power save protocol that has the following characteristics:
1. Nodes are scheduled to sleep at certain times.
2. A mechanism exists which ensures that all of a node’s neighbors will be awake at the same time to
receive a broadcast.
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While we focus on a synchronous power save protocol in this chapter, asynchronous and out-of-band protocols
with these characteristics could also use PBBF. For example, in an out-of-band protocol, nodes could be
scheduled to sleep between epochs when they sample the out-of-band channel for a wake-up signal. Then,
for broadcasts, a node could wake up all of its neighbors by transmitting a wake-up signal long enough that
each of its neighbors has time to detect it. For deterministic asynchronous protocols, the nodes would be
scheduled to sleep in certain slots and there could be one common slot scheduled at certain times.
We use IEEE 802.11 PSM [7] as the base protocol to demonstrate PBBF. Particularly relevant to this
work is the fact that 802.11 PSM, unlike many power save protocols, specifies a protocol for broadcast.
Additionally, some protocols designed specifically for sensors, such as S-MAC [45], are similar to IEEE
802.11 and use many of its mechanisms.
The goal of PBBF is to achieve a specified reliability, with high probability, while allowing a wide-range
of tradeoffs in energy consumption and latency. Specifically, we focus on two definitions of reliability in this
work: (1) the average fraction of nodes that receive a broadcast and (2) the average fraction of broadcasts
received by a node.
PBBF introduces two new parameters to a power save protocol: p and q. The first parameter, p, is the
probability that a node rebroadcasts a packet in the current active time even though not all neighbors may
be awake to receive the broadcast. With probability (1− p), the node will wait to send the packet according
to the power save protocol. The second parameter, q, represents the probability that a node remains on after
the active time when it normally would sleep (the length of time that a node remains on is a parameter of the
power save protocol being used). With probability (1− q), the node sleeps as it would in the original power
save protocol. Even with these modifications, a node still only rebroadcasts a packet once. In Section 5.3.1,
we introduce a third parameter that allows a node to rebroadcast a packet twice for added reliability.
Figure 5.1 shows pseudo-code of changes to any sleep scheduling protocol required for PBBF. The original
sleep scheduling protocol is a special case of PBBF with p = 0 and q = 0. The always-on mode (i.e., no
active-sleep cycles) can be approximated by setting p = 1 and q = 1. PBBF may be slightly different from
always-on in this case. For example, in synchronous protocols, there may still be byte overhead (e.g., sending
advertisements) and temporal overhead (i.e., PBBF cannot send data packets during the advertisement
window).
Intuitively, we can see that the p and q parameters will have the following effects.
Energy: As q increases, energy consumption increases. Changing p has a negligible effect on energy con-
sumption.
77
Sleep-Decision-Handler()
1 /* Called at the end of active time */
2 /* If stayOn is true, then remain on; else sleep*/
3 stayOn← false
4
5 if DataToSend = true or DataToRecv = true
6 then
7 stayOn← true
8 else if Uniform-Rand(0, 1) < q
9 then stayOn← true
Receive-Broadcast(pkt)
1 /* Called when broadcast packet pkt is received */
2 if Uniform-Rand(0, 1) < p
3 then Send-Broadcast(pkt)
4 else Enqueue(nextPktQueue, pkt)
Figure 5.1: Pseudo-code for PBBF.
Latency: As q increases, latency decreases, provided that p > 0. As p increases, latency decreases, provided
that q > 0.
Reliability: As q increases, reliability increases, provided that p > 0. As p increases, reliability decreases,
provided that q < 1. When p increases, there is a greater probability that a node rebroadcasts the
packet immediately. Thus, for a fixed q < 1, there is a greater chance that some of its neighbors do
not receive the broadcast since they chose to sleep.
If the conditions listed above (e.g., p > 0 for latency and reliability as q increases) are not met, then the
metric is not affected in that situation. In the subsequent sections, we investigate these interactions more
thoroughly.
5.1.1 Design Discussion
Connected Dominating Sets: An alternative method to address the problem of broadcast in energy
saving networks is to construct a connected dominating set (CDS) (a.k.a., virtual backbone) and allow the
selected set of nodes to remain in a high energy consumption state. Previous work [82,119,120] has presented
algorithms to approximate the construction of a CDS in wireless networks.
The key aspects of a CDS are that all the nodes in the CDS are connected and all nodes not in the CDS
are one hop away from a CDS node. Thus, if the CDS consists of high energy consumption, low latency nodes
in the always on state, then a broadcast could be unicast along the CDS without incurring any power save
delay. Then, each CDS node would incur one power save delay to rebroadcast the packet to all neighbors
78
which may be in a power save state. For example, let us assume that the latency to send a packet among
always on nodes is L1 and the latency to send a packet using power save is L2, where L1 ≪ L2. If the
maximum path length between any two nodes in the CDS is D, then the broadcast will reach all nodes in
at most DL1 + L2 time (assuming that the broadcast initiator does not use power save mode to transmit).
The major difficulty with the CDS approach is that the formation of the CDS is NP-complete so approx-
imation algorithms must be used [82, 119, 120]. Additionally, such an approach does not give fine-grained
control over the energy consumption and latency tradeoff. Once the CDS is formed, the energy-latency
tradeoff is fixed. By contrast, our design gives the user more fine-grained control of this tradeoff and does
not require the construction of a distributed structure in the network.
5.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results for PBBF. In Section 5.3.3, we discuss TinyOS [11] implemen-
tation results for our protocol. We simulated PBBF in two different ways. First, we used a grid topology
with ideal MAC and physical layers (i.e., no collisions, packet errors, or MAC delays). This allows us to
observe some fundamental aspects of the protocol behavior without second-order effects such as collisions
and irregular topologies. The second method of simulation was to test the protocol in ns-2 with uniformly
random topologies. This allows us to explore how PBBF performs in a more realistic setting.
In both sets of simulations, one source that broadcasts periodically. First, we present a brief overview of
the results from the ideal simulator. Then, in Section 5.2.1, we highlight some results from ns-2 simulations.
More details can be found in [1].
The metrics that we test are:
• Joules Consumed/Total Broadcasts Sent at Source: The sum of the total energy consumed by
each node in the network divided by the total number of broadcasts sent by the source.
• Average Per-Hop Latency: Calculated by finding the average latency for each node divided by the
node’s hop count from the broadcast source. These values are then averaged over the entire network.
For each broadcast, we only count the latency for nodes that received the broadcast.
• Average X-Hop Latency: The average latency of nodes that are exactly X hops away from the
broadcast source. For each broadcast, we only count the latency for nodes that received the broadcast.
• Fraction of Broadcasts Received: The fraction of broadcasts received by each node averaged over
the entire network.
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• Fraction of Broadcasts Received by 99% of Nodes: For each broadcast, we determine if it was
received by 99% of the nodes in the network. Then, the number of broadcasts that were received by
99% of the nodes is divided by the total number of broadcasts sent by the source.
In Figure 5.2, we show how the reliability increases as the values of p and q increase (e.g., PBBF-0.5 refers
to PBBF with p = 0.5). The key aspect of this figure is that PBBF demonstrates a threshold behavior as is
seen with connectivity in percolation theory [121]. In Figure 5.3, we see energy consumption as a function
of q. Figure 5.4 shows the latency for various p and q combinations. By combining the data from Figure 5.3
and Figure 5.4, we are able to see the achievable tradeoff between energy consumption and latency for a
given reliability in Figure 5.5. This demonstrates the wide-range of energy-latency tradeoffs for broadcast
made possible by PBBF.
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Figure 5.2: Threshold behavior for 99% reliability.
5.2.1 ns-2 Simulations
We simulated the broadcast application at the routing layer of ns-2. One random node is chosen to be the
broadcast source for each scenario. Broadcasts are sent deterministically at the source at a rate of 0.01
broadcasts/second. The total size and data payload of each packet are 64 and 30 bytes, respectively. Our
scenarios have 50 nodes placed uniformly at random such that the expected number of one-hop neighbors
per node is 10. We ran each simulation for 500 seconds and each data point is averaged over 10 runs. In
Table 5.1, we give the average and maximum standard deviations for the data points on each curve as a
percentage of their mean.
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Figure 5.4: Average per-hop broadcast latency.
Table 5.1: Standard deviation as percentage of mean for Section 5.2.1 figures (Average | Maximum).
Figure 5.6 Figure 5.7 Figure 5.8 Figure 5.9
PBBF-0.5 1.25 6.80 17.59 32.65 8.47 15.53 2.88 10.59
NO PSM 0.0 0.0 30.69 30.69 11.08 11.08 0.45 0.45
PBBF-0.25 0.59 2.21 11.74 15.85 3.99 6.89 1.03 3.11
PBBF-0.1 0.49 1.93 6.07 9.01 3.16 4.31 0.63 1.55
PSM 1.54 1.54 2.27 2.27 2.20 2.20 0.44 0.44
PBBF-0.05 0.48 1.60 3.47 4.64 2.49 3.99 0.71 1.28
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Figure 5.5: Energy-latency tradeoff for 99% reliability.
Our first simulations show how various values of q affect PBBF. Figure 5.6 shows how the average energy
consumed at a node, normalized for the number of broadcasts generated, changes with q. We can see that
using PSM saves almost 2 Joules per broadcast over using no PSM. The figure also shows that energy
consumption increases linearly with the q value. We also observe that q dominates p in the energy usage
because regardless of the p value, the PBBF lines almost overlap.
In Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, we see the effect of q on latency. Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 show the average
latency of nodes that are two hops and five hops from the source, respectively. In our simulations, new
packets always arrive at the source during the ATIM window, so they are sent with a delay of about AW .
As expected, the latency to reach two hop neighbors is about AW +BI. We can see that PSM consistently
has a high latency, whereas turning off PSM results in a much lower latency. PBBF does worse than PSM
at small values of q, but improves significantly as q and p increase. The reason PBBF performs worse for
small values of q is the amount of redundancy in broadcasts received from different neighbors is reduced.
Therefore, it is more likely that a node will not receive the broadcast from the neighbor that would result
in the smallest latency. However, as q and p get larger, the probability increases that a broadcast will be
transmitted and received without waiting for the next beacon interval. From Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, we
can also see that the cross-over q point where PBBF does better than PSM occurs at a lower value for nodes
farther from the source. This is expected since there is a greater probability that at least one node between
the source and a distant node is able to reduce the latency by at least one beacon interval. Whenever the
latency is reduced by at least one beacon interval and the broadcast is received on a path with the same hop
count as PSM, then PBBF does better than PSM in terms of latency. Also, potentially many more different
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Figure 5.6: Average energy consumption.
paths exist by which the broadcast can reach distant nodes.
Figure 5.9 illustrates how the q value affects the fraction of broadcasts a node receives. We observe that
setting p = 0.5 results in a significant degradation until q reaches about 0.5. For p = 0.25, a little degradation
occurs and all the other p values result in less than 1% loss. These results are explained the effect that p
and q have on the probability that a broadcast sent by a node is received by a neighbor. We must decrease
p and/or increase q until the desired level of reliability is achieved.
5.3 Implementation
We implemented PBBF in TinyOS [11] for the Mica2 Mote [104] sensors. This serves as a proof-of-concept
for the protocol and provides results from a real-world communication environment. As described in Sec-
tion 5.3.2, PBBF is implemented on top of a different sleep scheduling protocol than the 802.11 PSM protocol
that was the basis for the simulations in Section 5.2. This demonstrates the versatility of PBBF.
Additionally, we added an extension to the PBBF protocol described in Section 5.1. This extension is de-
scribed in Section 5.3.1. In Section 5.3.2, we describe the architecture designed in TinyOS. Our experimental
results are presented in Section 5.3.3. Section 5.3.4 details some lessons we learned from our implementation
experience.
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5.3.1 Protocol Extension
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the PBBF parameters p and q provide a tradeoff in energy consumption, latency,
and reliability for broadcast dissemination. Section 5.2 quantifies this tradeoff via simulation.
We propose another parameter that can be used in PBBF that induces an overhead tradeoff in addition
to the three aforementioned metrics (i.e., energy consumption, latency, and reliability). We denote this
parameter as r and it behaves as follows. When a sensor decides to immediately transmit a broadcast
packet according the p parameter (as described in Section 5.1), it will broadcast the packet a second time
with probability r. If the packet is broadcast for a second time, then the second transmission is advertised
according to the sleep scheduling protocol’s original protocol. The pseudo-code for this PBBF extension is
shown in Figure 5.10.
We can see that the r parameter induces an overhead tradeoff into PBBF. By increasing r, we increase the
reliability of a broadcast at the expense of increasing the packet overhead in the network. At the extreme, if
r = 1, then reliability should be close to 100% regardless of the p and q values, but each node is broadcasting
every packet twice. This gives designers yet another control parameter to achieve a desired tradeoff in the
energy consumption, latency, reliability, and overhead planes.
5.3.2 Design
We chose to implement PBBF in TinyOS [11] since this is a widely used open-source operating system
designed for sensors. Its adoption in the research community has led to a relatively stable system with a
84
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 50
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Av
er
ag
e 
5-
Ho
p 
La
te
nc
y 
(s)
Average Number of 5-Hop Nodes/Scenario = 7.2222
PBBF-0.5
NO PSM
PBBF-0.25
PBBF-0.1
PSM
PBBF-0.05
q
Figure 5.8: 5-hop average broadcast latency.
significant amount of documentation. For a hardware platform, the Mica2 [104] and Telos [122] Motes were
available. We chose to use the Mica2 platform since it has two power save protocols implemented for it.
The two power save protocols available on the Mica2 platform were S-MAC [45] and B-MAC [26]. These
protocols are both described in Chapter 2. Either would have been an appropriate choice for our PBBF
implementation. We chose to use B-MAC over S-MAC for several reasons. First, B-MAC is implemented in
the core of TinyOS whereas S-MAC is an add-on that must be incorporated into the TinyOS separately. Thus,
B-MAC has undergone more rigorous testing since it is used by nearly everyone that downloads TinyOS and
does not require an extra effort to get it working. Second, the code for B-MAC was less complex and easier
to understand. Thus, it was easier to make the necessary modifications for PBBF. Finally, B-MAC, unlike
S-MAC, does not require time synchronization. This eliminates a major source of potential experimental
errors.
As described in Section 2.1.2, B-MAC uses preamble sampling for in-band power saving. Sensors wake
up according to a specified duty cycle and carrier sense the channel. If the channel is idle, the sensor returns
to sleep until the next scheduled carrier sense period. If the channel is busy, the sensor continues listening to
channel in anticipation of receiving a pending data packet. When a node has data to transmit, it attaches
a preamble longer than the duty cycle in order to guarantee that all nodes will carrier sense the channel at
some point during the preamble and continue listening.
To implement PBBF on B-MAC, we make the following changes:
• When a node carrier senses the channel idle during its duty cycle, with probability q, it continues
listening to the channel until its next scheduled carrier sensing period.
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Figure 5.9: Average broadcasts received.
Receive-Broadcast(pkt)
1 /* Called when broadcast packet pkt is received */
2 if Uniform-Rand(0, 1) < p
3 then Send-Broadcast(pkt)
4 if Uniform-Rand(0, 1) < r
5 then Enqueue(nextPktQueue, pkt)
6 else Enqueue(nextPktQueue, pkt)
Figure 5.10: Pseudo-code for r parameter in PBBF.
• When a node has a packet to rebroadcast, with probability p, it transmits the packet without the long
preamble. In this situation, most of the node’s neighbors will not carrier sense the preamble and, hence,
not receive the broadcast packet at that time. With probability (1− p), the node will rebroadcast the
packet with the long preamble so that its neighbors will carrier sense it and receive the subsequent
data packet.
• When a node rebroadcasts the packet without the long preamble (as discussed in the previous item
above), with probability r, it will broadcast the packet a second time. This second broadcast will use
the long preamble.
The architecture we used for our implementation is shown in Figure 5.11. The solid arrows in the figure
represent the interface that connects two modules. The notation A
I→ B indicates that component B
implements interface I and that component A uses B’s implementation of interface I. The dashed arrows
indicate the message type that the connected module uses to send and/or receive via GenericComm. Details
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Figure 5.11: TinyOS architecture for PBBF implementation. The solid rectangles are modules (CC1000Radio
is an abstraction for the three modules listed in the dotted lines). The solid arrows represent the major
interface(s) that connect modules. The incoming dashed lines to GenericComm represent the message types
the connected module uses.
about the interfaces and packet types are in Appendix C. The GenericComm, UART, and CC1000Radio1
components are already implemented in TinyOS. We made some modifications to the CC1000Radio modules,
but used these components, for the most part, in their current TinyOS instantiation. We now describe the
functionality of each component from Figure 5.11.
DummyBcastSrc: This is the application that we use to test PBBF. The node with ID 0 is chosen as the
broadcast source and transmits a broadcast periodically according to a desired rate. The broadcast
1
CC1000Radio is an abstraction for the three modules listed in the dotted lines.
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does not contain any useful data. Non-source nodes that receive broadcast packets pass information
to the Stats module to collect experimental data.
DummyBcastSrc also serves as the link to the serial port (UART) for communication with a com-
puter. The module also passes control packets (e.g., what p, q, and r parameters to use for a particular
run) to CtrlPktHandler. Finally, it maintains all the timers for when an experimental run ends and
when statistics are sent back to the broadcast source.
SimplePbbfBcast: The main functions of this module are duplicate suppression and queuing for DummyBcastSrc’s
broadcast packets. Control packets are also passed to CtrlPktHandler and Stats is notified of every
broadcast sent or received.
CtrlPktHandler: This module handles incoming control packets by setting the p, q, and r parameters to
the values specified in the packet. This is done via its connection to Pbbf.
Stats: This module keeps track of statistics for our experiments and aggregates the information in pack-
ets to send back to the broadcast source. Via DummyBcastSrc, it keeps track of the end-to-end la-
tency of received packet as well as the total number of unique, application-layer received packets.
SimplePbbfBcast informs Stats of the total number of data packets sent and received. Pbbf signals
to Stats when a packet was transmitted twice due to the r parameter (as discussed in Section 5.3.1).
CC1000Radio signals this component whenever the radio switches to and from sleep mode to track the
total fraction of time spent sleeping.
This module also provides a basic end-to-end retransmission scheme for added reliability in reporting
experimental stats. We found this to be somewhat useful since the link layer retransmission scheme
seemed to occasionally fail. One limitation of the link layer retransmissions in TinyOS is that no
receiver is specified in the ACK packets. Thus, it is possible that both S1 and S2 send a packet to D
at about the same time and, for whatever reason, D receives only, say, S1’s packet. However, the ACK
send by D, which is intended for S1 in this example, will also be overheard by S2 and S2 will considered
its packet successfully received since the ACK does not specify if it is for S1 or S2. However, we did
not run tests to determine if this was the source of occasional failures for link layer retransmissions
since this was a peripheral issue that the end-to-end retransmissions seemed to fix. We mention it,
though, as a possibility.
GenericComm: (Existing TinyOS module) This serves primarily to multiplex and demultiplex packets
in TinyOS based on the packet type. Essentially, the packet type serves the role that ports do in
traditional TCP/UDP communications
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UART: (Existing TinyOS module) This component provides the lower level communication with the serial
port.
Pbbf: This is the actual implementation of the PBBF protocol. It is placed between GenericComm and the
CC1000Radio components. GenericComm is analogous to the network layer and CC1000Radio provides
the medium access and the physical layer.
The p, q, and r values that Pbbf uses are input from CtrlPktHandler. B-MAC notifies Pbbf of a
decision point for whether to sleep via the PbbfNotifier interface. At this point, Pbbf compares the
current q value to a random number to decide whether to tell the radio to sleep, as would be normal
operation, or continue listening to the channel, which is part of PBBF. For every packet received from
GenericComm, PBBF decides, based on the p and r values, whether to use a long preamble and whether
to transmit the packet twice, respectively. This layer also provides link layer retransmissions since this
feature is not implemented in lower layers (i.e., CC1000Radio).
CC1000Radio: (Existing TinyOS modules) These components provide the lower level communication with
Chipcon’s CC1000 radio [123] found on Mica2 Motes. Additionally, the B-MAC [26] implementation
is integrated into these components.
5.3.3 Results
To test our implementation, we set up the following experiments. The broadcast source, with ID 0, was
attached directly to a laptop via a MIB510CA board. This sensor also served as the sink for reporting
statistics back to the laptop. Our Mica2 Motes used the 433 MHz frequency. We were constrained to using
only nine Motes total, so the other eight Motes served as broadcast receivers.
Initially, we planned a multihop topology. However, statistics reporting proved far too unreliable for the
environment in which we attempted this (see Section 5.3.4 for more details). Thus, we only experimented
on a topology where all of the devices were within range of the broadcast source (and each other). This
setup was also beneficial since a limited number of Motes were available and PBBF relies on some amount
of density to operate efficiently. Furthermore, this simple scenario is sufficient for demonstrating some of the
key properties of PBBF.
In our experiments, the source transmitted a broadcast every 2.5 s. Each experiment ran for 30 s, which
results in 11 packets being sent per run (the first packet is not sent immediately when the test commences).
Each data packet uses the standard TinyOS format with 2 synchronization bytes, 5 header bytes, 2 CRC
bytes, and a payload of 29 bytes. The default preamble adds an additional 8 bytes, though, as described in
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Section 2.1.2, B-MAC increases the preamble length according to how much power saving is desired. In our
tests, we set the B-MAC parameters to have a duty cycle of 135ms and preamble size of 371 bytes. We note
that when a sender decides to transmit immediately, according to the p parameter in PBBF, the preamble
size is set to the default 8 bytes for that particular packet. We also note that the version of B-MAC we
used carrier senses the channel for 8ms once every duty cycle. If the channel is not carrier sensed idle, then
B-MAC extends the time that it is awake for 32ms. At the end of this 32ms interval, B-MAC carrier senses
again and will sleep or extend its listening for another 32ms depending on if the channel is idle or busy,
respectively. For statistics collection, once the sensor has run the experiment for the specified 30 s length, it
switches power save off for 10 s and reports its data.
The metrics that we measured are:
• Fraction of Time Not Sleeping: Obtaining fine-grained energy measurements for the Motes requires
special equipment. Thus, we use a coarse-grained metric where we track how much time a node spends
with its radio not in the sleep state over the course of an experiment. Thus, the larger the fraction of
time not sleeping, the more energy is generally being consumed by the radio.
• Average Broadcast Latency: This is the average latency from the time a packet is sent at the
sender’s application layer until the data begins transmission over the radio (i.e., after the preamble
and synchronization bytes have been transmitted). For this, we use the time stamping implementation
described in [40]. Again, this is not as fine-grained of a metric as we would like. However, this technique
obviates the need for time synchronization among the nodes which would induce a large amount of
complexity and overhead to our implementation. We only compute the latency for nodes that received
a given broadcast.
• Unique Data Packets Received: We measure the average fraction of broadcasts sent by the source
that are received by listening nodes.
• Total Data Packets Received: This is a measure of the receive overhead of the protocol. It is
the average total broadcasts received divided by the number of broadcasts sent by the source. Since
sensors filter duplicate broadcast packets (with respect to the source and sequence number), the total
data packets received is greater than or equal to the unique data packets received.
• Total Data Packets Sent: This is a measure of the sending overhead of the protocol. It is the
average total broadcasts sent by a node (excluding the broadcast source) divided by the number of
broadcasts send by the source.
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To test the effects of p, q, and r, we set their values to 0.0, 0.3, 0.7, and 1.0 and ran one experiment
(with multiple broadcasts) for each of the 64 possible combinations of these three variables using these four
values. For clarity of presentation, we omit some of the combinations in our graphs.
In Figure 5.12, we show the effects of p on energy consumption. When q = 1, obviously no energy savings
occurs. When r = 0, the energy consumption decreases with p because less packets are being received by the
nodes (it is proportional to the corresponding curve shown in Figure 5.14). If a sensor is receiving only a few
packets, then it will be sleeping most of the time. When r = 1, every packet transmitted immediately is also
transmitted a second time using the power save protocol. This results in increased overhead and reliability.
However, since more packets are being sent and received, the energy consumption is greater than for r = 0.
The curve is approximately flat when q = 0 and r = 1 because the number of transmissions that
follow the B-MAC power save protocol remain the same. In B-MAC, such transmissions, with their long
preambles, consume significantly more energy than the immediately sent packets. Thus, the dominating
energy consumption component, the packets sent using the power save protocol, remains constant. The
number of immediate sends increases as p increases, but the effect on the curve is small.
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Figure 5.12: Energy consumption.
The effect of p on latency is shown in Figure 5.13. We can see how p improves the latency when q = 1.
This improvement comes at the expense of energy consumption. The sharp drop-off in the q = 0, r = 0
case occurs because of a large decrease in reliability (shown in Figure 5.13). This is due to the fact that the
latency is only computed for sensors that receive a broadcast. So, the few sensors that happen to receive
the broadcast will do so with a small latency when p is high and q = 0. As an example, when p = 0.3, the
reliability of the broadcast is about 80%. However, the slight decrease in latency when p = 0.7 comes at
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the expense of achieving only a 20% reliability. The q = 0, r = 1 case actually shows an increase in latency
because the second packet being transmitted is what is usually being received. The second transmission
occurs only after the first transmission that uses a short preamble.
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Figure 5.13: Average broadcast latency.
Figure 5.14 shows, as expected, that if q = 1 or r = 1, the reliability is 100%. However, if both q and r
are zero, then the reliability steadily decreases with p to the point of almost 0% reliability.
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Figure 5.14: Reliability of broadcast.
The overhead for receiving and sending in the protocols can be seen in Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16,
respectively. As expected, when r = 1, we get twice the overhead for both sending and receiving when
compared to r = 0. In both figures, we see that the overhead increases as p increases when r = 1 since more
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packets are sent according to the p parameters and, hence, more packets are sent a second time according
to the r parameter. In the case where q = 0 and r = 0 in these figures, we see a decrease in overhead since
more packets are being transmitted according to the p parameter and less neighbors are listening at that
time (since q = 0).
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Figure 5.15: Reception overhead.
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Figure 5.16: Transmission overhead.
Consistent with our results in Section 5.2, Figure 5.17 shows that an increase in q causes a linear increase
in energy consumption. The p = 1 case uses significantly less energy than the other three cases at lower
values of q. This is due to a decreased reliability compared with the other three cases. When no packets are
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being transmitted using the power save protocol, sensors sleep more since they are receiving fewer packets.
This is similar to what was seen in Figure 5.12.
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Figure 5.17: Energy consumption.
Figure 5.18 shows the effect of q on latency. In the p = 1, r = 1 case, the latency shows a linear decrease
with q. This is because when q = 0, most of the broadcasts received are from the second transmission.
However, when q = 1, the broadcasts received are from the first transmission instead of the second rebroadcast
(as determined by the r parameter). In the p = 1, r = 0 case, when q = 0 the latency is low due to the
low reliability (as shown in Figure 5.19). After this point, however, there is a gradual decrease in latency as
more broadcasts are received directly from the source rather than rebroadcasts by a neighbor. When p = 0.3
and q = 0, we can see that r = 1 can actually have a negative effect when compared with r = 0 due to the
increased contention from the extra overhead induced.
The fraction of broadcasts that are received is shown in Figure 5.19. The interesting cases are only p = 1,
r = 0 and p = 0.3, r = 0 since the other two curves have enough redundancy to give 100% reception. In both
cases we can see how the reliability improves at q increases (the other two curves are flat at 100% regardless
of q’s value).
Finally, we tested the effects of r in our implementation. Figure 5.20 shows energy consumption. When
p = 1, q = 0, we can see that the nodes use more energy due to the increase in reliability that the increasing
r is providing. The reliability improvement with r is illustrated in Figure 5.21.
Figure 5.22 and Figure 5.23 show the overhead for receptions and transmissions, respectively. These
results show that the overhead doubles when p = 1 and q = 1 as r goes from 0 to 1. This occurs because
when p = 1, each sensor will transmit each broadcast once when r = 0 and twice when r = 1. When p = 0,
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Figure 5.18: Average broadcast latency.
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Figure 5.19: Reliability of broadcast (all curves overlap except for (q = 0, r = 0).
we see no effects on the overhead, with respect to r, as expected. When p = 1 and q = 0, then the overhead
is zero when r = 0 due to the lack of reliability. The increasing reliability with r causes the overhead to
increase linearly.
From these results, we see that our implementation in TinyOS shows the same trends as we observed
in simulation for energy consumption, latency, and reliability as a function of the p and q parameters.
Additionally, we have shown the effects of a new parameter, r, which can improve reliability at the expense
of extra packet overhead. Our figures show the quantitative performance of these three parameters on sensor
hardware.
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Figure 5.20: Energy consumption.
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Figure 5.21: Reliability of broadcast.
5.3.4 Lessons Learned
In this section, we list some lessons that we learned as a result of our implementation.
Lesson 1: A small fraction of seemingly trivial tasks will take a large fraction of your time.
Getting a reliable serial connection between a Mote and the laptop proved extremely time consuming.
The need for root access limited our PC choices to laptops. Most laptops are equipped with only
USB ports and not serial ports. However, the USB-to-serial adapters that we tried tended to produce
non-deterministic errors where serial communication would succeed about 10-20% of the time. After
devoting significant time working under the assumption that the operating system needed configured
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Figure 5.22: Reception overhead.
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Figure 5.23: Transmission overhead.
correctly, we eventually had to purchase a laptop with a native serial port.
Similarly, some aspects of TinyOS code are poorly documented and commented (though, overall,
the documentation is good relative to other open source projects). Thus, some questions that could
be answered quickly by someone familiar with the system took a much longer time to figure out by
perusing code, documentation, and running applications. Examples include finding that link layer
retransmissions were not implemented and discovering how to code them correctly. Another example
is determining the differences among the routing protocols provided in TinyOS and discovering how to
use these components correctly.
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Lesson 2: Multihop topologies are much more difficult to create than in simulation.
We found this particularly difficult in an indoor setting. Contrary to our assumption that one could
just place devices in a large seminar room spaced by a fixed distance, we discovered that this task
requires much more in the way of measurement studies in a specific location to create a topology.
Factors such as the height of a device, its distance to other objects, and asymmetry of communication
links proved extremely complex in our chosen environment. A much more rigorous measurement study
of a location or, better, a specifically designed testing area are needed to create multihop topologies.
Lesson 3: Statistic collection and software updates are extremely difficult without a wired backplane.
A significant amount of effort was needed to create a system for collecting statistics that did not
interfere with experimental runs. Without an out-of-band channel available, each node had to unicast
its statistics for a run back to the sink using the same channel on which the experiments were run.
This was exacerbated by the fact that the experiments required power save protocols to be used,
which decreased reliability and increased latency for packets. Our solution was to use local timers
with a large “fudge” factor to account for synchronization errors so that all nodes would report their
statistics at about the same time and could turn power save mode off while this was being done. Thus,
one node’s statistics collection was not interfered with by another node’s statistics reporting.
Another major difficulty with the lack of a wired backplane is that every time a change is made to
the code, each sensor must be manually connected to the laptop and receive the uploaded code. This
approach is obviously neither scalable nor desirable during the debugging phase.
Lesson 4: Debugging is difficult.
Essentially, the only output available is three LEDs. No gdb or printf statements can be used when
things do not go as planned. The simulator that is available with TinyOS is of some use, but some
lower level hardware abstractions are not available (e.g., the time-stamping mechanism) or significantly
differ from the Mica2 implementation (e.g., the channel bitrate in the simulator is hard-coded to be
twice that of the Mica2 hardware). Again, debugging is an area that would greatly benefit from a wired
backplane. Though, even this is made difficult by the fact that every module that needs debugged
must be wired to the backplane component and it must create a new packet type to communicate its
data.
Lesson 5: Buffer management is difficult.
In TinyOS, when an upper layer sends a packet to a lower layer, it is responsible for protecting the
memory allocated to that packet until lower layers signal that they are finished handling it. Lower
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layers are responsible for sending back pointers to packet memory locations when they signal that they
are finished. Coding must be done carefully to ensure that upper layers never reuse memory being
handled by lower layers and that lower layers return memory pointers consistent with what upper
layers are expecting.2
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a lightweight protocol, PBBF, that makes lower latency broadcast prop-
agation in power save networks more energy efficient than not using any power save protocol. Using the
protocol, a user has more fine-grained control over the energy consumption for a broadcast to achieve a de-
sired latency and reliability. Our simulations show the effectiveness of the protocol and allows us to quantify
the energy-latency-reliability tradeoff. Additionally, our implementation in TinyOS [11] demonstrates the
protocol on sensor hardware.
2For example, an upper layer has two packet queues from which it is sending. The pointers to the packets at the heads
of these queues are q1 and q2, respectively. Thus, if an upper layer sends the packet at pointer q1, it would expect that the
corresponding signal to indicate that the send is done will return pointer q1 so that it knows which queue just finished being
serviced. If a lower layer erroneously returns a different pointer, the upper layer cannot correlate which queue is being signaled
as serviced.
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Chapter 6
Leveraging Channel Diversity for
Secure Key Distribution
As sensor networks become more ubiquitous, security becomes a major concern. It is also an excellent
opportunity for researchers to integrate security in the initial stages of protocol design, rather than an added
afterthought as has occurred in many previous network protocols. To this end, an important aspect of sensor
network security is key establishment. Using secure keys is the foundation of many other aspects of security
such as encryption for confidentiality and message authentication for integrity.
Certain properties of sensor networks make the key establishment problem unique compared with proto-
cols for other types of networks:
• Sensors are resource constrained: The sensors are generally assumed to be small devices. This implies
that resources such as memory, computation power, and transmission rates are much more constrained
than in desktops and laptops. As an example, Mica Motes [25] have a CPU speed of 4 MHz, a few
hundred kilobytes of memory, and a bitrate of 19.2 kbps. From a security perspective, this means
that symmetric keys are preferable to asymmetric keys and, ideally, only a small portion of memory is
devoted to key material [6, 89, 90, 93, 95].
• Packets are broadcast over the air: This is true for wireless networks of all types and means that it is
much easier for an adversary to tap into a device’s communication channel. Thus, it is assumed that
an attacker can overhear any packet transmitted in its vicinity.
• Deployment may be large in scale: Networks may be on the order of thousands of sensors. Thus, it is
preferable to localize key establishment as much as possible.
• Topology may be uncontrolled: In some cases, it is envisaged that sensors may, for example, be tossed
out of an airplane to monitor an area. In such a case, there is no advance knowledge of which sensors
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will be neighbors in the network. Thus, it is conceivable that a device is equally likely to be neighbors
with any of the N sensors being deployed. If a sensor wishes to share a secret key with each of its
neighbors, it needs to store N − 1 in memory, creating a scalability problem given the memory size of
the sensors and the potentially large scale of the network.
• Deployment may be in hostile territory: Sensors may be used to monitor enemy areas, therefore it is
possible that an adversary is able to populate the network with a significant number of its own devices.
• Planned incremental additions may be desired: Sensor networks may be long-lived and require the
owner to deploy new sensors as older ones fail (whether maliciously or due to battery exhaustion).
Additionally, it may be desirable for an owner to occasionally “upgrade” the network by increasing
the density of the sensors to get better sensing coverage. In this work, we assume that incremental
additions are relatively rare events that can be planned reasonably well in advance.
Given these properties, we design a key establishment protocol based on symmetric cryptography that can
scale to hundreds or thousands of sensors without any prior knowledge of sensor locations and demonstrate
resilience to the threat model described in Section 6.1.2. In this chapter, we focus on distributing pairwise
keys among one-hop neighbors in a sensor network. Pairwise keys are important in sensor networks for
a couple of reasons. First, when sensors are sending their data to a sink, it allows secure aggregation of
data at each hop since a sensor shares a secret key with each of its children as well as its parent. Second,
pairwise keys can be used to authenticate a hash chain commitment that can then be used to do, for example,
authenticated broadcasts [124].
The design space for pairwise key distribution lies between two extremes. On one end, each sensor could
be loaded with N − 1 keys before deployment such that it shares a secret key with every other sensor in the
network. This scheme offers the most security since no information about the keys is ever broadcast and a
compromised sensor gives an attacker no information about keys being used by other sensor pairs. However,
this scheme suffers greatly from a scalability viewpoint since a sensor may need to store thousands of keys,
of which it probably uses only a small subset.
At the other extreme, each sensor is given one key which it shares with every other sensor in the network.
From a scalability viewpoint, this scheme is excellent since a sensor stores only one key regardless of the size
of the network. However, this scheme offers little resilience to an attacker since if one device is compromised,
the communication between every pair of sensors is also compromised.
The major contributions of this work are as follows. First, we present a distributed protocol that requires
a small amount of memory for storage and, with high probability, ensures each link in the network shares
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a unique key. Through analysis, we show the properties of our protocol and demonstrate that it is feasible
within the resource constraints of current sensor hardware.
Second, we show that diversity of sensor channels and location can be a benefit to sensor network security.
While such diversity has been widely used to improve performance in wireless networks (e.g., increasing
spatial reuse, decreasing bit errors), to our knowledge, this is the first work to apply these concepts to
symmetric key establishment. In particular, we show that the location diversity of randomly deployed
sensors greatly improves resilience to adversarial hardware that is deployed in the same manner. It is also
demonstrated that using only one extra channel during initialization (i.e., using two channels instead of one)
greatly improves security. Finally, we characterize the tradeoff in security and energy that is possible when
power saving is used.
6.1 Background
6.1.1 System Model
We assume that the sensors are deployed such that their locations are distributed in a desired area. In our
model, the network is relatively dense (e.g., more than ten one-hop neighbors per sensor) so a sensor can
overhear multiple neighbors.
Our analysis also assumes a radio model that can be represented by unit disks and that links are sym-
metric; so if A can hear B, then B can also hear A. We assume that the radio can communicate on multiple,
non-interfering channels, but can listen to or transmit on only a single channel at any given time. For exam-
ple, devices such as Mica Mote sensors [25] and any 802.11 compliant hardware [7] can use frequency-division
multiple access (FDMA) to achieve this.
6.1.2 Threat Model
In this work, an attacker’s primary objective is to learn the link key that a legitimate pair of sensors is using
for communication. If the attacker is able to learn this key, then the encryption and authentication for the
link is no longer secure. As in previous work [6,89,90,93,95], we consider denial-of-service to be beyond the
scope of this work. See [125] for a discussion of possible solutions to address such attacks in sensor networks.
The attacker has two means by which it tries to learn link keys. The first is by compromising legitimate
sensors and learning all the key material that is stored on the device. In this case, obviously all communication
with the compromised sensor becomes insecure. However, learning the key material of the compromised
sensor may also assist the attacker in learning the link keys being used by non-compromised sensors. In this
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work, we assume that attackers can compromise sensors any time after deployment. We note that this is a
stronger attack model than is assumed in some key establishment protocols [97] in which an attacker can
compromise sensors only after some initialization time.
The second method by which an attacker may try to learn link keys is listening to the plaintext keys
exchanged during the initialization phase as discussed in Section 6.2. Since all the information needed to
create link keys is broadcast in plaintext at some point during the initialization, the attacker may be able
to reconstruct link keys by eavesdropping.
As in [6], we assume that the hardware that an attacker deploys is similar to the legitimate sensor
hardware in the network. Thus, any radio hardware an attacker uses has a receive threshold equal to or
larger than that of the sensors in the network. That is, for a packet transmitted at a certain power level,
the attacker’s radio cannot receive a packet if it is farther away than the distance that sensors can receive
the packet. As another result of this assumption, the attacker cannot execute wormhole attacks whereby
colluding devices can propagate data across the network via an out-of-band channel.
We do not investigate coordinated channel assignment and switching protocols that an adversary may
use with multiple radio devices or colluding single radio devices. Such scenarios are an area for future work.
However, we do consider the effects of an attacker adding more devices that collude by combining their
knowledge of overheard packets.
6.1.3 Bloom Filters [4]
In our protocol, we use Bloom filters [4] to communicate sets of keys. In this section, we give a brief
overview of the operation of Bloom filters. For more information, the reader is encouraged to peruse any of
the numerous tutorials or surveys available on the subject (e.g., [126]).
Each sensor is preloaded with the same h one-way hash functions [127], H1BF , H
2
BF , . . . , H
h
BF .
1 Given
an input, each of these hash functions maps an object to a value between 1 and s according to a uniform
distribution. The Bloom filter is a bit vector of s bits. Initially, every bit is set to 0. Given an object, vi,
it is placed in the filter by setting the bits H1BF (vi), H
2
BF (vi), . . . , H
h
BF (vi) to 1. Thus, for each object (say,
i = 1 to n) added to the filter, up to h bits are set to 1. After receiving a Bloom filter, a sensor can check
to see if an object, vj , is in the filter by testing if the bits H
1
BF (vj), H
2
BF (vj), . . . , H
h
BF (vj) are all set to 1.
If this test is true, then the object is considered to be in the filter. False positives occur when each of the h
values for an object, vj , maps to a bit that was set to 1 by the hash function for some object other than vj .
1A one-way function, H, is easy to compute (i.e., given object x, H(x) can be computed in polynomial time), but hard to
invert (i.e., given H(x), no polynomial time algorithm exists to find y such that H(y) = H(x)).
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In 6.3, we investigate what values of h and s are appropriate for our scheme to avoid false positives with high
probability. However, our scheme is robust against occasional false positives as described in Section 6.2.5.
6.1.4 Merkle Trees [5]
Another cryptographic primitive used in our protocol is Merkle trees [5]. We use Merkle trees to provide
authentication that the set of keys being broadcast by a sensor was generated by a trusted source before
deployment.
Assume that a trusted source has m objects that it wishes to distribute among untrusted sensors. The
goal of a Merkle tree is that when a sensor claims to have a certain object, the value of that object can be
authenticated without contacting the trusted source. To do this, the trusted source generates the Merkle
tree for the objects before deployment and then loads each sensor with the root of the tree as well as the
lgm interior nodes of the tree needed to verify the authenticity of each object distributed to the sensor.
Figure 6.1, gives an example of a Merkle tree for four objects: v1, v2, v3, v4. First, each leaf node of the
tree is generated by hashing one of the objects. For example, C = HM (v1), where HM is a one-way hash
function [127]. Each of the interior nodes of the tree is generated by hashing a concatenation of the node’s
left and right child. For example, B = HM (E||F ). This continues until the root, R, is generated.
A B
C D E F
R
v1 v2 v3 v4
A = HM (C||D)
C = HM (v1)
Figure 6.1: An example Merkle tree [5] for four objects: v1, v2, v3, v4. The leaf nodes are generated by doing
a one-way hash, HM , on the corresponding object. The interior nodes are generated by doing a one-way
hash, HM , on a concatenation of the children of a node.
Each sensor can verify the authenticity of objects by being loaded with R by the trusted source. As an
example, consider a sensor that is given object v2 by the trusted source. The sensor is then also loaded with
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the values necessary to authenticate v2 (i.e., C and B). When the sensor wishes to verify the authenticity
of v2, it can do so by transmitting v2 along with the values of C and B. With these values, any sensor that
knows R can verify the authenticity of v2 by checking that R = HM (HM (C||HM (v2))||B).
6.2 Protocol Description
6.2.1 Overview
We begin with a brief overview of the details that are presented in Section 6.2.2 through 6.2.4. Table 6.1
provides a key for the notation used in this section.
Table 6.1: Protocol notation.
Notation Description
c Number of non-interfering channels available
α Number of keys broadcast by each sensor during initialization
λ Maximum number of advertisement keys from any one of a sensor’s neighbors
γ Cumulative number of keys a sensor includes in its advertisement from neighbors
η Minimum number of advertised keys a sensor must share with a neighboring sensor to
engage in communication
h Number of hash functions per Bloom filter
s Size of the Bloom filter (bits)
Prior to deployment, each sensor is loaded with a unique, non-overlapping set of α keys by a trusted
source. Unlike previous work [89, 90], this set of keys is known to only that sensor and not part of a larger
shared pool of keys. Along with these keys, the sensors are loaded with the Merkle tree nodes necessary for
others to authenticate the Bloom filter of their α keys (as discussed in Section 6.2.2, the actual keys could
be authenticated rather than the Bloom filter at the cost of increased overhead).
The sensors are then deployed non-deterministically over a given area. On a common channel, each sensor
broadcasts the Bloom filter of the α keys with which it was loaded along with the Merkle values necessary
to authenticate the filter. This allows sensors to verify that future keys received from a given neighbor were
given to that neighbor by the trusted source. In Section 6.2.2, we discuss this aspect of the protocol in depth
as well as how to deal with attacking devices that try to rebroadcast legitimate keys and generate arbitrary
keys.
During initialization, sensors switch their radios to a channel chosen uniformly at random and choose a
non-deterministic amount of time to listen to the channel before switching to another channel. Also during
this time, the sensors choose non-deterministic times to broadcast each of their α keys in plaintext. The key
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broadcast times are independent of the channel switching times. This procedure continues until all sensors
have had a chance to broadcast all of their keys. Each key is sent on the channel to which the sensor is
listening at the chosen broadcast time. During this initialization phase, sensors store every key that they
transmit as well as every key that they overhear in broadcasts by their neighbors.
At the end of the initialization phase, all sensors switch their radio to a common channel, and perform a
key discovery phase during which a sensor tries to establish a unique key to communicate with each neighbor.
For the discovery phase, each sensor hashes all its known keys into a Bloom filter and broadcasts the filter.
Every time a sensor overhears a filter, it searches the Bloom filter of its own keys to determine which keys
it has in common with the sender of the overheard filter.
After the key discovery phase, the key establishment phase is done. During key establishment, a sensor
broadcasts a separate message for each filter it overheard in the key discovery phase. In this message, the
sensor includes a Bloom filter indicating the keys it believes it has in common with the sender of the original
Bloom filter along with a random nonce encrypted by a link key composed of those shared keys. If the
sensor receives a single acknowledgment with a properly encrypted, incremented nonce value, a link key has
been established with that neighbor. This process continues until a sensor has a unique key for each of its
neighbors.
At this point, with high probability, the sensor shares a secret key with each of it neighbors and needs
to store only its link keys, α preloaded keys, and Merkle nodes for authentication [128].
6.2.2 Predeployment Phase
We now describe how keys for sensors in the initial deployment are loaded onto each device. In Section 6.6.1,
we discuss how this phase of the protocol can be extended to allow incremental sensor additions after this
initial deployment.
A trusted authority generates α keys per sensor that are loaded on each sensor before deployment. The
keys generated for each sensor are unique to that sensor, and not part of a global key pool as has been done
in previous work [89, 90] (i.e., a sensor’s set of keys do not overlap with another sensor’s set of keys). Once
the key sets are generated for the sensors, the trusted source computes the Bloom filter for each sensor’s
set of keys as described in Section 6.1.3. Finally, the trusted source creates a Merkle tree, described in
Section 6.1.4, as follows. The leaves of this Merkle tree are generated by hashing a concatenation of the
sensor’s ID with the Bloom filter of its keys (discussed in Section 6.2.2), denoted as BF .2 Thus, there is one
2Alternatively, the leaves of the Merkle tree could be a hash of each of the sensor’s keys instead of the Bloom filter of the
keys. This would increase the protocol’s storage and communication overhead, but eliminates the possibility of false positives
and increases robustness against attacks that generate arbitrary keys. Our work does not explore this approach.
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Merkle leaf for each sensor its value for that sensor is HM (ID||HM (BF )).3
At this point, each sensor is loaded with the α keys that the trusted source generated for that device, the
root of the Merkle tree, and the lgN interior Merkle nodes needed to authenticate the sensor’s Bloom filter
of its keys, where N is the number of sensors deployed. After deployment, every sensor listens to a common
channel. During this period, each sensor broadcasts the Bloom filter of its α preloaded keys along with the
lgN Merkle values needed to authenticate its Bloom filter and ID. Every sensor stores the ID and Bloom
filters for each of its neighbors for the duration of the key distribution procedure.
When the key broadcasting begins, a sensor only accepts a key from a neighbor if the key exists in
the Bloom filter associated with the neighbor’s ID. This scheme is vulnerable to two attacks. First, an
attacker may try to assume another sensor’s identity by rebroadcasting the packets containing a legitimate
sensor’s ID, Bloom filter, and Merkle values and then rebroadcasting keys that it hears the legitimate sensor
broadcast during key initialization. In Section 6.2.4, we explain why an attacker could benefit from such a
strategy. However, such an attack can be detected if any legitimate sensor overhears a key broadcast twice
claiming to be from the same ID since each key is to be broadcast only once. Alternatively, the malicious
device can be detected if the sensor that is the victim of identity theft overhears the attacker using its keys
and ID. Such detection will happen with high probability in relatively dense sensor networks. It is an area of
future work to quantify the optimal strategy for an attacker to try rebroadcasting legitimate packets while
remaining undetected.
The second type of attack is for the malicious devices to generate arbitrary keys that hash to all 1’s in
a legitimate sensor’s Bloom filter. In 6.3, we analyze the effort required by an attacker to generate these
arbitrary keys and see that somewhere on the order of tens to hundreds of arbitrary keys must be generated,
on average, for an attacker to create such a key. Also, increasing the size of the Bloom filter can greatly
increase the effort required to generate arbitrary keys.
Another way to combat such an attack is to keep track of the number of keys received from any one
neighbor and alert an authority when the number of keys received exceeds some threshold that may indicate
misbehavior. In applications that require greater immunity to this attack at the expense of storage and
communication overheard, each key could be placed as a leaf in the Merkle tree, resulting in α×N leaves for
the tree instead of only N leaves. This would allow each broadcasted key to be authenticated individually.
3If a sensor’s post-deployment location is known prior to deployment, then the techniques from [129] can be used to reduce
the amount of communication required to verify that a sensor’s leaf is legitimate.
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6.2.3 Initialization Phase
The goal of the initialization phase is to ensure that each pair of neighbors knows a unique subset of keys at
the end of the process. The length of the initialization process depends on how large α must be to achieve
the desired probability that all links have a unique set of keys and the amount of channel contention. We
assume that broadcasts are sent using CSMA/CA to reduce collisions. In Section 6.3, we analyze what values
of α are appropriate for a deployment.
Neighbor pairs are expected to share a unique subset of keys because of the channel and spatial diversity
in the network. The primary form of diversity is from the channel switching of the protocol. The only
constraints we make on the channel switching algorithm are: (1) each of a sensor’s α keys are broadcast
during the initialization phase, (2) that each broadcast from a sensor is, on average, overheard by a subset
of d/c neighbors, where d is the expected number of one-hop neighbors of the sensor and c is the number
of channels available, and (3) a different subset of neighbors overhears each of a sensor’s broadcasts, with
high probability. Thus, channel selection gives diversity in the subset of neighbors that overhears each of a
sensor’s key broadcasts.
This is illustrated in Figure 6.2 where E is a neighbor of A, B, and C. We refer to a key that is known
by both A and B as a shared key. In Section 6.2.4 and Section 6.2.5, we elaborate on how the shared keys
are used to generate a link key for the sensor pair. The link key is the secret symmetric key that A and B
use for secure communication. When C broadcasts a key, the probability that A and B are both listening
to the channel on which C broadcasts is (1/c)2. Given that A and B are listening to the same channel on
which C broadcasts, the probability that E is not listening to that channel is 1− (1/c). When this occurs,
A and B have a shared key that can keep the link secure against eavesdropping by E.
The spatial diversity comes from the fact that two neighbors, say A and B, may overhear broadcasts
from different sets of common neighbors. Consider the scenario in Figure 6.2 where A and B are one-hop
neighbors that are both within range of C and D. However, C and D are not within range of each other.
Thus, for example, if one of A and B’s shared keys comes from a broadcast by C, then D will not know that
key and, hence, A and B’s link can use the overheard key from C to secure the link from being compromised
by D. Similarly, if one of A and B’s shared keys comes from D’s broadcast, then the link can be made secure
against eavesdropping by C. Therefore, over the course of several broadcasts, the link between A and B is
expected to eventually be secure against eavesdropping by both C and D with high probability.
Another form of diversity from the wireless channel comes from uncorrelated packet loss. Thus, even if
A, B, and E all listen to the channel on which C broadcasts a key, E may receive a packet in error that A
and B receive correctly. In this case, A and B learn a key that E does not know. Packet loss can occur, for
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Figure 6.2: One-hop neighbors A and B can both overhear broadcasts from C and D. However, C cannot
overhear broadcasts from D and vice versa. E is a one-hop neighbor of A, B, and C.
example, due to noise and interference degrading the received signal.
If two sensors happen to end up close to each other, our protocol still provides some security from
diversity. Two cases need considered. The first is when two sensors are close enough to have the same set of
one-hop neighbors, but still far enough apart to have uncorrelated packet loss. In this case, the sensors may
still receive a different set of keys since they are switching to different channels and experiencing different
packet losses. The second case is when the sensors are within the coherence distance [130] of each other. In
this case, the diversity in key sets still exists since the sensors are switching to a different set of channels.
6.2.4 Key Discovery Phase
When the initialization phase completes after the specified time, to determine a link key, sensors must discover
which keys are known by its neighbors. To reduce communication overheard, we use Bloom filters [4] to
advertise key sets in a compact manner.
A sensor creates a Bloom filter for advertising its keys by including each of the α keys that it transmitted
and some of the keys it overheard from the broadcasts of others. We denote the set of keys that a sensor u
overheard from other neighbors as Ku. In Section 6.2.6, we discuss how to deal with an attacker who sends
out a filter packet that spoofs the address of a legitimate sensor (e.g., claiming the source of the filter is
sensor u when it is not). Sensor u then chooses a key subset of size γ to advertise in its filter (i.e., γ is a
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predetermined constant that, with high probability, is less than |Ku|). Since the sensor knows the source
of each of its overheard keys, an upper limit, λ, is placed on how many keys in this advertised subset come
from any one neighbor. This avoids giving disproportionate influence to any one neighbor in establishing
link keys. The sensor creates its advertisement by placing each of these α+γ keys into an s-bit Bloom filter.
Thus, to place key k in the filter, a sensor sets the bits H1BF (k), H
2
BF (k), . . . , H
h
BF (k) to one. A sensor also
computes and stores the hash values associated with each of the keys that it overheard or transmitted during
the initialization phase so that it can check its key hashes for inclusion in the Bloom filters of its neighbors.
Using CSMA/CA the sensors broadcast their s-bit filters.
Upon receiving a Bloom filter from one of its neighbors, a sensor checks to determine which subset of
keys it shares with the sender of the filter. Assume that sensor u overhears a Bloom filter advertisement
from sensor v. Node u checks to see which of its known keys are included in v’s filter. For each key for
which all h associated bits are set in the filter, u adds the key to the list of keys it potentially shares with v.
Because Bloom filters are susceptible to false positives (but not false negatives), u may add a key to the list
that is unknown to v. In Section 6.2.5, we describe how this list of keys is verified. After a filter has been
received from each of u’s neighbors, it has a list of keys that it believes to be shared with each neighbor.
For security, we can require that a sensor only participates in the key establishment phase with neighbors
that share some minimum number of keys, η, with the sensor. η can be determined based on the expected
number of keys a link should share such that, with high probability, their subset of shared keys is unique.
We note that η is similar to the q value in [90].
Now, u tries to determine a unique subset of keys that it shares with each neighbor and creates a link
key that will be used for future communication. The set of keys that sensor u believes it shares with sensor
v is denoted as Kuv. To try creating a shared key with v, u chooses a subset of Kuv of size η. It creates
the link key, kuv, as the hash of these η shared keys: kuv = hash(k1||k2|| . . . ||kη), where k1, k2, . . . kη ∈ Kuv.
Node u will try to verify kuv during the key establishment phase described in Section 6.2.5.
If a sensor determines that it does not share at least η keys with some neighbor, then a few options
exist. First, it can choose not to use the link. In a dense network, not being able to use a few links may be
acceptable. Alternatively, the sensors can request that the sensors do another initialization procedure at a
later time to try adding the links,4 though such a technique would require some authentication mechanism
for the request to avoid attackers spuriously sending such requests. Another option is to use one of the
multipath reinforcement mechanisms described in [90] if enough trust exists among its neighbors to do so.5
4If another link key initialization procedure occurs, sensors that established link keys previously do not try to re-establish a
new link key.
5Multipath reinforcement [90] allows a sensor pair, A and B, that do not share η keys to use m shared neighbors,
nbr1, . . . , nbrm to establish a key if A and B both already share η with each of these m neighbors.
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6.2.5 Key Establishment Phase
The final phase of the protocol is the key establishment phase. At this point, each sensor knows of a subset of
keys that it believes it shares with each of its neighbors (sometimes this belief may be erroneous as discussed
below). Furthermore, as we show in Section 6.4, with high probability, this subset of keys is unique to that
sensor pair. Each sensor has a list of unique filters received in the key discovery phase. We refer to this
as the filter list. In key establishment phase, a sensor, u, challenges its neighbor, v, with the key kuv that
it generated in the previous phase. Specifically, u sends a random nonce, RN , encrypted by key kuv to v
along with a Bloom filter containing the η keys that compose kuv. We refer to this packet as a Link Request
(LREQ). Thus, LREQ = (v||u||{RN}kuv ||BF (kuv)), where BF (kuv) is a Bloom filter containing the hashes
of the keys that compose kuv. We note that the size of BF (kuv) should be much smaller than the Bloom
filters send during the advertisement phase since, typically, η ≪ α + γ. In Section 6.2.6, we discuss how to
deal with an attacker who sends out a LREQ packet that spoofs the address of a legitimate sensor (e.g.,
claiming the source of the LREQ is sensor u when it is not).
When v receives the LREQ, it searches Kv to determine if it believes it knows every key in BF (kuv). If v
can decrypt the LREQ correctly using the keys that u used to compose kuv,
6 it will reply with a Link Reply
packet (LREP ). The form of this packet is LREP = (u||v||{RN + 1}kuv ). Once u receives the LREP and
verifies that the incremented value of RN is correct, the link key is established and, with high probability,
kuv is known only to u and v.
It is possible that v is not able to decode u’s LREQ correctly for one of two reasons. First, there could
have been a false positive when u determined its shared keys from v’s advertisement and it used the key
that caused this false positive to compose kuv. The second reason is that a false positive occurred when
v determined the keys that composed kuv from the Bloom filter in u’s LREQ. If one of these two event
occur, then v can reply with its own LREQ to u using some different subset of keys that it believes the
two sensors share. If the sensors are unable to agree on a shared key after some specified number of LREQ
exchanges, then can resort to one of the methods described in the previous section (i.e., do not establish the
link, request another link key initialization procedure, or use multipath reinforcement [90]).
6.2.6 Neighbor Address Authentication
We note that an attack could occur during the key discovery or key establishment phase whereby an attacker
spoofs the identity of another node in the filter, LREQ, or LREP packet. A malicious device could initiate
6We assume well-known fields are in the encrypted part of the LREQ so that a sensor can verify that it correctly decrypted
the random nonce.
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a Sybil attack [92] by spoofing multiple addresses in this manner. In this case, a legitimate node, v, may
receive two different packets claiming to be from a neighbor, u. One of the packets is actually from sensor u
while the other one is spoofed by the adversary. In this case, v has no way of identifying which set of known
keys are actually associated with u. If the v chooses the wrong set, it may end up establishing a pairwise
key with the malicious device thinking that it is sensor u.
To guard against this attack, we propose using Merkle trees and one-way hash chains for a challenge-
response system. Each sensor is loaded with the root of another Merkle tree (i.e., separate than the key
authentication tree discussed in Section 6.2.2). The leaves of this Merkle tree consist of hashing the con-
catenation of the sensor’s ID with a hash chain commitment (described below) for the sensor. Thus, the
leaf for sensor u is HM (u||HCu), where HCu is the chain commitment for u. The sensor is also loaded with
the lgN values necessary to authenticate the leaf with its ID and hash chain commitment, as discussed in
Section 6.1.4.
The hash chain works as follows. The commitment of the chain is obtained by applying multiple one-way
hashes to an initial value known to only the sensor associated with the commitment. For example, suppose
that RNu is a random nonce known to only u initially. In this case, HCu = Hc(Hc(. . . Hc(Hc(RNu)) . . .)),
where Hc is a one-way hash function for generating hash chains. Thus, if we denote RNu as v0, then the
i-th value (i > 0) of the hash chain, vi, is vi = Hc(vi−1). Thus, for a chain of length l, HCu = vl−1.
The hash chain is then revealed, as needed, in order starting with the value preceding HC in the chain.
That is, the first time a sensor needs to authenticate itself using the chain, it will send the value vl−2. Recall
that HC = vl−1 = Hc(vl−2). Thus, since Hc is a one-way function, it is computationally infeasible for any
sensor other than the owner of the hash chain to derive vl−2 prior to its initial broadcast. Additionally,
any sensor than knows the HC for the broadcasting node can verify vl−2 by testing that HC = Hc(vl−2).
Choosing a sufficiently long value for the hash chain represents a tradeoff in the number of challenges that
a device can respond to on one hand and the computation required to compute/verify chain values on the
other hand. We note that hash chains have been used for symmetric key authentication in other wireless
networks applications [131,132].
Each device broadcasts it hash chain commitment value along with the lgN Merkle tree nodes to au-
thenticate the commitment to its neighbors. When the authentication of a filter packet, LREQ, or LREP
is needed, a device will reveal the next value on its hash chain. If the most recent value that the sensor
broadcasted was vi, then it will next broadcast vi−1. A sensor can pessimistically authenticate each filter,
LREQ, or LREP packet that it sends, or do so only in response to a challenge by a neighbor. Such a
challenge could come, for example, in response to a sensor receiving two different packets claiming to be
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from node u, or if it receives a single packet which it suspects may spoofed.
Alternatively, instead of using hash chains, we could use another two-level Merkle tree as described in
Section 6.6.1. In this approach, each sensor would have k leaves in its Merkle tree and each leaf would
be the hash of the sensor’s ID with one of k random nonces. To authenticate in this scheme, the sensor
would include a previously undisclosed random nonce and broadcast the Merkle tree nodes necessary for
authentication.
We note that such an approach is not infallible. In particular, an attacker could learn the necessary
authentication values for a sensor, u, in one part of the network and transmit them out-of-band to another
part of the network for a malicious device to assume u’s identity. Such an attack is beyond the scope of our
work. Another shortcoming is when packet loss occurs, an adversary may rebroadcast a legitimate node’s
most recent hash chain value. A sensor that did not receive the legitimate node’s original disclosure of the
hash chain value, but did receive the adversary’s rebroadcast of the value will consider the adversary’s packet
authenticated. So, while this approach is not perfect, it does provide another level of security that makes
address spoofing more difficult.
6.3 Analysis
In this section, we present analysis, followed by simulation in Section 6.4. We use the notation in Table 6.1
and Table 6.2. This analysis is approximate and only considers a limited case (i.e., where only nodes within
range of each other are considered and the attacker is passive) in order to see the trends that arise. We
consider two sensors, u and v, that have duv common neighbors (duv excludes u and v) that are not within
range of an eavesdropper, w. We are interested in the probability that the link key generated by u and v
is known by w in the system. Thus, our analysis does not consider multiple, colluding adversary devices.
Nor does it consider an attacker that is broadcasting its own set of α keys during the initialization phase.
However, the simulation in Section 6.4, addresses these scenarios.
In our analysis, w has duvw neighbors that are shared by u, v, and w (duvw excludes u, v, and w). Thus,
the total number of shared neighbors for u and v is duv + duvw. In our analysis, we consider only sensors
u, v, and the duv and duvw shared neighbors of u and v. In a real network, there may be many sensors
within range of one of the sensors (i.e., u or v), but not the other one; this is not captured by our analysis.
In Section 6.4, we simulate the protocol in a more realistic setting. We then derive the probability that u
and v share at least one key in their key establishment phase that is unknown to w (and, hence, the link is
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secure against eavesdropping by w). In the analysis, we assume an ideal MAC layer with no collisions. In
Section 6.4, we simulate the protocol using a more realistic MAC layer.
Table 6.2: Analysis notation.
Notation Description
duv Shared one-hop neighbors of sensors u and v (excluding u and v) that are not within range
of w
duvw Shared one-hop neighbors of sensors u and v that are also shared by sensor w (excluding u,
v, and w)
pe Probability of a packet loss
ph Probability a sensor in overhears a key that is broadcast by one of neighbors
Xuv Random variable indicating the number of keys known to both u and v that originated
from either u or v’s α keys.
Xduv Random variable indicating the number of keys known to both u and v that originated
from their duv neighbors.
Xduvw Random variable indicating the number of keys known to both u and v that originated
from their duvw neighbors.
Ecomp Event that u and v’s link is compromised by w (i.e., w overheard all of u and v’s η keys).
Econn Event that u and v’s link is connected (i.e., u and v share at least η keys).
f False positive rate for Bloom filter
pa Probability an attacker creates an arbitrary key that will be accepted as a legitimate key
The probability that a sensor hears a key broadcast by one of its neighbors is: ph =
1
c
(1 − pe), where c
is the number of channels and pe is the packet loss probability. Now, we look at the probability a link is
connected and not compromised for given values of α and η. We do not consider the effects of λ or γ in
our analysis (refer to Table 6.1 for parameter meanings). Instead, we assume that a sensor advertises all
its keys and places no maximum on the number of keys included from any one neighbor (i.e., λ). These
assumptions simplify the analysis. In Section 6.4, we incorporate the γ parameter to avoid having arbitrarily
large advertisement packets.
Recall that η is the number of keys that u and v must share to have a link. Thus, we first determine the
probability with which u and v share this many keys. We partition the keys known by both u and v into
three sets: (1) those keys that came from either u or v’s set of α keys (indicated by the random variable
Xuv), (2) those keys that came from their duv neighbors that are not within range of w (indicated by the
random variable Xduv), and (3) those keys that came from their duvw neighbors that is within range of w
(indicated by the random variable Xduvw). We now present equations of the probability density functions
for these three random variables.
Each random variable has a binomial distribution [133]. ForXuv, there are a maximum of 2α keys possible
and each one is in the shared set with probability ph. This is because the originator of the key (either u
or v) knows that key with probability 1 and the non-originator will have heard the key with probability ph.
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Thus, we have:
Pr[Xuv = x] =
(
2α
x
)
pxh(1− ph)2α−x , when 0 ≤ x ≤ 2α (6.1)
The expressions for Xduv and Xduvw are similar to Equation 6.1 but have different parameters. The
maximum number of keys that can come from these sets are duvα and duvwα, respectively. The probability
(for both Xduv and Xduvw) that a key is in u and v’s shared set of keys is p
2
h since both u and v overhear
such a key with probability ph. This gives us:
Pr[Xduv = x] =
(
duvα
x
)
p2xh (1− p2h)duvα−x , when 0 ≤ x ≤ duvα (6.2)
Pr[Xduvw = x] =
(
duvwα
x
)
p2xh (1− p2h)duvwα−x , when 0 ≤ x ≤ duvwα (6.3)
Now, we can derive the probability that u and v are connected, or Pr[Econn] (i.e., they share η keys
overheard during the initialization phase).
Pr[Econn] = Pr[Xuv +Xduv +Xduvw ≥ η]
=
∑
i+j+k≥η
Pr[Xuv = i] · Pr[Xduv = j] · Pr[Xduvw = k]
(6.4)
Next, we find the probability that a link is compromised given that it is connected (i.e., Pr[Ecomp|Econn]).
For this, we note that if u and v share even one key from a common neighbor that is not w’s neighbor, then
w cannot compromise this link since, by design, such neighbors are are not overheard by w. Therefore, we
need to sum over the event space where Xduv = 0 and (Xuv +Xduvw) ≥ η.
Pr[Ecomp|Econn] =

Pr[Xduv = 0] · 2α∑
i=0
duvwα∑
j=max(η−i,0)
pihp
j
h Pr[Xuv = i] · Pr[Xduvw = j]

/Pr[Econn] (6.5)
Given these expressions, we can now compute the probability that u and v’s link is connected and not
compromised:
Pr[Ecomp ∧ Econn] = (1− Pr[Ecomp|Econn]) · Pr[Econn] (6.6)
Based on these expressions, we generated some numerical results. Due to the O(α3) complexity of
Equation 6.4, we had to make a simplification to achieve an acceptable computation time. The simplification
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is that we do not consider u and v’s keys to be a separate partition of the key space. Instead, we include
them in the duvw set of keys to reduce the algorithmic complexity to O(α
2). Again, since our analysis is
approximate, the numerical results only serve to show trends whereas the simulation results in Section 6.4
capture effects that are ignored in our analysis. To generate these numerical results, we set η = 10, duv = 0,
duvw = 11, and pe = 0.01.
Figure 6.3 shows the fraction of links that are connected as a function of α and Figure 6.4 shows the
fraction of links the are connected and not compromised.7 We note that the curves in Figure 6.3 and
Figure 6.4 are the virtually the same for all but the c = 1 case. This means that, for the curves where c > 1,
a link is secure with high probability given that it is connected. For the c = 1 case at lower α values, we can
see that the connectivity is approximately one, but a significant fraction of links are compromised. Thus, for
the c = 1 case, connectivity does not correlate to a link not being compromised as strongly as it does when
c > 1.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  50  100  150  200
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Li
nk
 is
 C
on
ne
ct
ed
c = 1
c = 2
c = 3
c = 7
c = 12
α
Figure 6.3: Connectivity of legitimate sensors vs. α.
We note that the trends in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 are the same as the corresponding Figure 6.7
and Figure 6.8, respectively, in Section 6.4. However, there are some differences when compared to these
simulation results. First, the security of the c = 1 case is higher in the analysis than in simulation. This
is because in the analysis we only consider one eavesdropper, whereas 30% of the sensors are colluding
adversaries in the simulation results. Also, the connectivity of the c = 2 and c = 3 cases is higher in the
analysis. This is because the analysis only considers an ideal MAC layer with no collisions. In the simulation,
when the number of channels is relatively low, the contention is higher and, hence, the number of packets
7These figures are plotted on the same scale as Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Due to
computation time, we were not able to extend the curves as far in the analytical numerical results.
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Figure 6.4: Secure connectivity of legitimate sensors vs. α.
a node receives is reduced. Finally, the connectivity for the c = 7 and c = 12 cases is lower in the analysis
than in simulation. When the number of channels is higher, contention is less of a factor. However, the fact
that we are not treating u and v’s keys separately in the numerical analysis reduces the connectivity. This
is because the keys from u and v’s sets of α keys have a ph probability of being in the pair’s set of η keys
whereas in our numerical analysis, such keys only have a p2h probability of being in the shared set of keys.
If duv > 0, then the security of the protocols improves to the point where virtually every connected link
is not compromised. This is shown in Figure 6.5, where we use duv = 3 and plot the probability that a link
is compromised given that it is connected (1 − Pr[Ecomp ∧ Econn]/Pr[Econn] = Pr[Ecomp|Econn]). We note
that for the c = 1 case, our tools do not have enough precision and all probabilities are rounded up to one
(i.e., Pr[Ecomp∧Econn] = 1 and Pr[Econn] = 1, which forces Pr[Ecomp|Econn] = 0 by our numerical method).
Therefore, we do not plot the c = 1 curve. We see that, for the cases we can plot with sufficient precision,
the conditional probability is at least 0.99999. Thus, when duv = 3, Pr[Ecomp|Econn] is virtually zero.
Figure 6.6 shows the fraction of links that are connected and not compromised as a function of the
number of channels. This is comparable to Figure 6.10 in the simulation section (both figures have the
α = 25 and α = 50 cases). In the analysis, when compared to the simulation, the connectivity is lower at a
higher number of channels and higher at a lower number of channels. The reasons for this are explained in
the previous paragraph in relation to Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.5: Probability of link compromise given the link is connected vs. α for duv = 3. Note that the lack
of precision in our numerical method causes the c = 1 case (not plotted) to always be zero.
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Figure 6.6: Secure connectivity of legitimate sensors vs. the number of channels.
6.4 Simulation Results
We simulated our protocol with ns-2 [103]. In each test, 50 sensors are placed uniformly at random such that
the density of the network (i.e., the expected number of one-hop neighbors per sensor) is 10. Each data point
is the average of 30 test runs. The standard deviation for the figures is shown in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4.
The default values used in the simulations for the protocol are: α = 100, γ = 100 (i.e., the advertisement
size, α+ γ, is 200 keys), and η = 10 (i.e., a sensor pair must share at least 10 advertised keys for their link
to be considered “connected”). We set λ = α; in future work, we plan to thoroughly investigate the effects
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of the λ parameter.
Table 6.3: Standard deviation as percentage of mean for Section 6.4 figures with channel curves
(Average | Maximum).
Figure 6.7 Figure 6.8 Figure 6.11 Figure 6.12 Figure 6.13
c = 1 0.00 0.00 43.62 45.00 65.38 224.82 0.45 0.91 44.50 65.42
c = 2 0.44 3.11 2.40 12.52 9.08 31.44 0.57 1.24 9.73 33.31
c = 3 2.91 20.35 3.69 24.45 3.08 13.56 0.68 1.40 7.06 21.36
c = 7 6.01 37.03 5.99 37.03 0.51 3.16 0.57 0.86 12.20 60.10
c = 12 15.89 81.48 15.89 81.48 0.22 0.78 0.49 0.81 14.20 45.14
Table 6.4: Standard deviation as percentage of mean for Section 6.4 figures with α curves
(Average | Maximum).
Figure 6.9 Figure 6.10
α = 25 13.51 50.08 20.29 49.92
α = 50 3.29 12.23 9.10 37.72
α = 75 1.33 5.94 6.38 33.26
α = 100 0.52 2.95 4.872 29.32
To implement the channel switching and key broadcasting discussed in Section 6.2.3, we use the following
algorithms. Sensors are assumed to be synchronized and at fixed intervals (we use 2 s in our tests), all of
the sensors switch to a new channel uniformly at random. Within each fixed interval, if a sensor has not
broadcast all of its α keys, it chooses a time uniformly at random to broadcast one of its remaining keys.
When the parameter is fixed, we set 30% of the sensors, chosen uniformly at random, to be controlled
by a malicious entity. In our tests, these malicious sensors follow the same protocol as the uncompromised
sensors, however, they collude in their knowledge of plaintext keys learned during the initialization procedure.
Thus, collusion among malicious devices is global; we do not restrict them to being neighbors to share their
knowledge. Thus, the attacker is able to compromise a link between two legitimate sensors if their set of
shared keys is found within the union of the sets of keys known by all the colluding malicious sensors.
In our tests, we vary α, c (the number of channels), and the percentage of colluding malicious sensors
and consider the following metrics:
Connectivity: defined as the fraction of links between legitimate sensors in the network that share at least
η advertised keys.
Secure Connectivity: the fraction of links between legitimate sensors that use a key set with at least one
key that it unknown to the colluding malicious sensors.
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In Figure 6.7, we see how increasing α improves the connectivity of legitimate sensor pairs for different
values of c. This is expected since sensor pairs will share more keys when their total number of known
keys increases. We also note that the connectivity improves with a smaller number of channels, since the
probability of a sensor overhearing a neighbor’s broadcast is increased.
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Figure 6.7: Connectivity of legitimate sensors vs. α.
However, as shown in Figure 6.8, using a smaller number of channels is not always good from a security
perspective. In Figure 6.7, using c = 1 gave a connected topology for all values of α. However, in Figure 6.8,
we see that less than half of the connected links for c = 1 remain uncompromised by the attacker. All of the
other values of c > 1 are much more resilient to attacker compromise, though they require a larger value of
α for all of the links to be connected. We note that the reason the c = 1 case does not converge to 70%, as
might be expected since 30% of the sensors are malicious, is due to the high network density. Intuitively,
if all sensors were within range of each other, then one would expect virtually all links to be compromised
provided at least one attacker is in the network.
In Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10, we look more closely at the effect of the number of channels on connectivity
and security. As expected, the connectivity of the network drops as the number of channels increases as
shown in Figure 6.9. The more interesting result is in Figure 6.10, which shows the large benefit obtained
from channel diversity. The reason that the c = 1 case is lower than the c = 2 case is because, despite the
high connectivity of the c = 1 case, the fraction of secure links for the c = 1 case is much lower. Thus, by
adding one extra channel (i.e., c = 2), the protocol’s security is greatly increased. We note that the benefit
from using multiple channel diversity is not possible in the Anderson’s work [6], which uses only one channel
to broadcast plaintext keys.
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Figure 6.8: Secure connectivity of legitimate sensors vs. α.
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Figure 6.9: Connectivity of legitimate sensors vs. the number of channels.
At this point, it is evident that setting c = 2 provides the significant gain in link security (compared
with c = 1) while maintaining very high network connectivity (compared with larger values of c). Thus, one
may wonder what is the utility of setting c > 2. To answer this question, we refer the reader to Figure 6.11,
which shows the fraction of connected links between legitimate sensors that are secure against the colluding
malicious devices as a function of the number of such devices in the network. Though we omit the data, we
note that the connectivity is greater that 90% in each of these tests and for c ≤ 7, the connectivity is greater
than 99% for each test. Thus, all the values of c shown in Figure 6.11 provide much higher connectivity than
is seen in the results for some other key predistribution schemes (e.g., [89, 90]).
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Figure 6.10: Secure connectivity of legitimate sensors vs. the number of channels.
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Figure 6.11: Fraction of links between legitimate sensors that are secure vs. the number of colluding attacker
sensors.
Figure 6.11 shows that having more channels allows connected links to be more secure against the
colluding malicious devices. In particular, for c = 2, when about 15 malicious devices are in the network
(30% of the sensors), some of the links are no longer secure. For c = 3, about 25 malicious devices, 50% of
the sensors, are necessary to start compromising some of the legitimate links. For c = 7 and c = 12, even
with 40 malicious devices in the network, virtually all of the links between legitimate sensors are secure.
We would like to emphasize that this last scenario corresponds to 80% of the sensors in the network being
malicious, which is an extremely hostile setting. Recall that in Anderson’s work [6], only up to about 3%
of the sensors were malicious.
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To test the effect on energy-saving on our protocol, when sensors switch channels once per fixed interval,
it also decides to sleep during the remainder of the interval with probability p. By increasing p, we are able
to consume less energy during the initialization, however the legitimate sensors will also overhear less keys.
The malicious sensors never sleep, so they can still overhear all broadcast keys.
In Figure 6.12, we see that the fraction of the time the legitimate sensors sleep has a linear relationship
with their average power consumption, as one would expect. In Figure 6.13, we show how the security of
the legitimate links decreases as the time spent sleeping increases. Finally, by combining the data from
Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13, we generate Figure 6.14 to characterize the effects of energy-saving on the
security of the protocol. This figure shows that using a small number of channels (i.e., c = 2 or c = 3), gives
us the desirable property that the security increases significantly for small increases in energy consumption,
until a certain point. At this point, to get a security level where virtually all of the legitimate links are
connected and secure requires a much larger increase in energy consumption in our protocol.
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Figure 6.12: Average power consumption vs. the fraction of time legitimate sensors spend sleeping.
6.5 Discussion
We now discuss our protocol in relation to the key predistribution method (e.g., [89, 90, 93, 95]) as well as
the approach of Anderson et al. [6]. In some scenarios, these methods may be preferable to our protocol.
However, we believe properties of our protocol make it desirable in many environments.
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Figure 6.13: Secure connectivity of legitimate sensors vs. the fraction of time legitimate sensors spend
sleeping.
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Figure 6.14: Average power consumption vs. the secure connectivity of legitimate sensors.
6.5.1 Comparison with Predistribution Schemes
We begin with some comparative advantages of our scheme:
• Network Connectivity: As shown in Section 6.4, our protocol is able to achieve close to 100% network
connectivity in many settings without using multipath reinforcement, which requires a sensor pair to
rely on other sensors to establish their link key. Allowing a sensor to communicate with all of its
neighbors is desirable from a performance perspective since it gives more options for forwarding a
packet over a high quality link [134].
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• Localizing Damage from Sensor Compromise: In the other predistribution protocols, every time a
sensor is captured, the entire network becomes slightly less secure since the attacker learns more about
the network’s global key pool. By contrast, our protocol localizes the damage caused by compromised
devices. If an attacker captures many sensors in one region of the network, it does not learn anything
about the link keys being used in another region of the network. This is because our protocol forms
link keys based on the key sets of nearby sensors rather than from a network-wide key set.
Some comparative disadvantages of our scheme include:
• Multihop Key Sharing: In some applications (e.g., [135,136]), it may be desirable for key establishment
to result in shared keys between sensors that are multiple hops away from each other. Predistribution
schemes provide this property since a sensor is as likely to share keys with one-hop neighbors as it is
to share keys with sensors in other regions of the network. Our protocol is localized and, therefore,
establishes keys among only neighboring sensors. Adapting our protocol to establish keys with sensors
multiple hops away is an area for future work.
• Key Set Authentication Overhead and Vulnerability: While key predistribution schemes do have sig-
nificant overhead to advertise their key sets, our protocol has the added overhead of sending Merkle
nodes to authenticate the Bloom filter of the key set that will be broadcast by a sensor. However, we
note that other sensor protocols have been proposed with O(lgN) overhead associated with Merkle
trees (e.g., [129]) and suggested methods to improve this overhead if location information is available.
Additionally, our protocol introduces a vulnerability that is not present in key predistribution schemes
whereby an attacker could generate arbitrary keys that will be accepted as legitimate when broadcast.
However, we have discussed methods to address this problem, such as increasing the Bloom filter size
or increasing the Merkle tree size, in Section 6.2.2.
6.5.2 Comparison with Anderson et al. [6]
Compared to Anderson’s protocol, our protocol is more complex and has more overhead. Additionally, our
protocol requires the availability of multiple channels, which we do not view as a disadvantage since current
sensors [25] already have this capability. We feel that our protocol offers significant comparative advantages:
• Greatly Increased Security: Any adversary that compromises our protocol could also compromise
Anderson’s protocol [6]. However, in many cases, Anderson’s protocol is compromised but our protocol
is not. Anderson’s protocol can provide security no greater than the c = 1 case that is simulated in
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Section 6.4. In the same section, we show that c > 1 significantly improves resilience to colluding
malicious sensors.
• Increased Link Authentication: From the description in Chapter 2, it is easy to see that Anderson’s
scheme is vulnerable to identity theft whereby a malicious device claims a legitimate sensor’s ID and
creates link keys with neighbors using this ID. In our protocol, we preload the sensors with data
necessary to authenticate their ID and key set by a trusted source. We note that the authentication
mechanisms that we use could be adapted for use in Anderson’s protocol.
6.6 Extensions
6.6.1 Incremental Deployment
We assume that incremental sensor deployment is done in a planned manner rather than a completely ad hoc
fashion. When the network is initially set up, the owner is assumed to have accurate knowledge of how many
incremental deployments will occur during the lifetime of a sensor as well as the maximum number of new
sensors that will be deployed each time. The new sensors are deployed in batches rather than individually.
When new devices are added after the initial deployment, sensors start another link key initialization
procedure. A link key initialization procedure after the initial deployment could be triggered by one of
several means. It could be at regular, predetermined intervals when the incremental deployment will happen.
Alternatively, the new sensors could request the initialization procedure on demand by broadcasting their
authenticated Bloom filters. Finally, a trusted source could send packets to the sensors telling them when
to start the procedure. As mentioned earlier, sensors that already have established link keys do not try to
create a new link key during subsequent link key initialization procedures.
Having discussed how the initialization, key discovery, and key establishment phases can be triggered for
incremental deployment, we now propose a modification to the predeployment phase to allow authentication
among existing and new sensors as well as provide a new key set for existing sensors in a space-efficient
manner.
First, we focus on authentication among existing and new sensors since it has a relatively simple solution.
Because incremental deployments are planned, it is assumed that the network administrator plans no more
than I incremental deployment over the lifetime of a sensor. Furthermore, for the i-th incremental deploy-
ment, the network owner knows in advance that no more than Ni sensors will be deployed at that time (we
let i = 0 be the initial deployment). Thus, whenever a sensor is deployed along with its associated Merkle
tree values, it is also loaded with the roots of the next I− iMerkle trees that will be generated by the trusted
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source for future deployments. The trusted source is able to generate these I − i Merkle roots in advance
since the maximum number of sensors that will be associated with each of these I − i Merkle trees is known
in advance. This allows an existing sensor to authenticate newly deployed sensors. To allow newly deployed
sensor to authenticate existing sensors, the new sensors are loaded with the previous i Merkle roots that
were generated for prior deployments. Given that sensors are loaded with these roots by the trusted source,
they can now authenticate the keys of sensors deployed over the previous i generations or I − i generations
in the future.
The second issue that needs to be addressed is how an existing sensor can generate a new set of au-
thenticatable keys to broadcast in subsequent deployments. If a sensor continues using the same α keys for
every initialization phase, this gives the attacker the chance to learn more of the sensor’s preloaded keys. If
the attacker records previously heard LREQ/LREP handshakes, then it may be able to break existing link
keys as more of the preloaded keys are learned. Also, we seek to avoid using α× I extra storage per sensor.
Thus, we present a scheme which requires only α+ 2I − 1 extra storage per sensor. To do this, the Merkle
tree generated in Section 6.2.2 is modified to be a two-level Merkle tree as follows.
Each sensor is again loaded with α unique, secret values. However, rather than use these values directly
as keys to broadcast, they are used to create a hash chain to generate key values. Specifically, each sensor
is loaded with the secret values sv11 , sv
1
2 , . . . , sv
1
α. The first set of keys a sensor broadcasts is generated by
applying a one-way hash function, Hkey , to each of these α secret values. Thus, the first key broadcast when
the sensor is initially deployed is Hkey(sv
1
1) and the last key broadcast during the sensor’s first initialization
procedure is Hkey(sv
1
α). When a new batch of sensors is deployed, the existing sensor must generate keys to
use for its second initialization procedure using a new set of secret values, sv21 , sv
2
2 , . . . , sv
2
α. This is done by
applying a hash function (not necessarily one-way), Hsv, to each of its secret values to generate a new set of
secret values. That is, sv2j = Hsv(sv
1
j ) for j = 1, . . . , α. The keys for the second initialization phase are then
created by applying the one-way hash function Hkey to each of the sv
2
j values. So, the first key broadcast
for the second initialization procedure is Hkey(sv
2
1) and the last key is Hkey(sv
2
α). Figure 6.15 illustrates
this process. Note that in between initialization procedures, a sensor needs store only α secret values rather
than α× I keys.
Now that we have specified a way for a trusted source to generate each of a sensor’s I sets of α keys each
in advance while using only α storage on the sensor, we must create the Merkle tree used to authenticate
the Bloom filter for each set of keys. To do this, we extend the Merkle tree discussed in Section 6.2.2 by
making each leaf node the root of another Merkle tree.8 Thus, each sensor in a given deployment generation
8Though this structure is actually just one larger Merkle tree, we refer to it as a two-level tree for ease of explanation.
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Figure 6.15: Key generation from secret values for incremental deployment. Kij denotes the j-th key broad-
cast by a sensor in the i-th initialization phase. Hkey is a one-way hash function and Hsv is a different hash
function that is not necessarily one-way.
has its own unique second Merkle tree. This second Merkle tree has I leaf nodes, one for each of the I
authenticated Bloom filters corresponding to its key sets. Each sensor is then loaded with the 2I − 1 nodes
from its second Merkle tree to authenticate its Bloom filters along with the lgN nodes from the primary
Merkle tree to authenticate the root of its second Merkle tree.
An example of a two-level Merkle tree is shown in Figure 6.16. In this example, N = 4 and I = 4.
Without loss of generality, consider the second sensor in the deployment. It is loaded with the four Bloom
filters necessary to authenticate its key sets, BF 21 , BF
2
2 , BF
2
3 , and BF
2
4 . The filters are then hashed to
form the leaves of its local Merkle tree. This local Merkle tree is constructed as described in Section 6.1.4
to generate root R2. This process is repeated for the three other sensors as well. Using these four roots as
leaves, the primary Merkle tree is constructed with root R0. The second sensor is then loaded with all the
nodes from the subtree rooted at R2 as well as the lgN nodes from the primary tree necessary to authenticate
root R0. The sensor must be loaded with all of the nodes rooted at R2 in order to ensure each of its I Bloom
filters can be authenticated.
6.6.2 Path Diversity
In this section, we explore another type of diversity that can be used to further improve our protocol. Ideally,
we would like to take scenarios where our protocol achieves, say, 99% secure links and augment the protocol
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A = HM (R1||R2)
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2
3 ||BF 24 )
Figure 6.16: Two-level Merkle tree for incremental deployment. In this example, we have four sensors and
four Bloom filters per sensor for the sets of keys on that device. BF ij refers to the Bloom filter for the keys
of the i-th sensor for the j-th initialization procedure.
to get, say, 99.9999% secure links. Thus, we consider the idea of path diversity, illustrated in Figure 6.17.
In this example, assume that the link between U and V is compromised, but all the links on the paths
U → A → V and U → B → C → V are secure. U can send a key, k1, along the U → A → V path and a
key, k2, along the U → B → C → V path. V could then create a secure link key, kuv by combining k1 and
k2 (e.g., kuv = k1 ⊕ k2). Provided that the intermediate sensors are trusted, U needs to have only one path
to V that has all secure links in order to form a secure key.
We note that this is similar to the multipath reinforcement scheme proposed in [90]. However, in [90],
multipath reinforcement was proposed to combat node compromise. By contrast, our path diversity scheme
aims to address link compromise. Thus, generally, multipath reinforcement algorithms need to discover node
disjoint paths whereas we need discover only link disjoint paths. A node disjoint algorithm guarantees link
disjointness, but a link disjoint algorithm need not necessarily find a node disjoint path. However, we have
found that there is little benefit to considering paths longer than two hops (i.e., using a shared neighbor
of U and V ) and the algorithm complexity increases significantly. In this case, node disjointness and link
disjointness between two nodes are equivalent.
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V
Figure 6.17: Example topology for demonstrating path diversity.
Analysis: Given a that links are secure with probability9 p, the probability of using one shared neighbor
for path diversity increases the probability that the link is secure to:
Pr[Link secure using one shared neighbor] = 1− (1− p)(1 − p2)
= p(1 + p− p2)
(6.7)
If 2-hop paths via N shared neighbors are used, we get:
Pr[Link secure using N shared neighbors] = 1− (1− p)(1− p2)N (6.8)
The benefit from using longer link disjoint paths can be considered by looking at the scenario where there
are N shared neighbors and M 3-hop paths:
Pr

 N shared neighbors are compromised and
at least one of M 3-hop paths is secure

 = (1− p2)N (1− (1 − p3)M ) (6.9)
Simulation Results: To test path diversity, we augmented our ns-2 code to determine the link security
if shared neighbors are used. We did some testing using 3-hop paths between two nodes. To do this, we
performed the Hopcroft-Karp matching algorithm [110] on the bipartite graph generated with one set of
vertices consisting of u’s one-hop neighbors and the other set of vertices consisting of v’s one-hop neighbors
(where u and v are the nodes that are using path diversity). Hopcroft-Karp finds the maximal matching on
9We note that this analysis assumes independence among link compromises which is not always true. Later we use simulations
to determine the effectiveness of path diversity when correlations may exist in link compromises.
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a bipartite graph, resulting in the discovery of the maximum number of 3-hop paths between u and v. Our
simulations showed virtually no improvement from using 3-hop paths over using two-hop paths, so we did
not further pursue methods of finding longer link disjoint paths.
In Figure 6.18, we show an example scenario from one run where using path diversity does effectively
reduce link compromise from over 10% to zero. Note that in this figure, the y-axis is inverted from our
graphs in Section 6.4 and now shows the fraction of compromised links. The x-axis is the number of shared
neighbors a link is allowed to use to try to improve their security. This demonstrates that it can be useful
to use more than one shared neighbor.
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Figure 6.18: Example topology that benefits from path diversity.
However, when averaging over multiple runs, we found that it is difficult reach 100% security when some
fraction of the links are initially compromised. Figure 6.19 shows an example where the fraction of secure
links in the network plateaus regardless of how many paths are used. The x-axis is the maximum number
of shared neighbors that a link is allowed to use to try to improve their security.
Unfortunately, we discovered that it is difficult to reach 100% link security even when the initial fraction
of secure links is relatively high. To investigate why, we looked in more detail at the (c = 2, α = 40) case.
From Figure 6.8, we see that these parameters give a high fraction of secure connectivity that is still less
than one.
Table 6.5 shows how path diversity affects five individual runs. Each run used the same input parameters
except for the random seeds used to generate the topology and run the simulations. Of the three runs
that did not result in all links being securely connected, two of them improve to one when just one shared
neighbor is used. However, in Run 2, the topology never becomes completely securely connected regardless
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Figure 6.19: Security improvements using path diversity.
of how many shared neighbors are used. Instead, it plateaus after one shared neighbor is used at 0.978.
Table 6.5: Fraction of connected links that are secure using shared neighbors.
Run Number Maximum number of shared neighbors used
0 1 . . . 7
1 1.0 1.0 . . . 1.0
2 0.968 0.978 . . . 0.978
3 1.0 1.0 . . . 1.0
4 0.989 1.0 . . . 1.0
5 0.982 1.0 . . . 1.0
The reason for this is that some topologies are compromised such that some sensors are partitioned from
their neighbors with respect to secure links. For example, in Run 2, we discovered the topology shown in
Figure 6.20. The dashed lines represent compromised links and the solid lines represent secure links. In this
example, we see that A can used shared neighbors to form a secure key with B, but cannot form one with
E or F since the compromise is such that there exists a partition. If E, F , and H do not have any other
neighbors, then it is impossible for A to form a secure key with any of them regardless of how much path
diversity is allowed.
In conclusion, our research in path diversity has shown that:
• Path diversity can improve the security of some links in our key distribution protocol. Depending on
the topology, in can make all links secure.
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Figure 6.20: Example topology of network security partition. Dashed lines are compromised links and solid
lines are secure links.
• Path diversity’s utility in making all links secure in a wide variety of networks is limited due to the
security partitions which can occur in large randomly deployed topologies.
• Finding the maximum number of link disjoint paths beyond two hops increases algorithm complexity
significantly and gives little improvement over exclusively using two-hop paths.
6.7 Summary
In this work, we have proposed a novel method of symmetric key establishment for a sensor network that uses
channel diversity, as well as spatial diversity, to create link keys for one-hop neighbors. Establishing such
keys is important because public keys are computationally expensive for many sensors. Sharing a symmetric
key with neighbors allows for secure aggregation as well as hash chains authentication, for example.
Via analysis and simulation, we show that our protocol performs well in network connectivity and re-
silience to colluding malicious devices compared with previous work. One result is that using even one extra
channel for broadcasting keys during the initialization phase significantly improves security. From a numer-
ical perspective, our simulations demonstrate that our protocol can achieve over 90% connectivity among
neighboring sensors with link keys that are uncompromised even when 80% of the devices in the network are
malicious and collude.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have considered the problems of saving energy and security in multihop wireless
networks. In Chapter 1, we discuss that wireless networking is a rapidly growing area and discuss the
advantages offered by multihop wireless. We then quantify the importance of the energy-efficiency problem
by presenting data that shows: (1) the energy density of batteries has shown little improvement in recent
years and (2) the radio interface can be a major source of energy drain, particularly in devices with little
or no displays (e.g., cell phones and sensors). We also argue that security research is of great importance
in this domain due to the ease with which the channel can be tapped and the resource constraints faced by
many wireless devices. In Section 1.1, we outline the major contributions of this dissertation.
Having demonstrated the relevance of the problems that we are addressing, we next propose techniques
to address energy efficiency and secure symmetric key distribution. In Chapter 3, we propose techniques that
reduce wasteful listening while checking for signals to wake up a device’s radio. In particular, we propose using
carrier sensing to make wake-up signal checking more efficient for both in-band and out-of-band protocols.
In Chapter 4, we use adaptive sleeping and listening to improve the energy efficiency of in-band protocols.
This compliments our previous work [27–29] that used adaptive techniques for out-of-band protocols.
Chapter 5 focuses on energy efficient broadcast dissemination in power save networks. In particular, we
propose a probabilistic protocol that allows users to reduce energy consumption while maintaining a desired
latency and reliability. Additionally, we implemented our protocol in TinyOS [11] to test it on readily
available sensor hardware.
In Chapter 6, we address security in sensor networks by proposing a pairwise symmetric key distribution
protocol. Unlike previous work, we propose using the underlying channel diversity to address the problem.
In doing so, our protocol shows significant improvements in connectivity and resilience to adversaries when
compared to other protocols.
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7.1 Future Work
In this section, we briefly mention areas of future work based on our thesis. We outline four directions—two
in energy efficiency and two in security.
• Implementation and testing in an application context: Most of our work is tested in simulation with
controlled traffic patterns. To truly quantify and qualify the benefits of our power save protocols, an im-
plementation would be beneficial. As with the implementation of our broadcast protocol in Section 5.3,
we anticipate that many design decisions do not manifest themselves in simulation. Additionally, this
would provide code that users in need of power save could run.
• Power save for multichannel and multi-interface protocols: With the emergence of devices and protocols
that use multiple channels and/or are equipped with multiple interfaces [137–139], it may be interesting
to determine how power save can be used in this realm. All of our energy efficiency work focuses on
either devices with a single channel or two interfaces (one of which is used exclusively for control
messages). While such scenarios are of interest since they are widely used, considering the more
general case of how to design power save protocols for devices with k channels and m interfaces may
be a promising area of future work.
• Quantifying the tradeoffs of public key exchange versus symmetric key approaches in sensor networks:
As mentioned in Section 2.3, we think that the research community could greatly benefit from a rigorous
comparison of using public key exchange on sensors versus the pure symmetric key approaches emerging.
While public key computation does have high computation overhead when compared with symmetric
key operations, they provide many advantages. Public keys are much more secure in binding a key to
an identity and have much less memory and communication overhead. Fully exploring such metrics
would help determine under what circumstances not using public key exchanges is more efficient.
• Exploring other techniques that use diversity for security: In Chapter 6, we have proposed a method
to use channel diversity for security in sensor networks. Traditionally, the focus of wireless diversity is
on performance [137–139] instead of security. A potential area of future work is considering other uses
of diversity for security (e.g., transmission power, channel bitrates, multiple interfaces and channels).
Looking at applications of such diversity to security is a promising area of future work.
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Appendix A
Carrier Sensing Modifications to
Handle Synchronization Errors
In this section, we show the correctness of the modifications to CS-ATIM discussed in Section 3.1.1. As
mentioned previously, we assume that the node’s clocks are always within ∆ seconds of each other. Thus,
∆ represents the maximum error between the clocks of any two nodes in the network. The modifications,
shown in Figure A.1, are as follows. Without loss of generality, we assume that a node with the fastest clock
in the network begins the current beacon interval at time Tf0. Thus, the latest a node’s beacon interval can
begin is:
Ts0 = Tf0 +∆ (A.1)
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Figure A.1: CS-ATIM time synchronization. The shaded area denotes a dummy packet being sent. The
slanted lines represent the ATIM window when ATIM packets can be transmitted. The wavy lines denote
when data packets can be transmitted.
To account for ∆, nodes that have no packets to advertise must wake up ∆ seconds after the beacon
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interval is scheduled according to their local clock. Thus, a node with the fastest clock carrier senses the
channel from time:
Tf1 = Tf0 +∆ (A.2)
until:
Tf2 = Tf1 + Tcs
= Tf0 +∆+ Tcs
(A.3)
A node with the slowest clock carrier senses the channel from time:
Ts1 = Ts0 +∆
= Tf0 + 2∆
(A.4)
until
Ts2 = Ts1 + Tcs
= Tf0 + 2∆+ Tcs
(A.5)
For a node that has packets to advertise, it begins transmitting the dummy packet when the beacon
interval begins according to its local clock and transmits the dummy packet for 2∆+Tcs time. Thus, a node
with the fastest clock transmits its dummy packet from time:
Tf3 = Tf0 (A.6)
until:
Tf4 = Tf0 + 2∆+ Tcs (A.7)
Since Tf3 < Tf1 < Tf2 < Tf4 and Tf3 < Ts1 < Ts2 = Tf4, nodes with the fastest clock and nodes with the
slowest clock are both guaranteed to carrier sense this dummy packet for the specified Tcs length of time. A
node with packets to advertise with the slowest clock will transmit its dummy packet from time:
Ts3 = Ts0
= Tf0 +∆
(A.8)
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until:
Ts4 = Ts0 + 2∆+ Tcs
= Tf0 + 3∆+ Tcs
(A.9)
Since Ts3 = Tf1 < Tf2 < Ts4 and Ts3 < Ts1 < Ts2 < Ts4, nodes with both the fastest and slowest clocks will
carrier sense this dummy packet for the specified time, Tcs.
If a node without packets to advertise detects the channel idle at the end of the Tcs time, it will return to
sleep. However, if the node detects the channel as busy, it will remain on for an additional 3∆ + Taw time,
as show in Figure A.1, for reasons explained below. For a node that does have a packet to advertise, it will
begin sending ATIM packets ∆ seconds after it finishes transmitting the dummy packet. During this ∆ time
gap between the end of the dummy packet and the beginning of the ATIM window, the node may receive
packets and reply with ACKs, however, it may not send any ATIMs or data packets during this time. At
the end of the ATIM window Taw seconds later, the node waits another ∆ seconds before it starts sending
data packets. Again, during the ∆ time gap, the node may receive and reply with ACKs, but may not send
ATIMs or data packets. For a node with the fastest clock, it is guaranteed to be on from time Tf4 (the time
it finished transmitting the dummy packet) until:
Tf5 = Tf4 + 2∆+ Taw
= Tf0 + 4∆+ Tcs + Taw
(A.10)
A node with the fastest clock is allowed to transmit during its ATIM window which starts at time:
Tf6 = Tf4 +∆
= Tf0 + 3∆+ Tcs
(A.11)
and ends at time:
Tf7 = Tf6 + Taw
= Tf0 + 3∆+ Tcs + Taw
(A.12)
For a node with the slowest clock, it is guaranteed to be on from time Ts4 until:
Ts5 = Ts4 + 2∆+ Taw
= Tf0 + 5∆+ Tcs + Taw
(A.13)
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A node with the slowest clock is allowed to transmit during its ATIM window which starts at time:
Ts6 = Ts4 +∆
= Tf0 + 4∆+ Tcs
(A.14)
and ends at time:
Ts7 = Ts6 + Taw
= Tf0 + 4∆+ Tcs + Taw
(A.15)
Because Tf4 < Ts6 < Ts7 = Tf5, a node with the fastest clock is guaranteed to be listening during the
entire ATIM window of a node with the slowest clock. Similarly, because Ts4 = Tf6 < Tf7 < Ts5, a node
with the slowest clock is guaranteed to be listening after its dummy packet transmission during the entire
ATIM window of a node with the fastest clock.
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Appendix B
Minimum Energy Routing Proof
Sections B.1, B.2, and B.3 give instances of known NP-complete problems [140, 141]. We use these for the
reduction in our proof in Section B.4.
B.1 Steiner Tree Problem (ST)
INSTANCE: An undirected graph G = (V,E), an edge cost function c : E → N , a subset S ⊆ V of
required vertices.
SOLUTION: A subtree of G that includes all the vertices in S. This is called a Steiner tree. Note that
vertices in V \ S may be included in the Steiner Tree and are called Steiner vertices.
MEASURE: Sum of the edge weights in the subtree.
B.2 Steiner Tree With Unit Edge Weights Problem (ST-UE)
A proof to show that ST is NP-complete is based on a reduction from the exact covering by 3-sets prob-
lem [140]. The ST proof [140] answers the following decision problem: given an undirected bipartite graph
G = (V,E), a subset of vertices S ⊆ V , and an integer B, is there a tree T in G that spans all of the S
terminals and has at most B edges?
By design, the ST proof [140] shows that ST is NP-complete even if the cost function is c : E → 1. Thus,
we know that even though ST-UE (defined below) is a limited case of ST, it is still NP-complete.
INSTANCE: An undirected graph G = (V,E), an edge cost function c : E → 1, a subset S ⊆ V of required
vertices.
SOLUTION: A subtree of G that includes all the vertices in S.
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MEASURE: Sum of the edge weights in the subtree.
We can see that the measure in ST-UE is equivalent to the following measure:
MEASURE 2: The number of edges in the subtree.
Trivially, minimizing the number of edges in a subtree also minimizes the number of vertices in the
subtree since VT = ET + 1.
B.3 Steiner Tree on Bidirected Graphs (ST-BG)
Any instance of ST (which, of course, includes ST-UE ) can be reduced to ST-BG by replacing every
undirected edge eij ∈ E with two directed edges eij and eji1 and giving both of the directed edges the same
cost as the original undirected edge. Then, any one node in S, which we denote r, is chosen as the root.2
Thus, the ST-BG problem (also called the Steiner arborescence problem [140]) is defined as follows.3
INSTANCE: A bidirected graph G = (V,E), an edge cost function c : E → 1, a subset S ⊆ V of required
vertices, and a root vertex, r.
SOLUTION: A directed subtree of G such that there exists a path from r to every vertex in S.
MEASURE: Sum of the edge weights in the subtree.
The corresponding decision problem is: given an instance of ST-BG, is there a solution such that the
sum of the edge weights is less than W?
B.4 Minimum Energy Routing for Multilevel Power Save (MER)
We now define the MER problem and show that it is NP-complete using a reduction from ST-BG. As
described in Section 4.2, we only consider the latency induced by the power saving protocol because this
delay tends to be larger relative to contention and queuing delay in the networks that we consider. Thus,
the li term mentioned below is only a function of a node’s power save state and not a function of the number
of flows that it and its neighbors are forwarding.
1The notation eij denotes an edge between i and j in the undirected case and a directed edge from i to j in the directed
case.
2In the undirected case, declaring a root is unnecessary since every node can reach every other node in the tree. In the
directed case, we specify a root to create a structure which ensures that the root can reach every other node in the tree.
3We skip the general definition of ST-BG, where c : E → N , and just focus on the version with unit edge weights.
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INSTANCE: A bidirected graph G = (V,E), a set of flows F (i.e., a set of source-destination tuples), a
maximum end-to-end latency threshold for a path L, and k the number of power save states available
to each node. Each power save state has an associated latency, li, and energy consumption, gi (where
1 ≤ i ≤ k). For i < j, li ≤ lj and gi ≥ gj. When a node is in PS state i, its energy consumption is gi
and the latency cost of all its incoming edges is li.
SOLUTION: A set of power save states for each node such that each flow in F can be routed without L
being violated for any of the flows.
MEASURE: Sum of the energy consumed by the power save state (i.e., gi) of each node in the network.
The decision problem that we use for MER is: can we assign power save states for an instance of MER
such that the sum of the energy consumed by the power save state of each node is less than Y ?
It is easy to verify that MER is in NP. Given a set of PS states for each node, all of the link costs in the
network can be fixed (i.e., the appropriate value of li for all incoming links to a node). Then, we do shortest
path routing on the weighted graph obtained by using latencies as edge weights for each flow in F and verify
that the cost of each path is less than L, which can be done in polynomial time. Additionally, we verify that
the sum of all the power save states is less than Y which can be done in polynomial time.
For convenience, we consider a special case of MER where:
• k = 2
• g1 = 1 and g2 = 0
• l1 = 1 and l2 = |V |
• L = |V | − 1
• All flows originate from one sender
• A flow is capable of satisfying the latency constraint. This can be checked in polynomial time by
placing all nodes in their highest energy state and computing a flow’s shortest path cost. If this cost
is greater than L, then we can immediately decide that the instance of MER is unsolvable.
By showing that the above special case of MER is NP-complete, we will have proved the general MER
problem to be NP-complete. We do so with a reduction from ST-BG. We show that given any instance of
the ST-BG problem, it is possible to construct an instance of the MER problem such that the instance of
ST-BG has a total edge weight less than W if and only if the MER instance has a total energy consumption
less than W + 1.
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Given an instance of ST-BG, we convert it to an instance of MER as follows. The graph, G, from ST-BG
is used as the graph in MER. The root, r, from ST-BG is the one sender in our special case of MER and
each vertex in ST-BG’s S set corresponds to a receiver in MER.
Now, we need to show that an instance of ST-BG has a total edge weight less than W if and only if the
corresponding MER instance has a total energy consumption less than W + 1.
If ST-BG Has Total Edge Weight < W : Then, we select all of the nodes in ST-BG’s subtree to remain
in PS state 1 while all other nodes are put in PS state 2. Since the cost of each edge in the tree is 1
and there can be at most |V | − 1 edges in the tree, then the latency must be less than or equal to L.
This is because each of the selected nodes has an incoming latency of l1 = 1 and there can be at most
|V |−1 edges in the tree since there are |V | nodes total. Thus, the total latency is at most L = |V |−1.
Since there must be at most W − 1 edges in the subtree, there can be at most W nodes in PS state 1
and, thus, the sum of the energy consumption in the network is less than W + 1.
If MER Has Total Energy Consumption < W + 1 and the Latency ≤ L = |V | − 1: Then, all the nodes
on every routing path must be in PS state 1 or else the latency would be greater than L (since one
node in PS state 2 would make the latency at least |V | > L). Thus, each node on the routing paths is
using one unit of energy. Therefore, if the total energy consumption is less than W + 1, then at most
W nodes in the network are using one unit of energy and the source can reach all receivers. Since the
source, each receiver, and all intermediate nodes on the paths form a tree with at most W nodes, we
have a subtree with at most W − 1 edges.

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Appendix C
PBBF Interfaces and Packet Formats
in TinyOS
C.1 Packet Formats
C.1.1 SimplePbbfMsg
typedef struct SimplePbbfMsg {
/* Source can be either the broadcast source or a predefined UART address */
uint16_t source;
/* A broadcast sequence number that is unique per source */
uint8_t seqno;
/* How many hops the packet has traveled from the broadcast source */
uint8_t hopCount;
/* The p value that the node should use */
uint8_t pVal;
/* The q value that the node should use */
uint8_t qVal;
/* The r value that the node should use */
uint8_t rVal;
/* Sequence number of the test run for this packet */
uint8_t runSeqno;
/* Timestamp for stats (granularity = 1/921.6 kHz) */
uint32_t latency;
} __attribute__ ((packed)) SimplePbbfMsg;
/* packed attribute removes field padding on Mica2 architecture */
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C.1.2 PbbfStatsMsg
typedef struct PbbfStatsMsg {
/* Source ID of the node reporting the stats */
uint16_t nodeId;
/* Total amount of data packets sent by SimplePbbfBcast */
uint16_t totalDataSent;
/* Total amount of data packets resent according to the r parameter */
uint16_t totalDataResent;
/* Total data packets received by SimplePbbfBcast (includes duplicates) */
uint16_t totalDataRecv;
/* Total application level packets received (duplicates suppressed) */
uint16_t totalAppRecv;
/* Average end-to-end latency from broadcast source to this node */
uint32_t avgLat;
/*****
* Fraction of time the node’s radio was not sleeping
* 0=0%, 255=100%, uniform spacing between
*****/
uint8_t fracOnTime;
/* Sequence number of the test run for which stats are being reported */
uint8_t runSeqno;
} __attribute__ ((packed)) PbbfStatsMsg;
/* packed attribute removes field padding on Mica2 architecture */
C.1.3 UARTMsg
UARTMsg can be of type either SimplePbbfMsg or PbbfStatsMsg.
C.2 Interfaces
C.2.1 PBBF Interface
interface PbbfControl {
/*****
* Each parameter can be set to one of 11 discrete values corresponding
* to probability values between 0.0 and 1.0 spaced uniformly.
*****/
command void setPLevel(uint8_t);
command void setQLevel(uint8_t);
command void setRLevel(uint8_t);
}
interface PbbfNotifier {
/* Signals PBBF module when a sleep decision needs made */
event result_t sleepDecisionPoint();
/* PBBF tells the signaling module whether or not to sleep */
command void setSleep(bool);
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}C.2.2 Broadcast Send Interface
interface BcastSender {
/* Used by the application to send a broadcast packet */
command result_t send(TOS_MsgPtr);
event result_t sendDone(TOS_MsgPtr, result_t);
}
C.2.3 Stats Handling Interface
interface PktStats {
/* A packet was sent, bool tells whether it was a control packet */
command void SentPkt(bool);
/* A packet was received, bool tells whether it was a control packet */
command void RecvdPkt(bool);
/*****
* Collect the stats from the received packet. uint32_t is the
* latency of the packet since it was sent by the source.
*****/
command void HandleRecvdStats(TOS_MsgPtr, uint32_t);
/* Signal that the stats have been handled */
event result_t HandleRecvdStatsDone(TOS_MsgPtr);
}
interface RadioPktStats {
/* Signal to the stats module when the radio switches on and off */
event result_t radioPoweredOn();
event result_t radioPoweredOff();
}
interface ReportStats {
/*****
* Used by the stats collection module to transmit collected stats
* back to the sink.
*****/
command result_t ReportStats();
event result_t ReportStatsDone(result_t);
}
interface PbbfStats {
/*****
* Signal to the stats module when PBBF sends a packet twice
* according to the r parameter.
*****/
event result_t didSecondSend(TOS_MsgPtr);
}
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C.2.4 Control Packet Handling Interface
interface NetworkInit {
/*****
* Signals a component when a control packet has
* been received to initialize the current test run
* for an application. The input parameters gives a
* unique sequence number to identify the test run.
*****/
event result_t isInitialized(uint8_t);
}
interface PktHandler {
/*****
* When a control packet is received, pass it to the
* control packet handling module.
*****/
command result_t handle(TOS_MsgPtr);
event result_t done(TOS_MsgPtr, result_t);
}
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